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Abstract: This paper delivers a contemporary estimate of the Eurozone’s natural real rate of 
interest. While it is found that the natural real rate has declined substantially between 1997 
and 2015, it has not become negative. Thus, even in the presence of low inflation and nominal 
interest rates at the zero lower bound, the Eurozone does not face an acute threat of secular 
stagnation as defined by Lawrence Summers. Similarly, it is deemed unlikely that a number 
of ‘headwinds’ or a demise of technological growth will lead to a secular decline of the 
Eurozone’s economic growth. At the same time, it is found that the Eurozone faces a rather 
profound threat of ‘diversity stagnation’, as large inter-state differences impair the efficiency 
of its single monetary policy. Combined with the insufficient enforcement of fiscal rules, this 
erodes the Eurozone’s economic potential as well as its stability. Far-reaching reforms of the 
monetary and fiscal framework could overcome the detrimental status quo. However, 
conflicting economic and political incentives among the different member states and 
governments render the implementation of a necessary reform unlikely. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
When the global financial crisis reached its peak seven years ago, the Western world entered 
what is known today as the ‘Great Recession’: A prolonged period of slow growth whose 
impact is still painfully felt in many economies. While the academic world struggled to 
explain the unusually slow recovery from the crisis, Lawrence Summers (2014a) added a new 
momentum to the debate when he reintroduced Hansen’s (1938) ‘secular stagnation’ 
hypothesis. According to this theory, the ‘natural’ real rate of interest (the rate which equates 
savings and investment under full employment) may have become negative in some Western 
economies. If the inflation rate is low and the nominal interest rate – which is restricted by the 
zero lower bound – cannot be lowered further, this would prevent conventional monetary 
policy from adequately stimulating demand and, hence, economic growth. The economy 
could then fall into a self-enforcing era of economic stagnation unless bold monetary and 
fiscal stimuli and far-reaching structural reforms are implemented.   
While an academic consensus on the occurrence of secular stagnation has yet to be 
reached, many observers agree that the Eurozone is much more susceptible to this threat than 
any other Western economy (with the possible exception of Japan). In most of its member 
countries, levels of GDP per capita are still lower than they were before the crisis. Rates of 
inflation and economic growth remain low despite nominal interest rates close to the zero 
lower bound. Levels of public debt and unemployment, on the other hand, have reached 
alarming levels. In addition to that, large differences among the Eurozone’s member states 
complicate the implementation of adequate monetary and fiscal policies to counter these 
developments. Because of this, a vibrant debate has recently emerged on whether the 
Eurozone might suffer from secular stagnation as defined by Summers (2014a). 
However, while many scholars argue that the Eurozone’s natural real rate of interest might 
have become negative, their proposals often remain largely theoretical and lack sufficient 
empirical backing. The present analysis aims to fill this gap by delivering a contemporary 
estimate of the Eurozone’s natural real rate. Doing so will deliver two important contributions 
to the debate on secular stagnation. Firstly, a comparison of this result with the ‘actual’ real 
rate and the inflation rate will allow for a formal test of the occurrence of secular stagnation in 
the Eurozone. And secondly, as the natural real rate is an important determinant in the 
monetary policy rule defined by Taylor (1993), the author’s estimates may also be used as a 
benchmark for assessing whether the ECB’s single monetary policy constitutes an adequate 
response to the threat of secular stagnation. If it is found that the Eurozone is in fact ill-
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equipped to counter this threat, the present analysis will additionally aim at identifying 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policy measures. 
While the empirical estimation of the Eurozone’s natural real rate should be regarded as 
the main contribution of the present analysis, the threat of secular stagnation will also be 
investigated under alternative definitions. Some scholars have argued that, even if the 
Eurozone should not be subject to a persistently negative natural real rate, it might still be 
threatened by secular stagnation if the latter is defined as a long-term decrease of potential 
output growth per capita. Gordon (2012) has proposed that such a decrease might be triggered 
by a number of ‘headwinds’ (such as a decline in working-age population growth), and 
authors such as Kasparov and Thiel (2012) consider a slowdown of technological growth as a 
likely cause. Hence, in order to investigate the threat of secular stagnation in the Eurozone in 
its entire magnitude, these alternative definitions are tested as well.  
Based on these considerations, the present paper aims at bringing some clarity to the vivid 
debate on secular stagnation. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed: 
1. Does the Eurozone face a serious threat from secular stagnation 
a. in the short to medium term due to a decline in the natural real rate of interest?  
b. in the long run due to a number of ‘headwinds’ or slow technological growth? 
2. What are the implications of a declining natural real rate for the Eurozone’s              
monetary policy? 
3. To what extent is the Eurozone’s monetary and fiscal policy affected by the large 
degree of diversity among its members? 
4. Can the Eurozone’s economic outlook be improved by means of monetary and/or 
fiscal reform? 
 
1.2 Structure of the Analysis 
After this first section has defined the objective and primary research questions of the present 
paper, the subsequent analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 delivers an overview of 
Summers’ (2014a) secular stagnation hypothesis and explains how this theory is linked to 
shifts in the natural rate of interest. An investigation of the main drivers of the natural rate 
shows why the threat of secular stagnation is often regarded as particularly acute in the case 
of the Eurozone. Based on these considerations, Section 3 offers a contemporary estimate for 
the Eurozone’s natural real rate and a subsequent discussion of the implications for the threat 
of secular stagnation. The adequacy of these results is underlined by a variety of robustness 
checks and by a number of additional considerations, such as the inclusion of land.                  
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Section 4 investigates whether the Eurozone is likely to experience a long-term decrease of 
potential output growth per capita due to Gordon’s (2012) headwinds or a slowdown in 
technological growth. Section 5 assesses the appropriateness of the ECB’s single monetary 
policy against the background of a declining natural rate. The analysis is conducted for the 
Eurozone as a whole as well as on the aggregated group level and the individual country level. 
The term ‘diversity stagnation’ is coined in order to define the primary weakness of the 
Eurozone’s monetary framework. Based on these findings, Section 6 additionally highlights 
the shortcomings of the Eurozone’s fiscal policies and investigates whether the Eurozone 
could benefit from a far-reaching reform of its monetary and fiscal framework. Several 
possible scenarios are presented, and the likelihood of their implementation is discussed by 
means of the theorem of the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Section 7 concludes the analysis and 
delivers recommendations for future research. 
Throughout the paper, many of the Eurozone’s most important macroeconomic 
developments are analyzed in detail. As these developments often strongly vary among its 19 
different member countries, it was deemed necessary to aggregate them into adequate country 
groups. Accordingly, the following arrangement has been maintained in the remainder of the 
analysis. The Core group contains the long-term members whose economies have been rather 
successful in overcoming the financial crisis and the Great Recession. The Periphery group 
includes the long-term members who experienced the most significant economic hardships 
during these periods. Finally, the New group consists of those members who consecutively 
acceded to the Eurozone following the year 2007. An exception has been made for Cyprus: 
while it became a member country in 2008, it was deemed to be rather comparable to the 
countries of the Periphery. Hence, the three groups were organized as follows: 
The Core group:      Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg  
        and the Netherlands 
The Periphery group:      Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
The New group:      Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia 
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Figure 1: Change in GDP and GDP per Capita for Major Developed Economies      
(Index = 2007), 2000-2019 
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2. The Threat of Secular Stagnation in the Eurozone 
2.1 The Great Recession and Weak Economic Recovery 
From the year 2007 onwards, the unfolding of the US subprime mortgage crisis and the global 
financial crisis paved the way for a significant decline in the world economy. However, the 
impact of this decline was unequally felt across the globe. While many developing and 
emerging countries – most notably India and China – saw their economic growth largely 
unimpaired, most Western economies experienced the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression (Stiglitz 2010). Consequently, in order to depict the analogy to the global crisis of 
the 1930s, the resembling downturn of our time has been labelled the ‘Great Recession’.1 
Figure 1 illustrates its impact on economic growth in the developed world:
2
 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by the IMF (2015) 
Not only did the economies displayed in Figure 1 experience a significant contraction 
following the year 2007, but their growth rates also remained low after the initial decline was 
overcome. As a result, it took all of these economies several years to reach their pre-crisis 
level of economic performance. Canada experienced the fastest economic recovery, as its 
                                                          
1
  While it has become common among academics and the media to refer to the aftermath of the financial crisis 
as the Great Recession, it has to be noted that the term is not always used synonymously. In its academic 
sense, a recession only refers to the contraction phase of a business cycle (Claessens, Kose and 
Terrones 2009). As such, the Great Recession lasted from 2007 to 2009 in the case of the USA (and similarly 
for many other Western countries) and was a true global recession only in the year 2009 (IMF 2009). On the 
other hand, a wide range of authors define the Great Recession more broadly as the time period during which 
the impact of the global financial crisis continued to weight on the Western economies. According to this 
logic, the Great Recession lasted much longer and might still be ongoing, as many economic hardships 
continue to persist in the aftermath of the actual contraction. As these hardships are particularly felt in the 
Eurozone (as will be shown in Section 2.3), the present analysis defines the Great Recession in its broad 
sense as the time period since the global financial crisis. 
2
  Estimations start after 2011 for the United Kingdom, after 2012 for the United States and after 2013 for the 
remaining countries. Scandinavia is defined in its strictest sense and hence only consists of Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden. The Eurozone’s composition was adjusted over the time period displayed in Figure 1, 
as almost half of its current member countries have entered the monetary union after the year 2000. In the 
case of Scandinavia and the Eurozone, each member country has been weighted according to the relative size 
of its GDP in each year. Unless stated otherwise, the same procedure has been chosen for all subsequent 
charts. 
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GDP reached the pre-crisis level in the year 2010. The remaining economies did not achieve 
this task until the years 2011 (Eurozone and USA), 2012 (Scandinavia), 2013 (Japan) 
and 2014 (United Kingdom). The recovery required even more time in the case of GDP per 
capita – as of 2015, three major economies (the Eurozone, Scandinavia, and the United 
Kingdom) have not yet reached their respective pre-crisis level. 
The significant reduction in economic performance reflects unfavorable developments in 
most economic indicators, such as an increase in unemployment and a decrease in investment 
and international trade. As shown by Figure 2, the value of goods traded by the Western 
economies experienced a much larger decrease than their GDP and GDP per capita. Post-
crisis growth was low as well, and many of those economies still traded less in 2014 
compared to 2007:
3
 
 Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by UN Comtrade (2015) and the St. Louis Fed (2015) 
Many economists expressed astonishment regarding the recovery of most Western 
economies, which was widely considered as unusually slow even after allowing for the severe 
impact of the financial crisis (Goodwin et al. 2013). While severe recessions had taken place 
in the preceding decades as well, the same economies had always resumed their pre-crisis 
growth rates after a much shorter period of time: 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the OECD (2015) 
                                                          
3
  The trade flows include the total of all HS commodities. All values were initially expressed in current US$ 
and have been adjusted using data on headline inflation provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (2015). A detailed analysis of this “mystery of the missing world trade growth” is provided by 
Armelius, Belfrage and Stenbacka (2014). 
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Figure 2: Change in Imports and Exports for Major Developed Economies               
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Figure 3 highlights a number of earlier recessions, such as the 1970s energy crisis or the 
recessions of the 1980s and 1990s. In all of these cases, economic growth in the Western 
economies recovered relatively fast, often even surpassing pre-crisis growth rates after a short 
time. This illustrates the severity of the Great Recession in a historical context and justifies 
the analogy with the Great Depression of the 1930s. But Figure 3 also delivers a second 
important insight: for most Western economies, average growth has continuously declined 
during the previous decades. Eight years after the global financial crisis, these economies 
seemingly remain trapped within an equilibrium of slow growth. 
 
2.2 The Secular Stagnation Hypothesis and its Recent Popularity 
Against this background, Summers (2014a) expressed the concern that Western economies 
might suffer from more profound constraints than just from a ‘normal’ cycle of slow growth. 
Referring to a theory formulated by Hansen (1938), he reintroduced the term ‘secular 
stagnation’ in order to describe what he considered as a long-term decline in the potential of 
Western economies. This theory is intrinsically tied to developments in the natural real rate of 
interest introduced by Wicksell (1898), which equates savings and investment under full 
employment.
4
 The difference between the natural real rate and the real rate of interest (the 
nominal rate of interest minus the inflation rate) determines to which degree the central 
bank’s monetary policy stimulates the economy. Table 1 highlights how the relationship 
between real rate 𝑟 and natural real rate 𝑟∗ influences an economy’s inflation gap (?̃?), output 
gap (?̃?), and unemployment gap (?̃?):5  
Table 1: The Natural Real Rate of Interest and Monetary Policy 
 𝑟 = 𝑟∗ 𝑟 < 𝑟∗ 𝑟 > 𝑟∗ 
?̃? 0 ↑ ↓ 
?̃? 0 ↑ ↓ 
?̃? 0 ↓ ↑ 
Source: Woodford (2003) 
Only if the real rate corresponds to the natural real rate, the economy operates at potential. 
In this case, inflation is at target and the output and unemployment gaps are closed. If the real 
rate falls short of the natural real rate, the result is an increase in inflation and output gap, and 
                                                          
4
  The natural rate is also known by a variety of other names, such as equilibrium rate, neutral rate, or 
Wicksellian rate. While all of these designations are common in the prevalent literature, this analysis only 
refers to it as the natural (real) rate of interest. 
5
  The inflation gap is defined as actual inflation minus the inflation target. The output gap is specified as GDP 
minus potential GDP. The unemployment gap corresponds to the unemployment rate minus the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
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vice versa (Woodford 2003).
6
 As the natural real rate is not directly observable, the central 
bank has to rely on estimations when deciding upon the optimum policy rate.
7
 Within this 
setting, Summers (2014a) formulated his (new) secular stagnation hypothesis. He argues that 
a chronic excess of savings over investment (or, to put it differently, a prolonged shortfall in 
aggregate demand) cannot be reversed by conventional monetary policy if the natural real rate 
of interest has become significantly negative, trapping the economy in a state of sluggish 
growth. This problem can be illustrated by a simple loanable funds model:
8
 
Source: Author’s illustration following Krugman (2000) and Summers (2014a) 
Let I and S denote the demand for investment and the supply of savings at full 
employment. Furthermore, r is the real interest rate, r* is the natural real interest rate and π is 
the inflation rate. In Figure 4a, I and S intersect in the positive area and r* is significantly 
larger than 0. If r* and π are correctly estimated by the central bank, it can set a nominal 
interest rate which equates savings and investment at full employment. In Figure 4b, the 
demand for investment decreases – triggered, for instance, by a decline in the working age 
population or by a lack of profitable investment opportunities. If the decrease is large enough, 
it is possible that I and S now intersect in the negative area. The result is a negative r*, but as 
it is still located above the inverted inflation rate, it can be targeted by the central bank as 
well. But if investment demand falls even further, the economy can enter a situation where r* 
lies below the inverted inflation rate (see Figure 4c). As the nominal interest rate is 
                                                          
6
  Woodford (2003) dedicates an entire chapter of his work to an analysis of the natural rate of interest in the 
context of monetary policy. He shows how “increases in output gaps and in inflation result from increases in 
the natural rate of interest that are not offset by a corresponding tightening of monetary policy […], or 
alternatively from loosenings of monetary policy that are not justified by declines in the natural rate of 
interest.” He does not mention the unemployment gap, but due to the tradeoff between unemployment and 
losses in a country’s GDP (Okun 1962), this variable was included nevertheless. 
7
  However, as will be further elaborated in Section 3, estimates of the natural rate are surrounded by a high 
degree of uncertainty. 
8
  While emanating from different considerations, the secular stagnation hypothesis shares many features with 
the ‘liquidity trap’ hypothesis, such as the focus on low inflation and the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates. The similarity of both concepts has also been acknowledged by Krugman (2013, 2014). For 
this reason, Figure 4 is based on the notation used in Krugman (2000). A more in-depth representation of 
secular stagnation using the loanable funds model has been provided by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014).  
Figure 4: Secular Stagnation in the Loanable Funds Model 
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constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), there is no achievable real interest rate which 
equates savings and investment at full employment. Hence, conventional monetary policy 
cannot provide sufficient stimulus to elevate the economy from a state of low demand. 
Economic growth remains sluggish and the economy will continue to operate below potential, 
leading to disinflation and leaving output and unemployment gap open. This is what 
Summers (2014a) defines as secular stagnation.
9
 
The reintroduction of the secular stagnation theory by Summers (2014a) has been met with 
widespread recognition, as many scholars regard it as a comprehensible explanation for the 
weak performance of most Western economies.
10
 A vivid debate has emerged on the optimum 
policy response, as only unconventional measures – such as raising inflation (expectations) 
through quantitative easing (QE) or boosting demand through expansionary fiscal policy – 
may lift an economy from a state of secular stagnation (Duprat 2015). In this analysis, it is 
argued that the sudden rise of the theory’s popularity can be explained by at least four factors. 
Firstly, the global financial crisis has indeed resulted in a tremendous decline in the Western 
countries’ demand for investment, as illustrated in Figure 5: 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the IMF (2015) and the World Bank (2015) 
                                                          
9
  However, it has to be recognized that the term ‘secular stagnation’ is not always used synonymously – as 
Eichengreen (2014) put it, “Secular Stagnation […] is an economist’s Rorschach test. It can mean different 
things to different people.” In the prevalent literature, there exist at least two interpretations of secular 
stagnation apart from the one provided by Hansen-Summers. The first one defines secular stagnation as a 
long-term decrease in potential output growth due to a number of ‘headwinds’. This interpretation is 
delivered by Gordon (2012), who argues for the existence of six ‘headwinds’ (in Gordon 2014, he reduces 
the number to four – demographics, education, inequality, and government debt). The second interpretation 
focuses on the inhibitive effect of balance sheet recessions on economic growth. Authors such as Koo (2011, 
2014) and Lo and Rogoff (2015) argue that unsustainable levels of debt in the years leading to the financial 
crisis have triggered an extensive process of deleveraging, and that economic growth will remain sluggish as 
long as this process prevails. While the three different interpretations share many common characteristics, 
they also differ in important aspects. A detailed comparison is provided by Pradhan et al. (2015), who also 
show that the three interpretations are mutually exclusive (the authors label this phenomenon as the 
“impossible trinity” of secular stagnation). In the present analysis, the term ‘secular stagnation’ is always 
used in the sense intended by Hansen (1938) and Summers (2014a) unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
10
 However, it has also received a significant degree of criticism, as will be laid out in Section 2.3. 
Figure 5: Investment-to-GDP Ratios for Major Developed Economies, 1980-2015 
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On average, the share of investment in GDP has dropped by 19.7% (gross capital 
formation) and 21.4% (total investment) between 2007 and 2009. As of 2015, Canada is the 
only economy where the ratios have reached their pre-crisis levels, and growth remains low in 
all of the economies. In a simple loanable funds model (see Figure 4), this would constitute a 
significant shift of the demand curve to the left. 
Secondly, unfavorable developments in many of the drivers of investment demand – both 
in the short and in the long run – indicate that aggregate demand may continue to grow at low 
levels. As an example of a short-term development, Figure 6 displays the surge in 
unemployment following the financial crisis: 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the OECD (2015) 
Beginning in the year 2008, all of the economies listed in Figure 6 experienced significant 
increases in their unemployment rates, especially in youth unemployment. While these rates 
have largely decreased between 2010 and 2015 (with the exception of the Eurozone, which 
saw a second increase following the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis), they still remain 
above the pre-crisis rates for all economies but Japan. As a contrast to the short-term increase 
in unemployment rates, Figure 7 presents the decline in working age population growth rates, 
which is a long-term evolution common to all major Western economies: 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the OECD (2015) 
Figure 6: Change in Unemployment and Youth Unemployment Rates for Major 
Developed Economies, 2000-2015 
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Figure 7: Working Age Population Growth Rates for Major Developed Economies, 
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As of 2013, the working age population was either declining or growing at very low levels 
for all economies displayed above.
11
 As can be seen from the 5-year averages, this does not 
represent a cyclical, but rather a truly secular development which is unlikely to be reversed in 
the near future. As demand for consumption and investment is primarily driven by the 
working age population, higher unemployment rates
12
 and a decline in the working age 
population growth indicate a lower growth of aggregate demand in the short and long run. 
Hence, both of these short- and long-term developments suggest that a significant shortfall of 
demand may require a long time to be reversed. 
Thirdly, all major Western economies exhibit low inflation rates and even lower short-term 
nominal interest rates, as illustrated by Figure 8:
13
 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the BoJ (2015), Eurostat (2015), the OECD (2015) and 
the St. Louis Fed (2015) 
After the onset of the Great Recession, short-term nominal rates were sharply reduced in 
all major Western economies. As of 2015, Canada and the United Kingdom display the 
highest rates, at 0.89% and 0.54%, respectively. The remaining economies have reduced their 
rates to levels close to the zero lower bound. Core inflation rates are low as well, amounting 
to 2.4% and 1.8% for Canada and the USA and to less than 1% for the remaining economies. 
As has been illustrated in Figure 4, low inflation coupled with nominal interest rates close to 
the zero lower bound may be problematic if the natural real rate declines. If actual real rates 
                                                          
11
  In the case of the Eurozone, data for all current member countries has been aggregated (with the exception of 
Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, and Lithuania). Each member country has been weighted according to the relative size 
of its population (as has also been done in the case of Scandinavia). In order not to distort the implications 
drawn from the trend growth line, the increase in working age population due to the German reunification is 
not reflected in Figure 7. 
12
 Higher unemployment leads to lower demand not only among the unemployed, but also among the employed 
population, as those who still have a job reduce consumption and investment as well if they sense a higher 
degree of uncertainty on the labor market. Hence, the inhibitive effect of unemployment on growth may be 
much larger than indicated by the unemployment rate only. 
13
 As they do not form a monetary union, aggregating the Scandinavian countries’ interest and inflation rates 
would deliver a misleading result. Therefore, these countries are not represented in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: Nominal Interest Rates and Core Inflation Rates for Major Developed 
Economies, 1965-2015 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
%
Year
Short-Term Interest Rate
Canada Japan United Kingdom United States Eurozone
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
%
Year
Core Inflation Rate
11 
 
cannot be reduced to the level of a significantly negative natural real rate, conventional 
monetary policy may be deprived of its chances of stimulating the economy. 
As has been shown so far, recent developments indicate that a decline in the natural real 
rate may have taken place in the Western countries, that such a development is unlikely to be 
reversed in the near future, and that these countries are ill-equipped to counter negative 
natural rates due to low inflation and the zero lower bound on nominal rates. A final factor in 
explaining the popularity of the secular stagnation hypothesis can be found in the detailed 
information available for the USA, especially concerning the development of the natural rate. 
Figure 9 presents Laubach and Williams’ (2003) updated estimate of the natural rate. 
According to these authors, the US-American natural real rate has experienced a continuous 
decline during the past 50 years and has even dropped into the negative territory after the 
onset of the Great Recession. When taking both the zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates and low core inflation rates into account (see Figure 8), this signifies that a further 
decline in either the natural rate or the inflation rate would pose a threat of secular      
stagnation (see Figure 4). 
Source: Laubach and Williams (2003)                                     Source: Summers (2014b),,, 
Summers (2014b) shows how this development coincided with a sequential downward 
trend in the predictions made on the U.S. economy’s potential GDP (see Figure 10), which he 
considers as indicative for the inhibitive effect of a declining natural rate on economic 
growth.
14
 Hence, the current experiences of the US-American economy seem to support the 
secular stagnation hypothesis. 
 
                                                          
14
  While it was estimated in the year 2007 that the economic potential would amount to almost 21 Trillion US$ 
in the year 2018, this estimate was since reduced to about 19.3 Trillion US$. Hence, Summers argues that the 
reduction in the US-American output gap has not been achieved by an increase in economic performance, but 
rather by a downward correction of its potential GDP.  
Figure 10: Potential GDP Estimates 
for the USA, 2007-2017 
Figure 9: Time-Varying Natural Rate 
for the USA, 1965-2015 
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2.3 The Case of the Eurozone 
The previous section has delivered an overview of the secular stagnation hypothesis 
reintroduced by Summers (2014a). It has also been shown that the theory’s popularity can be 
explained by the fact that it delivers a comprehensible – and seemingly empirically backed – 
explanation to what is perceived as unsatisfactory performance and outlook in many 
developed economies. However, compliance with this view is not unanimous, and a number 
of prominent economists – such as Bernanke (2015), Hamilton et al. (2015), Mokyr (2014a), 
and Taylor (2014)
15
 – have argued against the case of secular stagnation. But while no 
consensus has yet been reached on the threat of secular stagnation for the Western world as a 
whole, there seems to be a rather strong agreement on a certain point – namely, that the 
Eurozone is much more vulnerable than other developed economies.
16
 In the present section, 
it will be investigated to what extent this presumption is justified. 
To begin with, Figure 1 has already shown that the Eurozone’s recovery from the financial 
crisis was much slower compared to most other Western economies. The impact of the Great 
Recession – coupled with the sovereign debt crisis – continues to weigh heavily on many of 
its members, particularly on the Periphery countries: 
 
 
 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,  
                                                          
15
  While all of these – and a number of other authors – reject the proposal of secular stagnation, they avail 
themselves of very different arguments in doing so. Bernanke (2015) considers not a decline in aggregate 
demand for investment, but rather a global increase in desired savings – the ‘savings glut’ – as causative for 
weak economic growth. Within the loanable funds model (see Figure 4), this would translate into a rightward 
shift of the S-curve instead of a leftward shift of the I-curve. Hamilton et al (2015) argue that a state of a low 
(or even negative) natural real rate is not necessarily self-enforcing, and that the natural real rate may evolve 
back to a higher ‘normal’ level without the aid of extraordinary policy measures. Mokyr (2014a) brings 
forward that current technological progress (especially within fields such as nanotechnology, genetic 
engineering, and artificial intelligence) may lead to a boost in the productivity of Western economies. He 
argues that the effects are widely underestimated today, since aggregate statistics such as GDP and TFP – 
which “were designed for a steal and wheat economy” – do not properly capture productivity gains stemming 
from these fields. Finally, Taylor (2014) considers inefficient economic policies as the main reason for the 
financial crisis and the weak recovery of most Western economies. He puts forward that the market was 
deeply disrupted before the crisis by the Fed’s low interest policy and the loose enforcement of financial 
regulations as well as by a large number of policy measures which were implemented afterwards. He argues 
that the financial crisis and the Great Recession – and, consequently, the fear of secular stagnation – would 
have turned out less severe without these “deviations from rule-based policies that had worked in the past.” 
16
  Buiter, Rahbari and Seydl (2014) analyze the risk of secular stagnation for the Eurozone, Japan, the UK, the 
USA, and a number of emerging markets and conclude that “the threat […] is probably most serious in the 
Euro area”. Crafts (2014) regards the Eurozone as “much more vulnerable” to the threat of secular stagnation 
than the USA, concluding that the Europeans “should be much more afraid than the Americans”. While they 
consider most of the developed world to be in danger of secular stagnation, Posen and Ubide (2014) argue 
that the Eurozone “has made that situation worse for itself” by means of counterproductive policy measures. 
And Duprat (2015) considers the Eurozone “not well equipped to manage the challenge” and identifies a real 
“danger for Europe of falling into a protracted stagnation.” Krugman (2014) and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) 
highlight the similarities to the Japanese experience and argue that secular stagnation could ensure a 
European version of the ‘lost decades’ if appropriate policy measures are not swiftly implemented. 
13 
 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by the IMF (2015) 
The New country group experienced the fastest recovery from the financial crisis: as 
of 2015, only Slovenia has yet to reach its pre-crisis level of GDP per capita. The 
developments were less favorable in the Core countries, as five out of seven countries have 
not yet reached their pre-crisis level and growth remains low in all countries except Germany. 
But these economic hardships seem to fade when compared to those of the Periphery group, 
whose members all display significantly lower GDP per capita levels compared to 2007. In 
fact, the IMF (2015) expects that the recovery will take until the year 2018 in the case of 
Portugal and Spain, and much longer for the remaining countries in this group. 
This evidence illustrates that slow economic growth is not only significant for the 
Eurozone as a whole, but that its 19 member countries have been subject to the economic 
hardships following the financial crisis to a strongly varying degree. This distinct 
heterogeneity (which will be addressed more explicitly in Section 5) is one of the (many) 
reasons for which the Eurozone is often seen as particularly vulnerable towards secular 
stagnation. First evidence on this threat came from Summers (2014b) himself, who has shown 
that the Eurozone’s economic performance was not only far below its potential during recent 
years, but that its potential GDP has also continuously been corrected downwards: 
Source: Summers (2014b) 
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Figure 12: Potential GDP Estimates for the Eurozone, 2007-2017 
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Figure 11: Change in GDP per Capita in the Eurozone (Index = 2007), 2000-2019 
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In the year 2008, the IMF and Bloomberg databases (on which Summers 2014b bases his 
illustration) expected the Eurozone’s potential GDP to reach more than 10.5 trillion euros by 
the year 2017 (measured in 2005 euros). This estimate was consecutively reduced to less than 
9.5 trillion euros, which will probably still be much larger than the Eurozone’s actual GDP in 
the year 2017. According to Summers (2014b), this large decrease in the monetary union’s 
economic potential cannot only be explained by the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
but is likely to reflect a long-term decline in the natural real rate.
17
 In the following, it will be 
examined whether such a decline may indeed have occurred. According to the formal model 
provided by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), four factors are primarily accountable for such 
a decline: (1) a deleveraging shock, (2) a slowdown in population growth, (3) an increase in 
income inequality, and (4) a fall in the relative price of investment.
18
 
A deleveraging shock takes place if the simultaneous deleveraging effort of a significant 
number of economic entities – either in the private sector, the public sector, or both – creates 
adverse effects for the country’s economic activity. In the case of some Eurozone countries, 
rapid credit expansion in the years leading to the financial crisis resulted in unsustainable 
levels of debt in the non-financial private sector (Cuerpo et al. 2014). After the financial crisis 
and the onset of the Great Recession, this resulted in a significant deleveraging shock in these 
member countries:
19
 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by the World Bank (2015) 
                                                          
17
 As has taken place in the USA, see Figures 9 and 10. 
18
 There are certainly a number of additional factors playing a role as well. For instance, Eichengreen (2015) 
considers the global integration of emerging markets as a major reason for an increase in savings and a 
decrease in investment demand. And Andréz, López-Salido and Nelson (2009) show how the natural real rate 
can be driven down by a technology shock. For the sake of feasibility, however, this analysis considers only 
the primary factors which have been identified by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014). 
19
 Initially, the World Bank’s (2015) measure of domestic credit to the private sector was expressed as % of 
GDP, with levels ranging from 41.1% (Lithuania) to 252.5% (Cyprus) in the year 2014. 
Figure 13: Domestic Credit to the Private Sector in the Eurozone (Index = 2007),     
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As can be seen from Figure 13, the percentage increase in domestic credit in the years 
leading to the financial crisis was particularly large for the Periphery countries and the New 
countries (except Slovakia), but also for some Core countries (such as Finland and the 
Netherlands). Most Eurozone countries (14 out of 19) experienced private sector deleveraging 
between 2007 and 2014. The percentage change was particularly large (above 20%) in the 
case of Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Spain. 
Since private sector deleveraging shocks translate into a significant reduction of consumption 
and investment (Cuerpo et al. 2014), it can be assumed that this development has exerted 
considerable downward pressure on the Eurozone’s natural rate of interest. 
Concerning the slowdown in population growth (the second factor mentioned by 
Eggertsson and Mehrotra 2014), Figure 7 has already illustrated that the Eurozone’s working 
age population was growing slower than those of Canada, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The severity of this development is further illustrated by Figure 14, 
which delivers the growth rate in the population aged 15 to 64 for each Eurozone country. It is 
found that most member countries are currently experiencing a long-term decline in their 
growth rate, which can roughly be traced back until the 1980s. As of 2013 only Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal recorded a positive growth in their working age population (and in 
the case of Italy and Portugal, this seems to have represented a cyclical deviation from the 
significant decline which they had recorded in the preceding years): 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by the World Bank (2015) 
As has been laid out in Section 2.2, the decline in the working age population growth 
indicates a lower growth of aggregate demand for loanable funds in the long term. For the 
Eurozone, this is further exacerbated by the increasing discrepancy between life expectancy 
and retirement age, as can be seen from Figure 15:
20
  
                                                          
20
 In each of the three different country groups, the respective member countries have been weighted according 
to their relative size of their GDP in each year. If information on GDP was not available for a given year, 
Figure 14: Working Age Population Growth Rates for the Eurozone, 1955-2013 
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Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by the OECD (2012) and the UN (2013) 
For each group of countries, the life expectancy of both the male and the female population 
experienced a considerable increase during the last four decades. At the same time, the 
average effective retirement age was continuously reduced until about 1995 and has remained 
low until 2012. As a result, the gap between both indicators has widened in almost every year 
since 1970. This means that the average worker now spends a larger percentage of his   
lifetime being a retiree and a smaller percentage belonging to the working age population.          
Similar to the decrease in working age population growth, this development can be       
expected to reduce demand for investment and consumption, leading to a decline in the 
natural rate of interest. 
While these demographic factors highlight unfavorable developments in almost all member 
countries, the case of income inequality (the third factor mentioned by Eggertsson and 
Mehrotra 2014) delivers a more differentiated picture. Figure 16 illustrates the income ratio of 
the richest quintile relative to the poorest quintile for each Eurozone country: 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) 
As can be seen from Figure 16, income inequality strongly varies among the different 
country groups. Most Periphery countries demonstrate a much higher inequality compared to 
the Core countries, and the three Baltic states are far more unequal than the remaining 
countries in the New group. The development between 2007 and 2013/14 displayed 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
simple averages were calculated instead. Comparative tests have shown that doing so did not significantly 
alter the results. Unless stated otherwise, the same procedure has been chosen for all subsequent charts. 
Figure 15: Life Expectancy and Effective Retirement Age in the Eurozone, 1970-2012 
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Figure 16: Income Inequality in the Eurozone, 2000-2014 
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significant differences between the countries as well, as inequality decreased in five member 
countries (Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, and Finland) and remained at a 
comparable level for two additional member countries (Belgium and Estonia). In the 
remaining countries, however, the income distribution became more unequal. As a result, the 
inequality increased by 3.6% between 2007 and 2013 for the Eurozone as a whole (and by 
18.9% from 2000 to 2013). Further detail on this development is provided by Figure 17. 
Between 2000 and 2013, the Eurozone experienced not only a decrease in the share of 
national income held by the first quintile, but also a decrease in the share held by the second, 
third, and fourth quintile (albeit to a lesser extent). Only the share held by the fifth quintile 
increased significantly. Hence, it can be taken that the Eurozone’s income distribution has 
continuously become more unequal during the most recent years. And, as noted by Eggertsson 
and Mehrotra (2014), such a development may have a negative impact on the aggregate 
demand for investment and hence reduce the natural real rate of interest.
21
 
 
In addition to that, a higher degree of income inequality has often been found to be 
associated with a higher risk of poverty and an increase of material deprivation (see, for 
instance, Lelkes et al. 2009 and Calvert and Nolan 2012). As shown in Figure 18, the risk of 
poverty has increased in 15 out of 19 member countries since the global financial crisis. The 
material deprivation rate has increased in 12 countries. If households are exposed to a higher 
risk of poverty, this translates into a lower demand for investment and consumption 
(especially among risk-averse agents). Similarly, as the material deprivation rate reflects the 
                                                          
21
 Specifically, Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) distinguish between two types of income equality which may 
put downward pressure on the natural real rate: inequality within generations and inequality across 
generations. Information on the Eurozone’s income distribution across different age groups can be obtained 
from Eurostat (2015). However, this data is only available for the years 2005-2014, which was deemed 
insufficient for adequately investigating changes in intergenerational distributions. As a result, the present 
analysis only focuses on inequality within generations. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
L
at
v
ia
G
re
ec
e
C
y
p
ru
s
L
it
h
u
an
ia
It
al
y
P
o
rt
u
g
al
S
lo
v
ak
ia
Ir
el
an
d
M
al
ta
E
st
o
n
ia
S
lo
v
en
ia
S
p
ai
n
G
er
m
an
y
B
el
g
iu
m
F
ra
n
ce
A
u
st
ri
a
F
in
la
n
d
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
%
Risk of Poverty 2007 Risk of Poverty 2013
Material Deprivation Rate 2007 Material Deprivation Rate 2013
0
10
20
30
40
1st
Quintile
2nd
Quintile
3rd
Quintile
4th
Quintile
5th
Quintile
%
2000 2005 2010 2013
Figure 17: Income Distribution in the 
Eurozone by Quintile, 2000-2013 
Figure 18: Material Deprivation and Risk of 
Poverty in the Eurozone, 2007 vs. 2013 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data 
provided by Eurostat (2015) 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data 
provided by Eurostat (2015) 
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“inability to afford a selection of items that are considered to be necessary or desirable” 
(Eurostat 2015), such as not being able to finance a car, an increase in this rate reflects a 
reduction in investment demand. Therefore, it can be concluded that the economic 
consequences of increased income inequality have recently led to a downward pressure on the 
Eurozone’s natural rate of interest. 
Finally, Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) argue that a decline in the relative price of 
investment represents the fourth major reason for a decline in the natural rate of interest. 
According to this rationale, a lower relative price of investment (for instance, due to 
productivity gains owed to advances in information technology and the computer age) reduces 
the required savings rate, as less savings are needed for building the same stock of capital 
(Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014). This in turn drives down the natural rate of interest. 
Figure 19 highlights the decline in the relative price of investment within the Eurozone: 
Source: Artus (2015) 
As can be seen from Figure 19a, the relative price of productive investment (e.g., 
investment in information technology) has been reduced by almost 20% during the last two 
decades. The reduction in the relative price of investment led to falling prices and higher 
productivity in the sectors which produce capital goods and IT products, as illustrated in 
Figure 19b. Per capita productivity has significantly increased in both sectors, but even more 
so in the IT sector (which also was much less affected by the financial crisis). Figure 19c 
shows that the nominal investment rate has been falling relative to the real investment rate 
since the year 1995, with both rates coinciding in the year 2006. This implies that a given 
growth in GDP and capital in real terms could be achieved with a smaller nominal capital 
stock (Artus 2015). Therefore, it can be assumed that the fall in the relative price of 
investment – just as the three factors analyzed before – has led to a reduction of the demand 
for loanable funds, resulting in downward pressure on the Eurozone’s natural rate. 
Figure 19: The Declining Relative Price of Investment in the Eurozone, 1995-2015 
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The present section has highlighted the thread of secular stagnation in the Eurozone based 
on the remarks of Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), who argue that four factors may be 
causative for a decline in the natural rate of interest. It was shown that, in recent years, the 
Eurozone has been subject to unfavorable developments in all four of these factors. It is 
therefore concluded that the Eurozone’s natural rate is likely to have declined, which is an 
essential prerequisite for secular stagnation as defined by Summers (2014a). Based on these 
considerations, Section 3 provides a detailed assessment of the Eurozone’s natural real rate in 
order to empirically assess the threat of secular stagnation. 
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3 The Natural Real Rate and Secular Stagnation in the Eurozone 
3.1 A Contemporary Estimate of the Eurozone’s Natural Real Rate 
3.1.1 Existing Studies 
As has been laid out in Section 2.2, Summers’ (2014a, 2014b) definition of secular stagnation 
is intrinsically tied to developments in the natural real rate of interest. Specifically, a decline 
in the natural real rate coupled with low inflation rates may prevent the real rate of interest 
from becoming sufficiently negative (given the ZLB as a lower limit for the nominal rate of 
interest) to drive the real rate gap below zero. Hence, secular stagnation is formally defined as 
a permanently positive real rate gap coupled with low inflation (Pedersen 2015). It follows 
that, in order to draw conclusions on the presence of secular stagnation in the Eurozone, a 
contemporary estimate of the natural real rate is required. 
Unfortunately, the natural real rate is not directly observable, and its estimation is 
surrounded by a high degree of complexity and uncertainty. So far, no consensus has been 
reached on the optimum methodology, and a number of scholars have offered different 
estimations of the natural real rate for the Eurozone. Commonly applied methods were, 
among others, multivariate structural time series models (Crespo Cuaresma, Gnan, and 
Ritzberger-Gruenwald 2004), consumption-based capital asset pricing models (Browne and 
Everett 2005), as well as variants of Laubach and Williams’ (2003) Kalman filter approach 
(Garnier and Wilhelmsen 2005, Benati and Vitale 2007, Mésonnier and Renne 2007). 
Figure 20 summarizes the findings of these studies:  
Source: Benati & Vitale (2007), Browne & Everett (2007), Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2004), Garnier & 
Wilhelmsen (2005), Mésonnier & Renne (2007), Eurostat (2015), and OECD (2015) 
Unfortunately, all of these studies offer estimates of the natural real rate only until the 
year 2005 (with initial years ranging from 1965 to 1999), and one would certainly assume that 
significant shifts have occurred since then (see Section 2.3). Nevertheless, Figure 20 is useful 
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for the present analysis since it illustrates a central complication within the estimation of 
natural rates of interest: the results are very sensitive to changes in methodology, assumptions, 
and time frame.
22
 This is peculiarly true for the time period during which the euro was 
introduced: from 1999 to 2002, the estimates differ by up to 2.2%. And for the year 2005, 
despite some preceding convergence, the differences still amount to up to 1%. These 
variations are substantial if one were to consider the natural real rate as a benchmark for 
monetary policy. But while attempts to detect the “true” natural rate among the variety of 
results may be in vein, Figure 20 still offers an important insight: all of these studies indicate 
a significant decline in the natural rate following the year 2000. If this decline has continued 
since the year 2005 (as suggested by the developments highlighted in Section 2.3), this would 
deliver support for the secular stagnation hypothesis. Summers (2014a) argues that this may 
indeed have happened, and many other economists have expressed similar concerns (see, for 
instance, Bouis et al. 2013, Jimeno, Smets and Yiangou 2014, Crafts 2015, Rawdanowicz et 
al. 2014, Ubide 2014, and von Weizsäcker 2014).  
 
3.1.2 Determining the Eurozone’s Natural Real Rate 
However, the latest estimates of the Eurozone’s natural real rate – at least to the knowledge of 
the author – were those of Bouis et al. (2013), who offer results for the years 1980-2012.23 
Since information on the years 2013-2015 was needed as well in order to evaluate the risk of 
secular stagnation in the Eurozone, a contemporary estimate of the natural real rate has been 
obtained. The chosen methodology was that of Basdevant, Björksten and Karagedikli (2004). 
Implementing a rational expectation hypothesis, these authors define the real interest rate         
gap as the term premium in time t as compared to the average term premium over the                  
entire period: 
 ?̃?𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑖𝑡
𝐿 − (𝑖̇?̅? − 𝑖̇?̅?), (1) 
where 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 and 𝑖𝑡
𝐿 are the short-term (3-month) and the long-term nominal interest rates, 
respectively, and 𝑖̇?̅? and 𝑖̇?̅? are the average rates over the entire period. The N in the exponent 
of the real interest rate gap has been added in order to distinguish it from a second measure 
which was derived at a later point of the analysis. In a subsequent step, the natural real rate 
                                                          
22
 Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2005) apply the estimation methodology of a number of other scholars on Eurozone 
data for the years 1999-2005. They show that, while the choice of an identical time horizon and comparable 
underlying data may correct for some variation, the different methods still deliver strongly divergent results. 
23
 These authors, while not explicitly focusing on the Eurozone, estimate its natural real rate alongside those of 
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, and Switzerland. They conclude that the 
Eurozone’s natural real rate has indeed become negative following the year 2010. 
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was constructed by subtracting both the real interest rate gap and expected inflation one year 
ahead from the short-term nominal rate:   
 
𝑟𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 − ?̃?𝑡
𝑁 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒  
                            = 𝑖𝑡
𝐿 − (𝑖̇?̅? − 𝑖̇?̅?)  − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒, 
(2) 
with 𝜋𝑡
𝑒  being the 12-month ahead inflation expectations formed in period t. The idea behind 
equation (2) is that a simultaneous shift in the long-term and the short-term rate may be 
interpreted as a shift in the natural real rate if inflation is low and stable (provided that 
cyclical fluctuations are accounted for). Monthly data on 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 and 𝑖𝑡
𝐿 has been obtained from the 
OECD (2015) for the time period from 01/1995 to 03/2015 (T=243).
24
 Unfortunately, reliable 
and comprehensive monthly data on inflation expectations was not available, but Garnier and 
Wilhelmsen (2005) argue that actual inflation may be taken as a proxy if the observation 
period is sufficiently large and fluctuations are not extreme. Hence, the following assumption 
– which was subject to a subsequent sensitivity analysis (see Section 3.2.3) – was made for all 
subsequent estimations: 
 𝜋𝑡
𝑒 = 𝜋𝑡. (3) 
Information on harmonized inflation and core inflation
25
 was taken from Eurostat (2015), 
which reduced the time period to 01/1997-03/2015 (T=219). Figure 21 summarizes the 
variables used in the subsequent analysis: 
Source: Eurostat (2015), OECD (2015) 
Initially, a choice had to be made concerning the most suitable measure of inflation. As 
mentioned earlier, Basdevant et al. (2004) consider their methodology as appropriate for 
observation periods with low and stable inflation. Hence, core inflation was preferred since it 
exhibited a much lower mean (1.49 vs. 1.81), range (2.00 vs. 4.93) and standard deviation 
(0.43 vs. 0.90) compared to headline inflation, which is also in line with the recommendations 
                                                          
24
 01/1995 was chosen as a starting point for the analysis in order to allow for comparisons with earlier studies 
(see Figure 20). 
25
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of Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2004). In Figure 22, the Eurozone’s core inflation for the years 
1997-2015 is compared to New Zealand’s core inflation for the years 1992-2003 (the data 
range chosen by Basdevant et al. 2004): 
Source: Eurostat (2015), Statistics New Zealand (2015) 
When comparing both measures for the given observation period, the core inflation rate   
displayed a higher mean (2.08 vs. 1.49), range (2.92 vs. 2.00), and standard deviation (0.62 
vs. 0.43) for New Zealand than for the Eurozone. As Basdevant et al. (2004) considered their 
measure of inflation to be sufficiently low and stable, it was taken that the Eurozone’s core 
inflation rate – which was both lower and less volatile – justified the implementation of the 
chosen methodology.  
Based on the data displayed in Figure 21, the natural real rate of interest 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 was calculated 
from an average yield curve spread using equation (2) and (3). It was then compared to the 
real rate of interest 𝑟𝑡, which was calculated by subtracting core inflation from the short-term 
nominal rate: 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 − 𝜋𝑡. (4) 
As shown by Figure 23, it was found that both interest rates followed a similar pattern 
between 1997 and 2005. From early 2005 onwards, the real interest rate increased from 0.54% 
to 3.21% in October 2008, after which it experienced a sharp drop into the negative territory. 
The natural real rate, on the other hand, increased from 0.16% in 2005 to 1.85% in early 
2011.
26
 Subsequently, it dropped into the negative territory as well where, apart from an 
upturn in 2013/14, it was still located as of 03/2015. Hence, Figure 23 provides some support 
for the proposition of a negative natural real rate of interest in the Eurozone. 
                                                          
26
 This may seem surprising, as many of the economic hardships associated with the Great Recession (such as 
the deleveraging shock, see Figure 13) had already set in following the year 2008. However, it could also 
indicate that the natural real rate is less sensitive to short-term developments when calculated from the 
framework developed by Basdevant et al. (2014). 
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Source: Author’s calculations following Basdevant et al. (2004); based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and 
the OECD (2015) 
However, before discussing the relevance of these results for the Eurozone’s monetary 
policy, a more robust estimate of 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 was obtained by implementing a Kalman filter (as 
recommended by Basdevant et al. 2004). This filter was applied on the initial estimates by 
allowing both the natural real interest rate and the yield curve spread to fluctuate. The signal 
(observed) equations of the model were defined as 
 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑡 (5) 
          𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑡, (6) 
and the state (unobserved) equations were given as 
 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝜍1,𝑡 (7) 
               𝛼𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝜍2,𝑡, (8) 
with 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 following a random walk and 𝛼𝑡, which denotes a term premium, following an AR(1) 
process. An important distinction has been made compared to Basdevant et al. (2004): 
whereas these authors considered expected inflation to be constant over the entire period, 
assuming a time-varying rate was deemed more justifiable in the case of the Eurozone. 
Expected inflation was then proxied by actual inflation as described in equation (3). In its 
state-space form, the estimation framework was expressed as 
 (
𝑖𝑡
𝑆
𝑖𝑡
𝐿) = (
𝛽1 0 𝛽2
𝛽3 𝛽4 𝛽5
)(
𝑟𝑡
𝑁
𝛼𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)+ (
𝜀1,𝑡
𝜀2,𝑡
) (9) 
and  
 (
𝑟𝑡
𝑁
𝛼𝑡
) = (
𝛽6 0 0
0 𝛽7 𝛿1
)(
𝑟𝑡−1
𝑁
𝛿0
𝛼𝑡−1
) + (
𝜍1,𝑡
𝜍2,𝑡
). (10) 
The resulting estimates were not altered significantly by different assumptions on 𝛿0 
and 𝛿1, but constraining them jointly at 0 led to a much better convergence of the model. 
Therefore, the term premium was assumed to be constant over the entire period of 
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Figure 23: Time-Varying Natural Rate for the Eurozone, 1997-2015 
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observation. For comparison, the resulting real-time estimates were smoothed using a 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Filter which removed the trend component 𝜏𝑡 from 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 by solving:
27
 
 min
𝜏
(∑( 𝑟𝑡
𝑁 − 𝜏𝑡)
2
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ 𝜆∑[(𝜏𝑡+1 − 𝜏𝑡) − (𝜏𝑡 − 𝜏𝑡−1)]
2
𝑇−1
𝑡=2
). (11) 
As recommended for monthly data (Ravn and Uhlig 2002), 𝜆 was set equal to 129,000. 
Figure 24 compares the filtered estimates of the natural real rate to the previously obtained 
unfiltered estimates. In order to distinguish it from the previously calculated 𝑟𝑡
𝑁, the natural 
real rate obtained from the Kalman filter methodology has been denoted as 𝑟𝑡
∗. 
Source: Author’s calculations following Basdevant et al. (2004); based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and    
the OECD (2015) 
Both the filtered and unfiltered estimates generally followed the same path during the 
entire observation period. At the same time the filtered estimates were, on average, higher 
than the unfiltered ones (1.16% vs. 1.03%). This was even more profound if only the time 
since the onset of the ‘Great Recession’ was considered: for the time period from 01/2008 to 
03/2015, the average value of the filtered estimates was 0.94%, compared to 0.57% for the 
unfiltered ones. Based on these findings, the estimated values for 𝑟𝑡
∗ were used as a 
benchmark for evaluating the threat of secular stagnation in the Eurozone, instead of the less 
robust and conservative estimates of 𝑟𝑡
𝑁. These results show that the Eurozone’s natural real 
rate has indeed decreased in recent years, just as proposed by Summers (2014a) and indicated 
by a number of economic developments (see Section 2.3). Hence, the findings of the present 
section deliver valuable insights on the threat of secular stagnation in the Eurozone. 
                                                          
27
 For a detailed description, see the original paper of Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The notation was taken 
from Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003). 
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3.1.3 Implications for the Discussion on Secular Stagnation in the Eurozone 
As has been laid out in Section 2.2, Summers’ (2014a, 2014b) definition of secular stagnation 
is directly linked to developments of the natural real rate. If this rate drops into negative 
territory and the actual real rate – constrained by low inflation and the zero lower bound on 
nominal rates – cannot fall below the natural rate, this could lead the economy into a trap of 
permanent depression. Hence, conclusions on the threat of secular stagnation for the Eurozone 
require an investigation of the real interest rate gap, which is defined as  
 ?̃?𝑡
∗ = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗. (12) 
In the previous section, it has been shown that the Eurozone’s natural real rate experienced 
a significant decline since the beginning of the Great Recession. Despite this decline, 
however, 𝑟𝑡
∗ was found to be still larger than 0 as of 2015, while 𝑟𝑡 had almost continuously 
been below 0 since the year 2009. Consequently, the author’s calculations (both real-time and 
smoothed) suggest that the real interest rate gap has been negative during the past 6 years: 
Source: Author’s calculations following Basdevant et al. (2004); based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and 
the OECD (2015) 
According to the Hansen-Summers definition of secular stagnation, a permanently positive 
real rate gap constitutes a necessary premise for the occurrence of this phenomenon 
(Pedersen 2015). Figure 25 clearly shows that this condition has not been met in recent years. 
Hence, the decrease in the Eurozone’s natural real rate and the zero lower bound on its short-
term interest rate have not led to a scenario where conventional monetary policy would 
become inefficient. This is highlighted by Figure 26, which translates the author’s findings 
into a simple loanable funds model: 
Source: Author’s illustration following Krugman (2000) and Summers (2014a); based on the author’s 
calculations  
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From 1997 to 2015, the demand for loanable funds has declined, as represented by the 
leftward shift of the I-curve. The natural real rate, which equates savings and investment 
under full employment, was driven down as a result.
28
 Following the year 2008, the reduction 
of the short-term interest rate to the zero lower bound led to a sharp drop in the real rate. This 
was partly offset by a corresponding decrease in core inflation, which fell from 1.8% to 0.6%. 
As of 03/2015, the (smoothed) natural real rate had decreased to 0.45%, down from 2.14% in 
01/1997. Neither did the I-curve and the S-curve intersect in the negative area, nor was the 
natural real rate driven below the actual real rate (in fact, it was still located more than one 
percentage point above the actual real rate). 
As a conclusion, the author’s estimates of the Eurozone’s natural real rate deliver three 
important implications. Firstly, the natural real rate has indeed declined in recent years and 
was much lower in 2015 compared to the year 2005 (see Figure 24). Secondly, this decline 
was associated with a decrease in core inflation and a reduction of the short-term interest rate 
to the zero lower bound, which are two important premises for the occurrence of secular 
stagnation.  But thirdly (and most importantly), the decline in the natural real rate was by no 
means sufficient to fulfill the criteria of a permanently positive real rate gap. As a result, it 
was concluded that the threat of secular stagnation (as defined by Summers 2014a) was not 
imminent for the Eurozone as of 2015. Since this conclusion is in contrast to the proposition 
of Summers (2014a, 2014b), a number of robustness checks have been conducted in order to 
test for the adequacy of the author’s results. 
 
3.2  Robustness Checks 
3.2.1 Comparison with Existing Studies 
As a first robustness check, the estimates obtained in Section 3.1 were compared to the 
existing literature on the Eurozone’s natural real rate. Self-evident first candidates for 
comparison were the estimates of Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2005), who applied the same 
framework on Eurozone data for the years 1999-2005. To this end, the calculations were 
repeated using only data for this shorter time period, and the results closely matched those of 
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2005): 
                                                          
28
 To be precise, downward pressures on the natural real rate may not only stem from a decrease in the demand 
for loanable funds, but also from an increase in the supply (a rightward shift of the S-curve). While the exact 
shifts of both curves are unknown, it can be expected that neither of them has remained unaltered during the 
recent 18 years, and that the decrease in the natural real rate was likely to be associated with shifts in both 
curves. As Summers (2014a) has identified demand shortages as the main driver of secular stagnation, 
Figure 26 relates the drop in the natural real rate only to a leftward shift in the I-curve – but it has to be kept 
in mind that this is likely to represent only a simplified illustration of the actual development. 
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Source: Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2004) and author’s calculations following Basdevant et al. (2004); based on 
data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015 
As deviations between both estimates of 𝑟𝑡
∗ were small and may be attributed to differences 
in the underlying data, it was taken that the author’s calculations were an accurate 
implementation of the framework provided by Basdevant et al. (2004).  
Following this, it was investigated whether the results of Section 3.1 also bear comparison 
with those derived from different estimation methods. For this purpose, they were compared 
to a range of estimates provided by other scholars (see Figure 20) for the years 1997 (the first 
observation point in the author’s data) to 2005. It was found that the resulting estimates for 𝑟𝑡
∗ 
– a decline in the natural real rate from 2.25% to 1.56% – lay within the range of the findings 
reported by Benati and Vitale (2007), Browne and Everett (2007), Crespo Cuaresma 
et al. (2004), Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2005), and Mésonnier and Renne (2007). Hence, it 
was concluded that the author’s calculations delivered a convenient approximation of the 
Eurozone’s natural real rate until the year 2005. 
However, the evaluation of the current threat of secular stagnation in the Eurozone depends 
on the development of the natural real rate after 2005, especially since the onset of the Great 
Recession. As has been mentioned earlier, information on this matter is scarce. Figure 28 
compares the results of Section 3.1 to the only available contemporary estimates (to the 
knowledge of the author), which are those published by Bouis et al. (2013) and updated by 
Rawdanowicz et al. (2014).
29
 As can be seen from Figure 28, both estimates of 𝑟𝑡
∗ closely 
followed the same path until the year 2005. Afterwards, however, they rapidly diverged,    
with the natural real rate reported by Bouis et al. (2013) sharply dropping into the                 
negative territory: 
                                                          
29
 As the dataset used in Bouis et al. (2013) and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) was not publicly available, the 
information was taken from the charts provided by these authors. Hence, the data provided by Figures 28 
and 29 might deviate a little from the ‘true’ results obtained by these authors. However, these differences can 
be expected to be only marginal and do not alter the conclusions drawn from Figure 28 and 39. 
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Source: Bouis et al. (2013), Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) and author’s calculations following Basdevant                                  
et al. (2004); based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
The differences are particularly distinctive following the year 2009: while the author’s 
calculations suggest that 𝑟𝑡
∗ was permanently larger than 𝑟𝑡, Bouis et al. (2013) report that the 
natural real rate was almost exclusively located below the actual real rate. This may have 
important implications for the debate on secular stagnation, which – as has been laid out in 
Section 2.2 – critically depends on the real rate gap: 
Source: Bouis et al. (2013), Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) and author’s calculations following Basdevant                    
et al. (2004); based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
In contrast to the author’s estimates, the results offered by Bouis et al. (2013) indeed 
suggest a positive real rate gap since the year 2005, interrupted only from a slight drop into 
the negative territory in 2012/13. These estimates lead to very different implications 
compared to those of the author, which have dismissed the threat of secular stagnation under 
current circumstances (see Section 3.1.3). Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) argue that the results 
reported by Bouis et al. (2013) may indeed imply that “the decline in interest rates to close to 
zero may not be giving sufficient stimulus”, leading to “a risk that a secular stagnation 
scenario may become entrenched in the euro area.” An illustration of this risk is provided      
by Figure 30: 
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Figure 28: Comparison with Bouis et al., Natural Real Rate, 1997-2015 
a bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb𝑟𝑡
∗ (own estimates) 𝑟𝑡
∗ (Bouis et al. 2013) 𝑟𝑡 
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Figure 29: Comparison with Bouis et al., Real Rate Gap, 1997-2015 
Smoothed Estimates bouis?̃?𝑡
∗ (own estimates) ?̃?𝑡
∗ (Bouis et al. 2013) 
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Source: Author’s illustration following Krugman (2000) and Summers (2014a); based on data provided by Bouis 
et al. (2013) and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) 
 
As of mid-2013 (the last observation point in the updated estimates of Rawdanowicz et 
al. 2014), the Eurozone’s natural real rate had become significantly negative. However, even 
with a nominal interest rate close to the zero lower bound, this did not fulfill the conditions of 
secular stagnation as the natural real rate was still narrowly located above the inverted 
inflation rate. But taking into account that the core inflation rate has fallen to 1.0 as of 
09/2015, the Eurozone may indeed have entered what Summers (2014a) has defined as 
secular stagnation, provided that the estimates of Bouis et al. (2013) were correct and that the 
natural real rate has not increased since then. Any further discussion of these findings would 
hence require a contemporary update of these author’s findings. 
This discrepancy between the author’s findings and those of Bouis et al. (2013) can largely 
be attributed to differences in the estimation methods.
30
 The sharp drop in the natural real rate 
of Bouis et al. (2013) is mainly related to a decline in the growth rate of potential GDP 
(Rawdanowicz et al. 2014), which is not reflected in the author’s estimates. In addition, the 
results of Bouis et al. (2013) are subject to at least three sources of uncertainty: to the 
statistical properties of their Kalman filter calculations, to the OECD’s estimates of potential 
output, and to the assumptions taken on the risk aversion coefficient. Provided that the 
author’s estimates are also sensitive to the assumptions taken (as will be discussed in 
Section 3.2.3), it is difficult to determine which of these estimates of 𝑟𝑡
∗ are rather correct. 
Hence, in order to further assess the robustness of the author’s results, a correlation analysis 
has been conducted. 
 
3.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
According to Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2005), the Eurozone’s real rate gap should be 
significantly correlated to both the output gap and the inflation rate. As several scholars have 
reported similar findings, a correlation analysis was conducted on the previously estimated 
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 As has been the case with previous estimates of the Eurozone’s natural real rate (see Figure 20). 
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Figure 30: The Threat of Secular Stagnation in the Eurozone (Bouis et al.) 
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real rate gap. If the respective correlations would fail to materialize, this could indicate 
shortcomings of the estimation method chosen in Section 3.1. The first variable to be included 
in this analysis was the output gap, defined as 
 ?̃?𝑡 = (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗) ∗ 100, (13) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the logarithm of GDP and 𝑦𝑡
∗ corresponds to the logarithm of potential GDP. 
Monthly data on seasonally adjusted GDP was taken from the OECD (2015), based on which 
equation (13) was estimated using a HP filter with 𝜆 = 129,000.31 The second variable to be 
included was the inflation gap, which corresponds to the deviation of actual inflation from the 
inflation target:  
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑇 . (14) 
Information on core inflation was taken from Eurostat (2015), and the inflation target was 
set equal to two, as has been communicated by the ECB.
32
 Finally, as has been recommended 
by scholars such as Larsen and McKeown (2004), the unemployment gap was included as a 
second measure of economic slack. It was defined as 
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡
∗, (15) 
where 𝑢𝑡 is the unemployment rate and 𝑢𝑡
∗ represents the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU). As in the case of the output gap, monthly data on the Eurozone’s’ 
unemployment rate has been taken from the OECD (2015), based on which ?̃?𝑡 was derived 
from a HP filter with 𝜆 = 129,000.33 Figure 31 displays the variables used in the analysis. As 
can be seen, the permanent drop of the real rate gap in 2008 coincided with a decrease of the 
inflation gap and output gap and an increase of the unemployment gap. This indicates that the 
variables were subject to different dynamics after the financial crisis and the beginning of the 
Great Recession (albeit to a varying degree). 
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 As has been pointed out by Krugman (2012) and Williamson (2012), it is important to concede that the HP 
filter is nothing more than a trend line fit to the underlying data. Although it is widely used for calculating an 
economy’s potential, its results are based on a purely statistical measure irrespective of any economic 
assumptions. However, as no alternative measure for the Eurozone’s output gap was available on a monthly 
basis, the HP filter was implemented despite this shortcoming. In order to check for the suitability of this 
approach, a quarterly measure for the Eurozone’s output gap was derived using a HP filter with λ=1,600 and 
compared to the OECD’s (2015) estimate of the output gap (which is also available on a quarterly basis). The 
resulting Pearson correlation coefficient was 0.54 (p<0.001), indicating a moderate positive correlation 
according to the rule of thumb provided by Hinkle, Wiersma and Jurs (2003). Therefore, the use of the HP 
filter was deemed to produce an appropriate proxy for the Eurozone’s output gap. 
32
 As the inflation target was constant over the entire observation period, the resulting Pearson correlations had 
been identical if core inflation had been included instead of the inflation gap measure. 
33
 Comparably to the output gap (see Footnote 31), the OECD (2015) only offered quarterly data on the 
NAIRU, which were compared to quarterly estimates extracted from a HP filter with λ=1,600. Both measures 
were found to be moderately correlated with a Pearson coefficient of 0.53 (p<0.001). Based on this, the 
measure derived from the HP filter was considered as a reasonable approximation for the Eurozone’s 
unemployment gap. 
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Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
This is further confirmed by Table 2, which provides mean values and standard 
deviations (SD) for the variables included in the analysis. It was found that all four variables 
displayed a lower mean for the time period from 2008 to 2015. In addition to that, all 
variables except the inflation gap were also found to be more volatile (as indicated by a higher 
standard deviation) for this period:
34
  
Table 2: Statistical Properties of the Variables used in the Correlation Analysis 
 1997-2015 1997-2007 2008-2015 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
?̃?𝑡
∗ -0.125 -1.171 -0.452 -0.700 -1.001 -1.201 
?̃?𝑡 -0.000 -1.234 -0.115 -1.116 -0.174 -1.384 
?̃?𝑡 -0.512 -0.429 -0.367 -0.398 -0.731 -0.382 
?̃?𝑡 -0.000 -0.512 -0.025 -0.425 -0.038 -0.622 
T -219 -219 -132 -132 -87 -87 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015)  
Consequently, the correlation analysis was conducted for the entire observation period as 
well as for the two sub periods. Doing so allowed to control for possible changes in the 
relationships among the variables following the financial crisis and the onset of the Great 
Recession. Table 3 provides Pearson correlations between real rate gap, output gap, 
unemployment gap and inflation gap. As the real rate gap has also been shown to be a useful 
indicator for future inflation (Neiss and Nelson 2003), the 12-month ahead inflation gap was 
included in the analysis as well. The Pearson correlation coefficients were evaluated using the 
rules of thumb suggested by Hinkle, Wiersma and Jurs (2003). 
Table 3: Main Results of the Correlation Analysis 
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 ?̃?𝑡
∗ ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡+12 ?̃?𝑡 
?̃?𝑡
∗   1.000***     
?̃?𝑡     0.566  *** - 1.000***    
?̃?𝑡     0.429  ***     0.069  ***   -1.000* **   
?̃?𝑡+12     0.527  ***     0.495  ***     0.400  ***   1.000***  
?̃?𝑡    -0.588  ***   --0.636  ***    -0.316  ***    -0.402  *** -  1.000*** 
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 For the observation period as a whole, both the output and the unemployment gap were centered around 0 as 
they had been derived from a HP filter. 
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Figure 31: Variables used in the Correlation Analysis, 1997-2015 
Unemployment Gap Real Rate Gap Output Gap Inflation Gap
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Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015); 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
†
p<.1 
Initially, correlations among unemployment gap, output gap, and inflation gap were 
examined in order to further evaluate the appropriateness of the HP filter in constructing the 
measures of economic slack. The correlation between output and unemployment gap ranged 
from moderately to highly negative. This reflects the well documented tradeoff between 
unemployment and losses in a country’s GDP (Okun 1962). At the same time, both the 
present and the future inflation gap were positively related to the output gap and       
negatively correlated with the unemployment gap, as suggested by the Phillips curve.
35
     
These results were taken as further indication for the appropriateness of the measures               
derived from a HP filter. 
The real rate gap was found to be significantly correlated with all other variables for the 
observation period as a whole. It showed a moderate and positive correlation with the output 
gap and both the present and the future inflation gap, as well as a moderate and negative 
correlation with the unemployment gap. In the case of the two sub periods, the correlation 
with both the present inflation gap and the unemployment gap was stronger for the 
years 2008-2015. The correlation with the output gap and future inflation was more 
pronounced for the years 1997-2007. Hence, as suggested by Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2003), 
Table 3 confirms that the previously estimated real rate gap was significantly related to the 
measures of economic slack and to both previous and future inflation. 
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 Lately, a significant number of scholars have expressed doubts about the usefulness of the Phillips curve in 
forecasting inflation. For example, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) ascribe an “inability to accurately forecast 
inflation” to the Phillips curve for the business cycle on which they base their research. Stock and 
Watson (1999) and Orphanides and Van Norden (2005) point to the unreliability of estimates of both the 
output gap and the NAIRU, and Stock and Watson (2009) demonstrate how inflation forecasts are much 
more precise for periods during which economic slack is substantial, as compared to ‘normal’ periods. 
However, as the present analysis did not attempt to construct a precise measure for inflation forecasting, but 
was only concerned with investigating the sign, significance and approximate size of the coefficients, it was 
argued that these concerns should not significantly alter the results of this section. 
Table 3 (continued) 
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∗ ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡+12 ?̃?𝑡 
?̃?𝑡
∗ - 1.000***     
?̃?𝑡     0.766  *** - 1.000***    
?̃?𝑡    -0.094  ***    -0.077  ***   1.000***   
?̃?𝑡+12    -0.391  ***    -0.479  ***    -0.290  ***   1.000***  
?̃?𝑡    -0.681  *** -  -0.788  ***    -0.323  ***    -0.601  *** -  1.000*** 
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 ?̃?𝑡
∗ ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡+12 ?̃?𝑡 
?̃?𝑡
∗ - 1.000***     
?̃?𝑡     0.544  *** - 1.000***    
?̃?𝑡     0.579  ***     0.153  ***   1.000***   
?̃?𝑡+12     0.294  ***     0.564  ***     0.255  ***   1.000***  
?̃?𝑡    -0.859  ***   --0.536  ***    -0.449  ***    -0.334  ***   -1.000*** 
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As the real rate gap was found to be significantly correlated with the future inflation gap, it 
was decided to further explore this relationship. Following Neiss and Nelson (2003), 
correlations were extracted for a variety of lags in order to determine the informative value of 
the real rate gap in forecasting inflation. Table 4 provides Pearson correlations between ?̃?𝑡
∗ 
and ?̃?𝑡+𝑘 at different values of k: 
Table 4: Correlation between ?̃?𝑡
∗ and ?̃?𝑡+𝑘 at Different Values of k 
 ?̃?𝑡
∗  ?̃?𝑡
∗  ?̃?𝑡
∗ 
?̃?𝑡+1 0.427 *** ?̃?𝑡+10 0.549 *** ?̃?𝑡+20 0.305 *** 
?̃?𝑡+1 0.457 *** ?̃?𝑡+11 0.539 *** ?̃?𝑡+21 0.272 *** 
?̃?𝑡+2 0.479 *** ?̃?𝑡+12 0.527 *** ?̃?𝑡+22 0.241 *** 
?̃?𝑡+3 0.499 *** ?̃?𝑡+13 0.507 *** ?̃?𝑡+23 0.214 *** 
?̃?𝑡+4 0.518 *** ?̃?𝑡+14 0.482 *** ?̃?𝑡+24 0.187 *** 
?̃?𝑡+5 0.532 *** ?̃?𝑡+15 0.454 *** ?̃?𝑡+25 0.158 *** 
?̃?𝑡+6 0.548 *** ?̃?𝑡+16 0.427 *** ?̃?𝑡+26 0.132 
†** 
?̃?𝑡+7 0.553 *** ?̃?𝑡+17 0.401 *** ?̃?𝑡+27 0.114 *** 
?̃?𝑡+8 0.555 *** ?̃?𝑡+18 0.371 *** ?̃?𝑡+28 0.104 *** 
?̃?𝑡+9 0.554 *** ?̃?𝑡+19 0.339 *** ?̃?𝑡+29 0.100 *** 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015);  
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
†
p<.1 
It was found that the real rate gap was positively correlated with the inflation gap at the 1% 
level for lags of up to 2 years. The strength of the correlation increased until k=8, after which               
it continuously dropped in size and significance with each additional lag. For k>25, the       
correlation became insignificant at the 5% level. Comparably to Garnier and 
Wilhelmsen (2005), the following relationship was subsequently investigated: 
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝛽2?̃?𝑡−𝑘
∗ + 𝜀𝑡. (16) 
Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, equation (16) was estimated for different 
values of k. The results are displayed in Table 5: 
Table 5: The Real Rate Gap as a Predictor of Future Inflation 
 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 
𝛽0   -0.038 *   -0.039 *   -0.039 *   -0.040 *   -0.040 *   -0.041 ** 
𝛽1   -0.929 ***   -0.929 ***   -0.927 ***   -0.926 ***   -0.925 ***   -0.923 *** 
𝛽2   -0.022 *   -0.022 *   -0.022 *   -0.022 *   -0.022 *   -0.023 * 
R²   -0.899   -0.899   -0.898   -0.898   -0.898   -0.899 
 k=6 k=8 k=9 k=10 k=11 k=12 
𝛽0   -0.039 *   -0.039 *   -0.038 *   -0.036 *   -0.035 *   -0.034 * 
𝛽1   -0.928 ***   -0.930 ***   -0.932 ***   -0.935 ***   -0.938 ***   -0.942 *** 
𝛽2   -0.019 
†   -0.017 †   -0.016 †   -0.014   -0.012   -0.010 
R²   -0.898   -0.898   -0.898   -0.897   -0.897   -0.897 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015);  
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
†
p<.1 
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Similarly to Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2003), it was found that the lagged real rate gap had 
indeed some predictive power for the future inflation gap. Thus, the analysis confirmed the 
informative value of the real rate gap in forecasting inflation, which has been suggested by 
Neiss and Nelson (2003). However, it has to be acknowledged that, after controlling for the 
influence of the past inflation gap, the coefficients of the real rate gap were small and became 
less significant for larger values of k. 
So far, this subsection has demonstrated that the previously estimated real rate gap was 
significantly related to the output gap, the unemployment gap, and the present and future 
inflation gap. However, the results also exhibited a certain complicacy: while Garnier and 
Wilhelmsen (2005), Neiss and Nelson (2003) and Larsen and McKeown (2004) report a 
negative relationship between the real rate gap and inflation, the author’s results suggest the 
opposite. Likewise, these authors show how their estimates of the real rate gap are negatively 
related to the output gap and positively related to the unemployment gap – again, this is 
contrary to what the author’s results indicate (see Table 3). 
There are several conceivable explanations for this discrepancy. To begin with, it is 
possible that the present analysis was conducted using improper measures for inflation, output 
gap, and unemployment gap. In order to test for this, the correlation analysis was repeated 
using headline inflation rather than core inflation, which did not significantly alter the results. 
Also, while the author’s measures for the output gap and the unemployment gap have to be 
taken with caution (see Footnote 31 and 33), using more precise measures would surely not 
lead to a reversion of the signs.  
As a second possible explanation, the variation among the different findings could be 
attributed to differences in the methodology used for estimating the natural real rate. Hence, 
as a comparative measure, the correlation analysis was repeated based on the natural real rate 
provided by Bouis et al. (2013) and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014):
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Table 6: Repeating the Correlation Analysis on the Estimates of Bouis et al. 
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?̃?𝑡
∗ - 1.000***     
?̃?𝑡     0.672  *** - 1.000***    
?̃?𝑡    -0.094  ***     0.069  *** 1.000**   
?̃?𝑡+12     0.248  ***     0.495  ***    -0.400  *** 1.000**  
?̃?𝑡    -0.693  ***    -0.636  ***    -0.316  ***    -0.402  *** 1.000** 
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  See Footnote 29. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
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 ?̃?𝑡
∗ ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡+12 ?̃?𝑡 
?̃?𝑡
∗ - 1.000***     
?̃?𝑡     0.866  *** - 1.000***    
?̃?𝑡    -0.265  ***    -0.077  *** 1.000**   
?̃?𝑡+12     0.435  ***     0.479  ***     0.290  *** 1.000**  
?̃?𝑡    -0.590  ***    -0.787  ***    -0.323  ***    -0.601  *** 1.000** 
2
0
0
8
-2
0
1
3
 
(T
=
6
6
) 
 ?̃?𝑡
∗ ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 ?̃?𝑡+12 ?̃?𝑡 
?̃?𝑡
∗ - 1.000***     
?̃?𝑡     0.577  *** - 1.000***    
?̃?𝑡     0.503  ***     0.153  ***   1.000***   
?̃?𝑡+12     0.411  ***     0.564  ***     0.255  ***   1.000***  
?̃?𝑡    -0.856  ***   --0.536  ***    -0.449  ***    -0.334  ***   1.000*** 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Bouis et al. (2013), Rawdanowicz et al. (2014), 
Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
†
p<.1 
As can be seen, the results delivered in Table 6 are very similar to those reported in 
Table 3. If the Eurozone’s natural real rate was calculated using the methodology of            
Bouis et al. (2013), the resulting real rate gap was positively correlated with the output gap                  
and the future inflation gap and negatively correlated with the unemployment gap.          
Hence, these findings did not only stem from the estimation method chosen in the                                   
author’s analysis. 
Lastly, the difference in the findings of this paper compared to those of previous authors 
could result from variations in the underlying data. According to this logic, the results offered 
in the present study – a positive correlation with the output and the inflation gap and a 
negative correlation with the unemployment gap – do not indicate that the author’s estimates 
of the real rate gap are wrong. Rather, they could differ simply because previous authors 
based their calculations on data for different countries (Neiss and Nelson 2003, Larsen and 
McKeown 2004) or observation periods (Garnier and Wilhelmsen 2005). A similar argument 
is brought forward by Amato (2005), who finds a positive relationship between the real rate 
gap and inflation as well and hypotheses that these correlations may strongly be affected by 
shocks related to externalities or to situations of inefficient supply. He argues that, in such a 
case, “the correlation between real rate gaps and inflation will be weakened and the sign could 
even be reversed.” In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the correlation analysis to 
changes in the observation period, the calculations have been repeated for varying start and 
end points. The results are displayed in Figure 32: 
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Light brown areas: p<.05, red areas: p<.1, white areas: p>.1; Source: Author’s calculations; based on data 
provided by Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015) 
As can be seen, the choice of a different observation period led to changes in the size, the 
significance, and even the sign of the correlations related to the real rate gap. For instance, if 
the analysis had been conducted with the final observation point lying between 05/2002 and 
02/2009, the results would have suggested a negative correlation between the real rate gap and 
the inflation gap. This may explain why the implications of the present study differ from those 
of Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2005), Neiss and Nelson (2003) and Larsen and 
McKeown (2004). Therefore, the results of the present study were maintained and it was 
argued that these deviations do not alter the implications for the debate on secular stagnation 
in the Eurozone. 
 
3.2.3 Sensitivity to the Assumption made on Inflation Expectations 
A final robustness check investigated the sensitivity of the chosen method for estimating the 
natural real rate to the assumption made in equation (3). While 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡 were taken from 
observed market data, 12-month ahead inflation expectations were assumed to equal core 
inflation rates in each time period. As this may be considered to be an overly strong 
assumption, the estimations were repeated using different proxies for inflation expectations. 
For the first proxy, it was assumed that consumers were rationally expecting the core inflation 
rate of the next time period. For the second proxy, it was assumed that inflation expectations 
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Figure 32: Pearson Correlations at Different Start and End Points of the Sample 
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were equal to the average core inflation rate of the next 6 months. In the third and fourth 
proxy, the consumers formed their expectations based on the average core inflation rates of 
the last 6 and 12 months, respectively. The results are displayed in Figure 33: 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015) 
It can be seen that the author’s estimates of the natural real rate were indeed very sensitive 
to the assumptions made for expected inflation. If consumers were correctly assuming future 
core inflation rates, the result was a downward push in the natural real rate. Conversely, if 
inflation expectations were formed solely on past experience, the resulting estimates were 
higher. For the entire time period from 1997 to 2015, average values ranged from 0.26% to 
1.89%, and for the last common observation period (09/2014), the results ranged from 0.13% 
to 1.12%. As a consequence, the implementation of different proxies for inflation expectations 
also led to varying results for the real rate gap: 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the ECB (2015) 
If the assumptions made on inflation expectations produced a higher natural real rate, the 
result was a lower real rate gap (and vice versa). Therefore, these assumptions directly 
influenced the implications for the debate on secular stagnation in the Eurozone. However, as 
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can be seen from Figure 34, the results obtained from the different proxies all suggested that 
the real rate gap had remained negative since the beginning of the Great Recession. Therefore, 
while acknowledging the sensitivity of the author’s estimates, the results of the present 
section still reject the proposition that the natural real rate has become persistently negative or 
has even been pushed below the real interest rate since the onset of the crisis. 
 
3.3 Additional Considerations on the Natural Real Rate and Secular Stagnation 
3.3.1 Overaccumulation in the Eurozone 
The empirical estimates and robustness checks of Section 3.1 and 3.2 have shown that the 
Eurozone does not suffer from secular stagnation if the latter is defined as a permanently 
positive real rate gap coupled with low inflation. However, according to Homburg (2014), the 
(new) secular stagnation theory proposed by Summers (2014a, 2014b) may also be tested 
under a slightly altered definition. As has been laid out before (see Figure 4), secular 
stagnation is characterized by a persistent shortfall of aggregate demand (similar to the 
‘savings glut’ hypothesis, see Bernanke 2015). Homburg (2014) argues that such an 
overaccumulation of capital can only occur if the interest rate has been pushed below the 
economy’s growth rate. Accordingly, the following condition has to be fulfilled: 
 (𝑖𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑔𝑡) < 0. (17) 
In order to fully investigate the threat of secular stagnation in the Eurozone, this second 
definition has been tested as well. The results are displayed in Figure 35:
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Source: Authors’s calculatons; based on data provided by the OECD (2015) 
Beginning with the year 2009, GDP growth rates took a turn for the positive in most 
Eurozone economies. At the same time, the 3-month interbank offered rates (which were used 
as a proxy for safe assets following Caballero and Farhi 2014) were continuously reduced. As 
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  No Information was available for Cyprus, Lithuania, and Malta. 
Figure 35: Nominal Interest Rates (Safe) vs. Growth Rates in the Eurozone, 2003-2014 
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of 2014, the term (𝑖𝑡
𝑆 − 𝑔𝑡) had therefore become negative for every Eurozone member 
country except Greece. According to this simple indicator, a significant degree of 
overaccumulation – an essential prerequisite for secular stagnation under the present 
definition – has indeed taken place in the Eurozone. 
However, as shown by Homburg (2014), empirical assessments of overaccumulation may 
be seriously misleading if they are performed using safe interest rates. Rather, in a world of 
uncertainty, investment decisions are made based on risky interest rates. Consequently, the 
overaccumulation condition from equation (17) has been modified to 
 (𝑖𝑡
𝑅 − 𝑔𝑡) < 0. (18) 
The risky interest rate 𝑖𝑡
𝑅 has been proxied using nominal rates on loans to non-financial 
corporations (ECB 2015).
38
 The updated estimates are provided by Figure 36:
39
 
Source: Authors’s calculations following Homburg (2014); based on data provided by the ECB (2015) and the 
OECD (2015) 
When the calculations were repeated using risky interest rates instead of safe rates, the 
implications for the Eurozone changed significantly. While Figure 36 generally reports the 
same cycles compared to Figure 35, the differential between interest and growth rates was 
found to be negative in only six member countries (Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Luxembourg) as of 2014. In addition, during the preceding years, the 
differentials were continuously increasing for Germany and the three Baltic states. Hence, it 
can be concluded that the Eurozone as a whole does not face an acute level of 
overaccumulation.  
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  Annualised agreed rate (AAR) / Narrowly defined effective rate (NDER).  
  Series code: MIR.M.[2-Digit Country Code].B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 
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 No Information was available for Cyprus and Malta. 
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At the same time, overaccumulation might still pose a significant challenge for some 
individual member countries (particularly Luxembourg and Ireland). According to 
Homburg (2014) and Knolle (2014), further clarification may be delivered by incorporating 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) measure into the analysis. According to this 
logic, the corporate bond rates used in Figure 36 might not be ‘risky enough’ in order to fully 
control for dynamic efficiency. The WACC, on the other hand, would more accurately 
capture the actual cost associated with an investment. Therefore, the analysis was repeated 
one final time on the following condition: 
 (𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔𝑡) < 0. (19) 
Information on 𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 has been taken from Knolle (2014), who calculated the degree of 
dynamic (in)efficiency for the OECD countries plus China.
40
 The results are displayed             
in Figure 37: 
Source: Authors’s calculatons; based on data provided by Knolle (2014) and the OECD (2015) 
After repeating the analysis using information on 𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 instead of 𝑖𝑡
𝑅, not a single 
Eurozone country displayed signs of overaccumulation as of 2014. The differential between 
𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 and 𝑔𝑡 was located well in the positive area, even for the six countries which had been 
found to suffer from overaccumulation in Figure 36.  
These findings complement the conclusions drawn earlier in this analysis. While 
Section 3.1 and 3.2 have shown that the Eurozone is not subject to a permanently positive real 
rate gap coupled with low inflation, the present section has demonstrated that it also does not 
suffer from overaccumulation. Hence, the present section still concludes that the Eurozone 
does not suffer from secular stagnation as defined by Summers (2014a, 2014b). 
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 As interest rates on corporate bonds represent a lower level of the return on investment (Homburg 2014), 
𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶  will not report dynamic inefficiency when this has been ruled out by 𝑖𝑡
𝑅. However, it is possible for 
𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶  to point out dynamic efficiency when 𝑖𝑡
𝑅 has reported inefficiency. For this reason, Knolle (2014) does 
not deliver 𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶  in the case of Italy. 
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3.3.2 Secular Stagnation and the Importance of Land 
By pointing at significant decreases in the Eurozone’s potential output, Summers (2014b) has 
made a compelling argument for the threat of secular stagnation (see Figure 12). In addition to 
that, Section 2.3 has shown that the Eurozone has recently been subject to (1) a deleveraging 
shock, (2) a slowdown in population growth, (3) an increase in income inequality, and (4) a 
fall in the relative price of investment. According to Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), these 
four factors can primarily be held accountable for a decrease in the natural real rate. Faced 
with this evidence, it has to be asked how an empirical assessment of the Eurozone’s natural 
real rate (see Section 3.1) may possibly dismiss the threat of secular stagnation. 
There are a number of reasons which might explain this apparent discrepancy. First of all, 
the empirical results of Section 3.1 could be inaccurate. However, Section 3.2 has provided 
some tests for the adequacy of these results. In addition to that, it has been shown that secular 
stagnation may still be ruled out if the gloomier outlook provided by Bouis et al (2013) is 
taken into account.
41
 As a second reason, it might be possible that Eggertsson and 
Mehrotra (2014) overstate the significance of at least one of their four factors in shifting the 
natural real rate. Thirdly, it could be argued that the propositions of Eggertsson and 
Mehrotra (2014) are correct, but that the effect of the four factors was simply not strong 
enough (or not lasting long enough, as of 2015) in order to create a permanently positive real 
rate gap in the Eurozone. This is supported by the finding that the natural real rate did indeed 
decrease in recent years (see Figure 24), albeit not enough to support the claim of secular 
stagnation. And finally, it might be possible that the propositions of Summers (2014a, 2014b) 
as well as the formal model of Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) are overlooking one or more 
variables which may be crucial for the possible emergence of secular stagnation. The present 
section argues in favor of this final reason, and shows how the discussion on secular 
stagnation changes if land is introduced. 
As has been laid out in Section 3.3.1, secular stagnation – under the definition of 
Summers (2014a, 2014b) – can be seen as a result of overaccumulation. However, 
Homburg (1991) has shown that overaccumulation cannot occur in the presence of a “non-
producible productive asset”, such as land.42 Even if it is only marginally productive, the rent 
on land will always be strictly positive. If the economy’s interest rate is pushed below its 
growth rate, the value of land – which is defined as the discounted present value of its future 
                                                          
41
 Further clarification on that matter could surely be provided if the results of Bouis et al. (2013) were updated 
using data of 2014 and 2015. 
42
 Land only refers to the productive ground. It does not refer to unproductive ground (such as a desert), nor to 
any improvements or structures situated on it (houses, streets, bridges and the like would be regarded as 
reproducible assets, see Homburg 1991, 2014). 
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returns – increases. As a result, economic agents will increasingly demand land instead of 
capital, hence preventing any overaccumulation of capital. The price of land – which is in 
finite supply – will then increase as long as the growth rate exceeds the interest rate. 
Consequently, even if the natural real rate is subject to persistent downward pressure from 
a range of other factors – such as adverse demographic developments or increasing inequality 
– it may not become negative if the economy is endowed with land. To put it simple, the 
possession of land prevents the emergence of secular stagnation. Following Homburg (2014), 
Figure 38 highlights the importance of land for a number of OECD economies:
43
 
Source: Illustration taken from Homburg (2014); based on data provided by the OECD (2015) 
As of 2012, land featured prominently in the national accounts of each of the countries 
highlighted in Figure 38. Land/output-ratios ranged from 51.1% (Czech Republic) to 415.8% 
(South Korea), and the value of land therefore grandly exceeded the value of public debt in 
every single country. Furthermore, for most of these countries, the importance of land has 
increased in recent years, as shown by Figure 39: 
Source: Author’s illustration following Bova et al. (2013) and Homburg (2014); based on data provided            
by the OECD (2015) 
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 The data given by the OECD (2015) is based on the System of National Accounts (SNA). Additional 
information on the theoretical background, the data requirements and the empirical methodology of 
estimating the value of land is provided by Kim (2008). 
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Unfortunately, the OECD (2015) only provides information on land values for those 
countries included in Figure 38 and 39.
44
 As this group only includes three out of 
the 19 Eurozone countries, it is difficult to draw a final conclusion concerning the importance 
of land for the Eurozone. However, there is little reason to believe that information on the 
remaining 16 countries would deliver a very different picture. If land is of utmost importance 
in France and the Netherlands, why should it be of much lesser significance in Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, and other countries? Hence, it was taken that land is an important 
endowment for the Eurozone as a whole. 
This evidence, of course, raises the question why land is mostly ignored in the prevalent 
literature on secular stagnation. Summers (2014a, 2014b) does not mention land at all. 
Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) do not include land in their formal model, but argue that it 
would be “straightforward to introduce […] land used for production, and maintain a secular 
stagnation equilibrium”. With regards to the findings of Homburg (1991, 2014), this seems 
questionable. In addition, it has to be asked why a significant share of the related literature 
focuses on the role of public debt (see, for instance, Gordon 2012, von Weizsäcker 2013, and 
Lo and Rogoff 2015), when land was found to be of much higher relative importance for each 
country included in Figure 38. 
A possible explanation might be that, as Homburg (1991) acknowledges, the introduction 
of land into growth models “considerably complicates the analysis of steady states”. This 
could explain the absence of land in formal models such as the one provided by Eggertsson 
and Mehrotra (2014). A less theoretical reason could be that the importance of land is not 
widely acknowledged due to the lack of data – after all, comparable land values are only 
known for a very small number of countries (see Figure 38). Nevertheless, a number of 
economists have supported the propositions made by Homburg (2014), according to which 
land precludes overaccumulation and, hence, secular stagnation (see, for instance, 
Mayer 2014, Rowe 2014, and Sinn 2014). The proposition of a permanently negative natural 
real rate, which is discussed by Summers (2014a, 2014b), Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), 
and others, only holds when land is exempted from the discussion.  
Hence, in addition to the empirical findings of Section 3.1 and 3.2, the considerations of 
Section 3.3 have delivered further evidence against the case of secular stagnation in the 
Eurozone. Neither has the real rate gap become permanently positive, nor does the Eurozone 
                                                          
44
 The Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database provides information for a small number of additional 
countries, such as Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Slovakia, and Switzerland (see Bova 
et al. 2013). However, as this data is based on a different reporting scheme, it was not included in Figure 38 
and 39. 
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suffer from overaccumulation. Additional considerations on the importance of land indicate 
that the natural real rate will also not become permanently negative in the future. There-    
fore, it is ruled out that the Eurozone it threatened by secular stagnation as defined by 
Summers (2014a, 2014b). 
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4. Secular Stagnation in the Long-Term Perspective 
4.1 The Long-Term Challenge from Gordon’s Headwinds 
4.1.1 Demographics 
In Section 3, a contemporary estimate of the natural real rate has shown that the Eurozone 
does not face an imminent threat of secular stagnation as defined by Summers (2014a). 
Irrespective of the bleaker outlook delivered by Bouis et al. (2013), additional considerations 
– such as the incorporation of land – indicate that fears of a permanently positive real rate gap 
are exaggerated. However, as has already been referred to in Section 2.2, there exists an 
alternative theory which does not rely on shifts in the natural real rate, but rather argues that 
secular stagnation can be thought of as a long-term decrease in potential output growth. This 
theory is brought forward by Gordon (2012, 2014), who proposes that four distinct 
‘headwinds’ – demographics, education, inequality, and government debt – are primarily 
accountable for such a decrease in the case of the US economy. The present section investi-
gates these headwinds in the context of the Eurozone in order to determine whether the threat 
of secular stagnation – albeit under a different definition – might materialize after all. 
Concerning demographics, Section 2.3 has already pointed out that most Eurozone 
countries currently suffer from a decrease in their working age population. According to 
estimates of the United Nations (2013), this trend in unlikely to be reversed in the near future: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the UN (2013) 
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As can be seen, the dependency ratio will increase until 2030 – and even more so until 2060 – 
for every Eurozone member country.
45
 Different assumptions on fertility and migration do not 
alter the general picture: over the next decades, dependency ratios will grow much faster in 
the Eurozone compared to the global average. Some member countries will even see their 
ratios increase to values beyond 100, which indicates that the dependent population will 
surpass the working-age population in absolute numbers. 
These developments will not only constitute a major socioeconomic challenge for the 
Eurozone, but may also have a profound impact on its long-term economic performance. As 
potential output per capita growth is defined as growth in labor productivity times growth in 
hours per capita, a declining working age population could only be offset by an increase in 
labor productivity or participation (Gordon 2014). However, as shown in Figure 41, recent 
developments indicate the opposite:46 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the OECD (2015) 
For all three country groups, the annual growth rate of GDP per hour worked has steadily 
declined between 1970 and 2014. The average number of hours worked per person employed 
experienced mostly low or negative growth rates, as did labor utilization. The annual growth 
                                                          
45
 The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the dependent population (0-19 and above 65 years of age) 
per 100 population in the working age (20-64 years of age). In the case of the Eurozone, this definition is 
considered to be more realistic compared to the common practice of defining the working age population as 
from 15 to 64 years of age. The zero migration scenario is based on the assumption of a medium fertility rate. 
46
 Labor utilization is defined as the number of hours worked per head of the population. No data was available 
for Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta. 
Figure 41: Annual Growth Rates of Productivity Indicators in the Eurozone, 1970-2014 
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Figure 42: Secondary and Tertiary Enrollment Ratios in the Eurozone 
and the USA, 1970-2013 
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rate of unit labor cost sharply decreased, but still remained positive for the Core and New 
countries in the year 2014. Hence, all four variables indicate that the Eurozone’s productivity 
growth has slowed down in recent decades. If this development prevails in the future, it is 
unlikely that the significant decrease in the relative size of the working age population will be 
offset by an increase in labor productivity or labor force participation. Hence, it can be 
concluded that demographic factors may indeed have a significantly negative effect on future 
potential output growth in the Eurozone. 
 
4.1.2 Education 
Education represents the second headwind identified by Gordon (2012, 2014). He argues 
that the impact of education on US-American productivity growth has decreased after a 
comparably high level of education became the norm. Figure 42 compares the development of 
US-American secondary and tertiary enrollment ratios to those of the Eurozone:
47
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               
        
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the World Bank (2015) 
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  Secondary enrollment is expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. 
Tertiary enrollment is expressed as a percentage of the population of the five-year age group following on 
from secondary school leave. Initially, some countries displayed enrollment ratios above 100% (for instance, 
due to the inclusion of under- and over-aged students, early or late school entrance, or grade repetitions). In 
these cases, the values were set to 100% instead. 
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In the earlier decades of the 20
th
 century, US-American educational institutions gradually 
opened up to previously unprivileged groups of the population (such as minorities, females, 
and lower income groups). This led to a significant increase in the average workers’ 
productivity, which in turn proved to be an important growth factor in the economy’s 
potential output per capita. However, as can be seen from Figure 42, the process of increasing 
educational participation was largely concluded as of 2013. Consequently, Gordon (2014) 
argues that education will be much less substantial in driving future US-American potential 
output per capita, as compared to earlier decades. 
For the Eurozone, the same appears to be true in terms of secondary enrollment. As 
of 2013, all member countries except Malta had reached secondary enrollment ratios close 
to 100% for both their male and their female populations. In many countries, this adjustment 
took somewhat longer compared to the USA (especially in the case of the female population), 
which may indicate that the Eurozone’s potential output per capita still experienced a positive 
impact between 1970 and 2013. But as the process of increasing secondary enrollment is 
almost concluded by now, it can be expected that the effect of higher participation on future 
potential output per capita growth will be negligible. 
The case of tertiary, on the other hand, is a bit different. As of 2013, many Eurozone 
countries displayed enrollment ratios which were much lower than the US-American ones. If 
these ratios continue to rise in the future, this could have a significant impact on productivity 
and, hence, potential output per capita. The threat of ‘educational stagnation’, which 
Gordon (2014) suspects to be a significant headwind to US-American economic growth, 
might therefore be smaller in the case of the Eurozone. However, it has to be taken into 
account that many Eurozone economies rely on their apprenticeship systems to a much larger 
extent than the USA (particularly Germany with its “dual system”, see Lazaryan, Neelakantan 
and Price 2014). Given that these apprenticeship systems often lead to the education of highly 
skilled workers (Clark 2001), an increase in tertiary enrollments at the expense of the number 
of apprentices would not necessarily be productivity-enhancing.  
Gordon (2012) further argues that the education-related headwind in the USA is 
aggravated by the significant “cost inflation in higher education”. As college tuition fees 
continue to grow rapidly compared to the price of other goods, tertiary education becomes 
increasingly inaccessible for the lower income population. In the long run, this may lead to a 
substantial loss in the US-American economic potential. In this regard, the Eurozone has one 
significant advantage: the private costs of education are much lower compared to the USA.                                                                                                                                         
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This is displayed in Figure 43, which compares the Eurozone’s private costs of tertiary 
education (which are composed of direct costs and foregone earnings) to those of the USA:
48
 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the OECD (2014) 
As of 2010, only the Netherlands displayed total costs of tertiary education that rivaled 
those of the USA (which were more than twice as high as the OECD average). In addition, the 
direct costs of education (such as tuition fees) amounted to only a small fraction of the total 
costs for the Eurozone, while the larger share was represented by foregone earnings. Only in 
the USA did the direct costs of education surpass the amount of foregone earnings. Of course 
it has to be taken into account that the private benefits of attaining tertiary education were also 
larger in the USA than in most other countries (OECD 2014), but the high amount of direct 
costs represents a much bigger challenge for US-American college students:
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Table 7: Tuition Fees & Financial Aid to Students in 2010, Eurozone vs. USA 
 Annual Tuition Fees in US$ Percentage of Students who received Financial Aid 
 Public 
Institutions 
Government
Dependent 
Private 
Institutions 
Independent 
Private 
Institutions 
Public Loans Scholarships
/Grants 
Public Loans 
and 
Scholarships
/Grants 
No Public 
Loans and/or 
Scholarships
/Grants 
Austria 860 860 Up to 11,735 n.a. 15 n.a. 85 
Belgium (Fl.) 576-653 576-653 n.a. n.a. 19 n.a. 81 
Belgium (Fr.) 653 754 n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 84 
Estonia n.a. 3,527 5,322 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Finland 0 0 n.a. n.a. 54 n.a. 46 
France 200-1,402 1,138-8,290 n.a. n.a. 31 n.a. 69 
Ireland 6,450 n.a. n.a. n.a. 37 n.a. n.a. 
Italy 1,407 n.a. 4,406 n.a. 19 n.a. 81 
Netherlands 1,966 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85 15 
Slovakia Up to 2,916 n.a. n.a. n.a. 26 n.a. n.a. 
Spain 1,129 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United States 5,402 n.a. 17,163 13 26 37 24 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the OECD (2014) 
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 The private costs of attaining tertiary education were evaluated by comparing workers attaining tertiary 
education to those attaining upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education. Costs were expressed 
in equivalent US$ after adjusting them using data on PPP. No information was available for Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Malta. 
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 Only national full-time students are included. Costs were expressed in equivalent US$ after adjusting them 
using data on PPP. No information was available for Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
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Figure 43: Private Costs of Attaining Tertiary Education in the OECD (2010) 
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While comparative information on tuition fees and financial aid to students is incomplete, 
Table 7 still delivers two important points. Firstly, as of 2010, tuition fees were in fact much 
higher for the USA than for most Eurozone countries, especially with regard to public 
institutions. And secondly, about 50% of all US-American students received a public loan 
bound to compulsory repayment, much higher than in any Eurozone country except the 
Netherlands.
50
 And since Table 7 does not deliver information on private loans, the actual 
debt burden might be even higher.   
Based on the information delivered by Figure 43 and Table 7, it cannot be ruled out that 
increasing costs of tertiary education may also lead to lower college enrollment and higher 
student debt in the Eurozone. But even in this case, the effect would surely be much less 
adverse compared to the USA which, in the words of Gordon (2014), faces the threat of 
creating “a new generation of indebted baristas and taxi drivers”. The present section 
therefore concludes that the Eurozone is not facing the acute threat of seeing its potential 
output per capita growth lowered due to “educational stagnation”. While further quantitative 
research would be needed in order to assess whether the Eurozone’s economy is adversely 
affected by a slower growth in enrollment ratios or an increase in the private costs of tertiary 
education, this headwind would be less profound than in the case of the USA. 
 
4.1.3 Inequality 
Rising inequality represents the third headwind which, according to Gordon (2012, 2014), 
may reduce future growth in potential output per capita. He points out that, in recent years, the 
average per capita income was growing much faster than the median real income. The larger 
share of income gains was captured by the richest one percent of the population. 
Gordon (2014) concludes that, if GDP is defined as consumer welfare and if consumers are 
defined as the bottom 99% of the income distribution, real GDP per capita was growing at a 
slower pace than indicated by the official numbers. Consequently, every further increase in 
income inequality would lead to a decrease in potential GDP per capita growth. 
Concerning the Eurozone, Section 2.3 has already shown that income inequality has 
recently increased in most member countries. However, as detailed data on income 
distribution was only available for the year 2000 onwards, it is difficult to draw con-          
clusions on future developments solely on this information. But according to Piketty (2014), 
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 And in the case of the Netherlands, the available information did not reveal whether those “public loans and 
scholarships/grants”, which were received by 85% of the students, did effectively pledge them to repay    
these loans. 
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capital/income ratios – which have steadily increased in most European countries since 
the 1950s – will continue to grow substantially in the next decades:51 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by Piketty (2014) 
According to Piketty (2014), capital amounted to no less than 544% of Western Europe’s 
GDP (Germany: 412%, France: 575%) and 400% of Eastern Europe’s GDP in 2010. Until 
2100, he expects these ratios to increase to 744% and 693%, respectively. He argues that this 
trend, which he attributes to higher relative returns on capital, will lead to an increasing 
concentration of wealth, probably even to “levels of inequality never before seen”. If these 
predictions are correct, this would indicate that the richest one percent of the Eurozone’s 
population will continue to capture ever larger shares of the available income gains. In the 
context of Gordon’s (2012, 2014) findings, this development would constitute a significant 
headwind for the Eurozone’s growth in potential output per capita.  
However, the bleak outlook given by Piketty (2014) has not remained unchallenged. 
Analyzing Piketty’s original data, Rognlie (2014) finds that recent increases in capital wealth 
and income inequality are by no means self-enforcing, but are rather driven by rising housing 
prices.
52
 He explains the importance of housing – which “accounts for nearly 100% of the 
long-term increase in the capital/income ratio” – by the artificial scarcity of land: as 
governments implement land use regulations, land becomes scarce relative to output, which in 
turn leads to a higher relative price of land and housing. This implication is particularly 
important for the present analysis: if inequality is indeed significantly driven by housing 
prices, the current development of these prices might allow for conclusions on future 
inequality in the Eurozone. 
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 Private capital is defined as the “total value of private wealth in real estate, financial assets, and professional 
capital, net of debt”.  
52
 These findings are similar to those of Homburg (2015a), who analyzes Piketty’s original data as well and 
shows that recent increases in wealth-income ratios can largely be attributed to rising land prices (compare to 
Figure 38 and 39). While not specifically focusing on housing prices (in contrast to Rognlie 2014), he arrives 
at the similar conclusion that increases in wealth are not bound to a rising capital-income share. In other 
words, increasing wealth does not necessarily imply higher inequality. It follows that Piketty’s (2014) 
predictions of ever-increasing levels of inequality have to be taken with caution. 
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In order to test for this, the development of housing prices in the Eurozone was investi-
gated, with the results being displayed in Figure 45. In most member countries, housing prices 
increased much faster than disposable household income until the financial crisis (the only 
exceptions being Germany, Austria, Portugal, and Slovakia). After the onset of the Great 
Recession, housing prices dropped significantly relative to disposable household income:
53
  
Source: Author’s calculations following Friggit (2012); based on data provided by Mack and Martínez-
García (2011), Eurostat (2015), and the IMF (2015) 
As of 2013, the results were mixed: in seven out of 18 Eurozone countries, housing prices 
had experienced a much higher growth relative to disposable household income since the 
year 2000. The discrepancy was particularly large in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg     
(the even higher increases in Malta and Slovenia have to be taken with caution,                            
see Footnote 53). On the other hand, the opposite was true in four countries, where              
housing prices had experienced a much lesser growth compared to disposable household            
income. In the remaining seven countries, both indicators had grown more or less            
comparably from 2000 to 2013.  
Hence, the development of housing prices only allows for a miscellaneous outlook on 
inequality in the Eurozone. Provided that Rognlie (2014) is correct in assuming that 
capital/income-ratios (one of the driving forces of inequality according to Piketty 2014) are 
primarily driven by housing prices, the recurring of higher growth rates in housing prices may 
lead to a substantial increase in inequality. However, as of 2015, it is difficult to predict this 
behaviour. If the fast growth of housing prices relative to disposable household income would 
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 No information was available for Estonia. In the case of the five remaining countries in the New country 
group, information on disposable household income was only available for the years 2005-2013. Based on 
this, the values for the years 2000-2004 were worked backwards using the growth rates of the respective 
countries’ GDP per capita for the same time period (IMF 2015). As the growth rates of GDP per capita and 
disposable household income may differ substantially, these results have to be taken with caution.  
Figure 45: Home Price Indices vs. Disposable Household Income in the Eurozone,     
1995-2013 (Index = 2000)  
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have continued in the absence of the Great Recession, it might be assumed that these high 
growth rates will arise again once the Eurozone has overcome its economic hardships. On the 
other hand, unpredictable developments – such as the availability of more land due to higher 
governmental supply or the possible burst of a future housing bubble – might keep average 
growth rates at lower levels. In any case, policy makers should keep a close look on housing 
prices in the different Eurozone member countries, and possibly intervene if they threaten to 
create an inequality-related headwind to future economic growth. 
 
4.1.4 Government Debt 
The final headwind identified by Gordon (2012, 2014) for the US economy is represented by 
government debt. The logic of this is straightforward: as the growth rate of potential GDP per 
capita decreases (particularly due to the remaining headwinds), tax revenues will grow slower 
than expected as well. As a consequence, the US government will have to face an uneasy 
choice: If it wants to avoid any further increase in its debt-to-GDP ratio (which has risen 
from 33.8% in 2001 to 80.9% in 2015, see IMF 2015), it has to reduce expenses and/or raise 
taxes. However, both higher taxes and lower transfers would lead to a decrease in disposable 
household income, dampening economic activity and, as a consequence, growth in potential 
output per capita. As a result, Gordon (2014) predicts that the US-American debt-to-GDP 
ratio might increase to 150% in the late 2030s, and to much more in the longer run due to 
“apparently intractable pension burdens”. 
As Gordon warns about unsustainable levels of government debt in the USA, this threat 
may be even more acute in the case of the Eurozone, which is still struggling to overcome the 
combined effects of the Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis. Figure 46 compares the 
debt-to-GDP ratio of the United States to those of the Eurozone:
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the IMF (2015) 
Figure 46: Debt-to-GDP Ratios in the Eurozone and the United States, 2000-2015 
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Between 2007 and 2015, debt-to-GDP ratios increased in every single Eurozone country, with 
the increase ranging from only 1.6% (Germany) to 82.9% (Ireland).
54
 As of 2015, average 
levels of debt amounted to 43.2% (Core), 115.3% (Periphery), and 44.9% (New). However, 
intragroup variation was substantial, and some countries displayed debt-to-GDP ratios far 
above the average of their respective group. For example, the Core group displayed ratios                      
from -45.1% (Finland) to 90.6% (France). Hence, if Gordon (2014) is correct in assuming that 
the US-American debt-to-GDP ratio of 80.9% is seriously threatening fiscal stability and 
future economic growth, then the same may be true in the case of the Eurozone. 
In order to draw conclusions on this, it has to be taken into account that higher levels of 
government debt are not necessarily associated with slower economic growth. As has been 
laid out before, a government may choose to increase its debt burden in order to finance 
expenses for which it otherwise would have to raise taxes or decrease transfers. In this regard, 
an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio may be stimulating economic growth. In the case of the 
Eurozone, the empirical research by Checherita and Rother (2010) suggests that, on average, 
the negative growth effect of high debt sets in at debt-to-GDP ratios of 70-100%. Figure 47 
depicts this relationship using quarterly data for the Eurozone: 55 
Left Chart: 1999-2007 (n=640), right chart: 2008-2015 (n=522). Source: Author’s illustration; based on data 
provided by the IMF (2015) and the World Bank (2015) 
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 Debt-to-GDP ratios were expressed as government net debt divided by GDP. While gross debt is often used 
as a benchmark for evaluating government indebtedness (as an example, see Lo and Rogoff 2015), this may 
overstate the actual debt burden for some countries. For example, Finland’s gross government debt amounted 
to 59.3% of its GDP in 2015, while its net debt amounted to -45.1% (IMF 2015). As information on net 
government debt was not available for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Figure 46 
displays the gross debt-to-GDP ratio for these countries instead. 
55
 For Cyprus, Lithuania, and Malta, information on GDP growth was not provided by the World Bank (2015) 
and has therefore been taken from the IMF (2015). No data was available for Slovenia. In the case of Malta, 
no data was available for the years 1999 and 2000. The IMF (2015) did not provide information on net public 
debt for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Complementary data was therefore taken from 
the World Bank (2015). As a result, the information in Figure 47 slightly differs compared to Figure 46. 
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Figure 47: Government Debt and GDP Growth in the Eurozone, Pre-Crisis vs. Post-Crisis 
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Before the financial crisis, larger debt-to-GDP ratios were, on average, associated with 
higher levels of GDP growth. After the onset of the Great Recession, however, the opposite 
was true: higher debt burdens were now associated with lower growth rates (particularly in 
the Periphery and the New group).
56
 As post-crisis growth experienced a lower reduction in 
the less indebted Core countries, the simple correlation analysis in Figure 47 delivers some 
support for the findings of Checherita and Rother (2010). 
In addition to having an adverse effect on economic growth, very high levels of public debt 
may raise the question of fiscal stability. The following chart compares the Eurozone’s 
governmental debt burden to Fitch’s long-term credit rating for government bonds, which can 
be taken as an (imperfect) indicator of fiscal stability:57 
Left Chart: 1999-2007 (n=648), right chart: 2008-2015 (n=522). Source: Author’s illustrations, based on data 
provided by Fitch Ratings (2012, 2015), the IMF (2015) and the World Bank (2015) 
Due to increasing levels of government debt, the fitted line displays a much steeper curve 
for the years 2008-2015, and a significant degree of downgrading took place in the highly 
indebted Periphery group. As long-term credit ratings for government bonds reflect the 
creditworthiness of sovereign states and determine their borrowing costs, this development 
might be indicative for a decreasing fiscal stability in the Eurozone.
58
 
So far, the present section has shown that high levels of public debt are surely a matter of 
concern for the Eurozone. Solely based on these findings, however, it is difficult to conclude 
whether public debt will materialize as a profound headwind for the Eurozone, and a number 
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 This also indicates that, contrary to popular belief, the slow recovery in the periphery countries was not 
initiated by imposed austerity policies. For a more detailed assessment of this, see Homburg (2013a, 2015b).  
57
 As in Figure 47, quarterly information on government net debt in the Eurozone was provided by the 
IMF (2015) for all countries except Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovakia. For these countries, data was 
been taken from the World Bank (2015). No data was available for Slovenia. 
58
 In recent years (and especially since the global financial crisis), credit rating agencies have been subject to an 
increasing degree of criticism. In particular, critics have debated the accuracy of credit ratings and possible 
adverse effects on a country’s financial stability. However, taking these effects into account would be beyond 
the scope of the present analysis, and long-term credit ratings for government bonds have therefore been 
taken as a simple proxy for fiscal stability. Further information on the importance of rating agencies on the 
Eurozone’s economy is provided by Paudyn (2013). 
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Figure 48: Government Debt and Credit Rating in the Eurozone, Pre-Crisis vs. Post-Crisis 
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of additional factors would have to be taken into account. For instance, Reinhart, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2012) and Bornhorst and Arranz (2014) show that conclusions on the impact of 
public debt on potential economic growth cannot be drawn without taking the size and 
structure of private and external debt into account as well. Similarly, the importance of public 
and private deleveraging would have to be analyzed: Authors such as Koo (2014) and Lo and 
Rogoff (2015) argue that it is not the actual size of the debt burden, but rather the prolonged 
process of deleveraging which hinders potential output growth. In contrast to Gordon (2012, 
2014), who considers high levels of debt to be a long-term headwind, they argue that a 
balance sheet recession may be overcome by appropriate policy measures.  
However, taking these (and other) considerations into account would be beyond the scope 
of the present analysis. This section therefore simply concludes that high levels of public debt 
will remain a considerable challenge for the Eurozone in the foreseeable future. Luckily, 
European policymakers are fully aware of this threat (see, for instance, Draghi 2015), and it 
remains yet to see whether they can avoid the emergence of a debt-related headwind. 
Summing up, Section 4.1 has investigated whether the Eurozone faces the threat of secular 
stagnation as defined by Gordon (2012, 2014), who proposes that four distinct headwinds may 
substantially decrease future growth in potential output per capita in the case of the USA. It 
was found that demographic factors, combined with a decrease in labor productivity growth, 
will most likely turn into a headwind for the Eurozone’s economy. The same might be true for 
income inequality and government debt, although future trends in these indicators are difficult 
to predict. The last possible headwind, education, will probably have a much less adverse 
effect compared to the USA. Hence, while acknowledging that at least three out of these four 
factors will challenge the Eurozone’s future economic growth, current evidence is not 
sufficient enough to assert that they will constitute a prolonged period of secular stagnation. 
 
4.2 A Possible Demise of Technological Growth 
After having dismissed both the (new) secular stagnation theory proposed by 
Summers (2014a, 2014b) as well as Gordon’s (2012, 2014) ‘headwinds’ in the context of the 
Eurozone, the present section investigates one final definition of secular stagnation: the 
possible demise of technological growth. According to a number of scholars, the largest 
impediment to long-run economic growth might be a slowdown of innovation. It is argued 
that current technological advances have a much smaller impact on productivity growth – and, 
ultimately, on per capita output growth – than those of earlier periods (such as electricity or 
the steam engine). This ‘innovation stagnation’ hypothesis is therefore closely related to the 
58  
 
‘headwinds’ of Gordon (2012), although he stresses that technology was not his primary 
concern (see Gordon 2014).
59
 Nevertheless, the innovation stagnation hypothesis has recently 
been advanced by scholars such as Kasparov and Thiel (2012) and Fernald (2014) and 
features prominently in many subsequent works on secular stagnation (see, for instance, 
Teulings and Baldwin 2014). As many of the Eurozone’s member countries may be 
characterized as innovation economies, possible innovation stagnation could have a profound 
impact on future economic growth. Hence, this final – and, admittedly, rather broad – 
definition of secular stagnation has been investigated as well. 
Technological progress is essentially unobservable, but it may be defined as the increase in 
output growth which cannot be explained by changes in production inputs (Solow 1957). In 
order to draw conclusions on technological progress, it has been approximated by total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth in the present analysis. If we are in fact experiencing an era of 
innovation stagnation, TFP growth rates should have declined substantially compared to 
periods of significant technological progress. It follows that long-term historical data on TFP 
is needed in order to test for innovation stagnation. Unfortunately, in the case of the Eurozone 
countries, detailed data on that matter is scarce. However, estimations for the last 125-145 
years have been given by Gordon (2012, 2014) and Shackleton (2013) for the US economy: 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on the data provided by Gordon (2012, 2014), Shackleton (2013), and the 
FRBSF (2015). Vertical lines depict the growth cycles identified by Shackleton (2013) 
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 While Kasparov & Thiel (2012) expect a significant slowdown in the pace of technological progress, 
Gordon (2014) makes it clear that he does not. Rather, he argues that constant technological change will 
translate into lower rates of productivity growth compared to previous decades. Hence, it was taken that 
Gordon’s headwinds and the innovation stagnation theory follow two different economic rationales, which is 
why they have been investigated separately. 
 In fact, technology could also be investigated within the context of Summers’ (2014a, 2014b) definition of 
secular stagnation. Similarly to a negative aggregate demand shock, a positive technology shock may 
potentially drive down the natural real rate (see Arestis and Chortareas 2008 and Andréz, López-Salido and 
Nelson 2009). However, as Section 3 has already ruled out the threat of secular stagnation as defined by 
Summers, technology was only analyzed in the broader sense provided by the present section. 
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Figure 49 delivers two important implications for the discussion on innovation stagnation. 
Firstly, as proposed by Shackleton (2013), US-American technological progress can roughly 
be divided into growth cycles. Secondly, the US-American TFP is currently growing much 
slower compared to earlier cycles. Owed to advances in information technology, TFP growth 
has accelerated between 1990 and 2010 compared to 1970-1990, but still remained much 
lower compared to the period of 1920-1970. While such detailed information is only available 
for the USA, it can be argued that the developments should have been similar in the (Core) 
Eurozone and other innovation economies (such as Great Britain or Japan). Hence, Figure 49 
seems to support the “Gordon-Kasparov-Theil” argument, according to which our 
technological frontier is expanding more slowly than it once did. This slowdown in 
technological progress would then translate into lower productivity growth and, consequently, 
lower per capita output growth (Lo & Rogoff 2015). 
However, while Figure 49 has indicated that technological progress is currently slower 
than it used to be, any reflection on the threat of innovation stagnation has to go beyond that – 
more precisely, it requires estimating the likely evolution of future technological           
growth. Hence, two main questions were examined: firstly, is it probable that TFP will                   
continue to grow at low levels, or will future technological advances prove the                              
pessimists wrong? And secondly, what will be the role of the Eurozone in shaping future                    
technological progress?  
While current technological progress is not directly observable, this is all the more true for 
future technological progress. However, as has been shown by Jalles (2010), there exist at 
least two suitable proxies: patents and intellectual property rights indices. Figure 50 displays 
the development of patent applications at the world’s leading offices: 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the IMF (2015) and the WIPO (2015) 
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Between 1985 and 2013, the total number of worldwide patent applications grew 
from 920,000 to 2,570,000, mainly due to large increases in China and the USA. The number 
of applications grew more slowly for the European Patent Office (EPO) and South Korea, 
although the increases were still substantial. Only in Japan did the number of applications 
decrease in recent years, but the country still held the third place as of 2013. A different 
picture is delivered by the number of patent applications per 100,000 inhabitants. When the 
size of the population is accounted for, the Japanese and South Korean offices displayed much 
more applications, although the USA was catching up to a decreasing Japan. For both China 
and the EPO, the growth in the total number of applications was largely offset by rapid 
increases in their population.
60
  
Hence, Figure 50 does not seem to support the gloomy outlook of the innovation 
stagnation hypothesis. Between 1985 and 2013, the total number of patent applications has 
almost tripled, and the number of applications per capita has increased for all offices except 
Japan.
61
 At the same time, the global investment in research and development (R&D) has 
increased significantly, as shown by Figure 51 and 52: 
 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided 
by the OECD (2015) 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided 
by the OECD (2015) 
In most of today’s innovation economies, the share of resources allocated to the 
development of technological progress is growing. From 1981 to 2013, the OECD countries 
(with the exception of Luxembourg, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom) and China 
continuously raised their relative expenses for R&D. Simultaneously, the number of re-                         
searchers per capita significantly increased in every single OECD country plus China. As                                        
                                                          
60
 The EPO’s “population” grew much faster than the actual European population due to the continuous 
admission of new member states. While only 11 countries were EPO members in 1985 (inhabitants: 
291 million), this number had increased to 28 in 2013 (inhabitants: 605 million). 
61
 According to Glaeser (2014), the large increase in the number of patents could also indicate that modern 
patents have become less important, or that patent offices have lowered the requirements for applications. 
However, he argues that these factors are not likely to be significant. 
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future technological progress can be expected to be more knowledge-intensive compared to 
earlier cycles (Mokyr 2014a, 2014b), this is only consequential and casts further doubt on the 
notion of innovation stagnation. 
Until now, the present section has only focused on those countries which have primarily 
driven technological growth during recent decades. If the focus is instead turned towards a 
worldwide perspective, it can easily be seen that our global population still holds large 
amounts of untapped potential:
62
 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the World Bank (2015) 
As of 2012, tertiary enrollment ratios amounted to more than 90% in the case of North 
America, and to almost 70% in the case of the European Union. For all other world regions, 
the ratios were significantly lower than 50%. However, the latter regions – with the exception 
of Sub-Saharan Africa – all displayed high growth rates since the mid-1990s. In most cases, 
this was coupled with high population growth (especially in East and South Asia), leading to a 
rapid increase in the global (tertiary) student population:
63
 
Source: Author’s illustration, based on data provided by the World Bank (2015) 
                                                          
62
 Tertiary Enrollment is defined as “the total enrollment in tertiary education […], regardless of age, expressed 
as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following in from secondary school 
leaving”. No distinction is made between sexes. As the European Union and the Eurozone displayed almost 
the same enrollment ratios, the Eurozone has not been highlighted separately. 
63
 No distinction was made between sexes, public and private institutions, or full- and part-time students. 
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Between 1970 and 2012, the global population roughly doubled, while the global student 
population increased by the factor of six. As the global population will still grow in the 
coming decades, and as tertiary enrollment ratios can be considered to increase further as well 
(especially in East and South Asia, see Figure 53), the number of students will continue to 
grow faster than the number of humans. This delivers an important implication for the 
discussion on innovation stagnation: even if the student population in North America and 
Europe does not increase further (due to low population growth and high enrollment ratios), 
the vastly growing number of students on a global scale may help to maintain (and potentially 
even increase) the speed of innovation. It is therefore argued that a global demise of 
technological growth seems quite unlikely. 
But which role will the Eurozone play in shaping future technological progress? As has 
been shown in Figure 50, the EPO is still one of the world’s leading patent offices. But 
compared to the other large offices, applications are relatively low in absolute numbers, and 
even more so when adjusted for population size. Furthermore, as with most other economic 
indicators, large intergroup differences persist within the Eurozone. In 2013, 59.5% of all 
EPO applications were filed by the Core countries (particularly Germany and France), 9.6% 
were filed by the Periphery countries (mainly Italy and Spain), and only 0.4% were filed by 
members of the New country group:
64
 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by the WIPO (2013) 
The large degree of intergroup differences is partly related to differences in intellectual 
property rights (IPR), which Jalles (2010) has defined as a second possible proxy for 
technological progress. As of 2014, the IPR index and most of its subscores were usually 
much smaller in the Periphery and New countries (Ireland being the only notable exception): 
                                                          
64
 The remaining 30.5% were largely attributable to Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. Significantly smaller numbers were filed by residents of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, San Marino, and 
Turkey. Applications filed by residents of non-EPO countries were not included. 
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Figure 55: The Eurozone’s Share in Global Patent Applications (2013) 
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Source: Author’s illustration; based on data provided by the PRA (2015) 
In particular, copyright protection and the protection of individual property rights were 
much lower in those countries.65 As these indices are significantly linked to the evolvement of 
innovation, further improvements could ensure that these countries play a larger role as 
drivers of technological process.  
But what if the Eurozone’s innovation environment cannot be significantly increased? 
What if the Eurozone’s student population will not grow further due to adverse demographics, 
what if budget constraints prohibit the allocation of additional resources for R&D, and what if 
the number of patents filed at the EPO remains low? Or, to put it bluntly, what if the 
Eurozone will be playing an ever smaller role in driving global technological growth? Even in 
this case, the Eurozone would not face any type of secular stagnation in the shape of slow 
technological growth. In our globalized world, innovation spillovers will also be felt in 
slower-growing areas – if a Chinese firm achieves a breakthrough in biotechnology or 
artificial intelligence, this knowledge will sooner or later become accessible to Western 
researchers and firms as well.   
As a conclusion, the present section has shown that the global economy – and, hence, the 
Eurozone – will not suffer from innovation stagnation in the near future. Rather, it is argued 
that technological growth will be sustained or even accelerated, as has been proposed by 
authors such as Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) and Mokyr (2014a, 2014b). But while the 
predictions of these authors have often been considered as too optimistic and scientifically 
unfounded,
66
 the present section bases its conclusion solely on factor endowments. The global 
population of college students – and, consequently, the number of researchers – is rapidly 
                                                          
65
 For most of the countries included in Figure 56, information on the IPR and its subscores was given for the 
years 2007-2014. However, most of these scores did not experience substantial changes during said time 
period. Because of this, the development over time has not been displayed. No data was available for Estonia, 
Latvia, and Slovenia. 
66
 For instance, Gordon (2014) regards them as “techno-optimists [who] focus entirely on their hopes and 
dreams of unprecedented future breakthroughs in technology” and who predict “hypothetical future 
breakthroughs without any contact with the historical data”. 
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growing. In almost all advanced economies, the amount of resources allocated to R&D is 
much larger compared to previous decades – and it is still increasing. Faced with this 
empirical evidence, it is difficult to believe that the technological frontier will                  
expand significantly more slowly in the future. Hence, in addition to the propositions of 
Summers (2014a, 2014b) and Gordon (2012, 2014), this third definition of secular stagnation 
is rejected as well in the case of the Eurozone. 
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5 Monetary Policy and the Decline of the Natural Rate of Interest 
5.1 Identifying the ‘Correct’ Target Rate for the Eurozone 
Section 3 has proposed a contemporary estimation of the Eurozone’s natural real rate of 
interest. It was found that, while the natural real rate was exposed to a considerable downward 
trend in recent years, it had not become negative. With core inflation rates close to 1%, the 
real interest rate 𝑟𝑡 was still located considerably below 𝑟𝑡
∗. Therefore, it was concluded that 
the Eurozone did not enter an era of secular stagnation as defined by Summers (2014a, 
2014b). However, a decline in the natural real rate still has important implications for the 
Eurozone’s monetary policy, as 𝑟𝑡
∗ is a key variable in the monetary-policy rule defined by 
Taylor (1993). The present section aims at investigating how the decline in 𝑟𝑡
∗ has affected the 
target rate recommended by the Taylor rule and whether or not the ECB’s monetary        
policy has been appropriate against this background. In its general form, the Taylor rule                 
can be written as 
 𝑖𝑡
𝑇 = 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
∗ + 𝑎𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝑎𝑦?̃?𝑡, (20) 
where 𝑖𝑡
𝑇 is the target rate, 𝑟𝑡
∗ is the natural real rate of interest, ?̃?𝑡 is the inflation gap (as 
defined by equation (14)) and ?̃?𝑡 is the output gap (as defined by equation (13)). In his initial 
paper, Taylor (1993) made the additional assumption that 
 𝑎𝜋 = 𝑎𝑦 = 0.5. (21) 
However, following this proposition resulted in target rates which were remarkably lower 
than the actual interest rate for most of the observation period. Hence, as recommended by 
Nechio (2011), it was assumed that the ECB places more emphasis on the output gap than on 
the inflation gap, resulting in 𝑎𝜋 = 0.5 and 𝑎𝑦 = 1. Furthermore, the ECB has declared an 
inflation target of 2%. Under these assumptions, equation (20) can be rewritten as 
 𝑖𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑟𝑡
∗ + 1.5𝜋𝑡 − 1 + ?̃?𝑡. (22) 
In his original proposition, Taylor (1993) specified 𝑟𝑡
∗ to be 2%. Since then, it has become 
the prevalent approach among economists to assume a constant natural real rate when 
calculating the Taylor rule (see, for example, Moons and Van Poeck 2008, Nechio 2011, 
Bouis et al. 2013
67
 and Afflatet 2014 for the Eurozone). In the present analysis, it was initially 
assumed as well that the natural rate of interest equaled 2% over the entire observation period. 
This restriction was then relaxed later on. Quarterly data on (core) inflation and seasonally 
                                                          
67
 Bouis et al. (2013) estimate the Eurozone’s natural real rate for the years 1980-2012 and acknowledge that it 
has declined substantially, but use a constant rate of 1.9% for their calculations of the Taylor rule. 
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adjusted GDP was taken from Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015). Some scholars, such as 
Rudebusch (2010) and Nechio (2011), have argued that the output gap may be replaced by the 
unemployment gap in order to obtain a better estimate of the target rate. In a comparative 
approach, ?̃?𝑡 was therefore replaced by (−?̃?𝑡) as defined by equation (15). The OECD (2015) 
estimates ?̃?𝑡 using a production function approach and 𝑢𝑡
∗ using an inflation modeling 
approach. For comparison, the output gap and the unemployment gap were approximated 
using a HP filter with λ=1,600, as recommended for quarterly data (Ravn and Uhlig 2002).68 
Figure 57 compares the target rates calculated from this framework to the ECB’s main 
refinancing operations (MRO) rate: 
Source: Author’s calculations following Taylor (1993) and Nechio (2011); based on data provided by the 
ECB (2015), Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
It was found that the different setups produced strongly varying results. For instance, 
from 2009 to mid-2010, both measures based on the output gap reported a target rate below 
the actual MRO rate, while the calculations based on the unemployment gap suggested the 
opposite. For the last observation period, the deviation of the different estimates amounted to 
up to 3.46%. Overall, it seemed that the estimates were somewhat more volatile when they 
were based on the output gap. At the same time, the target rate tended to be overestimated for 
the most recent years when the output or unemployment gap was extracted from a HP filter – 
as of 03/2015, increasing the MRO to 2.7% could be considered unrealistic at best. On the 
other hand, the target rate seemed to provide a reasonable fit and was more in line with other 
recent literature when based on the unemployment gap calculated by the OECD’s inflation 
modeling approach. Hence, subsequent calculations were based on this measure. 
                                                          
68
 As has been mentioned in Footnote 31 and 33, output and unemployment gaps calculated from a HP filter 
have to be taken with caution. However, since it is often found that HP filtered results closely match those 
derived from more theoretically founded calculations, the HP filter was applied as a comparative measure 
nevertheless. 
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Figure 57: Taylor Rule Recommendations and MRO Rate, 1999-2015 
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After having determined the most convenient slack variable, the assumption of a constant 
natural real rate was relaxed. To this effect, the previously obtained monthly estimates of 𝑟𝑡
∗ 
(both real-time and smoothed) were converted into quarterly data and entered into 
Equation 22. Figure 58 compares the target rate provided by a constant 𝑟𝑡
∗ of 2% to those 
resulting from a time-varying 𝑟𝑡
∗: 
Source: Author’s calculations following Taylor (1993) and Nechio (2011); based on the author’s estimates of the 
natural real rate and on data provided by the ECB (2015), Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
From 1999 to 2015, the average target rates derived from a time-varying 𝑟𝑡
∗ were 2.17% 
(real-time estimates) and 2.01% (smoothed estimates), fairly close to the actual MRO rate, 
which had an average of 2.23%. The average target rate derived from a constant 𝑟𝑡
∗ of 2% was 
much higher, at 2.95%. It is difficult to believe that for the years 2009 to 2012 (right after the 
onset of the Great Recession) the MRO rate should have been considerably higher than it 
actually was. Hence, it was concluded that assuming a constant natural real rate (especially a 
relatively high rate, such as 2%) may seriously overestimate the target rate and result in 
misleading policy recommendations.
69
  
In the following, the target rate derived from the author’s (real-time) estimates of 𝑟𝑡
∗ was 
therefore used as a benchmark for evaluating the ECB’s monetary policy. From Q3/2003 to 
Q1/2008, the MRO rate closely followed this target rate. Following Q1/2008, the target rate 
sharply dropped until Q1/2010, while the actual MRO rate was held constant and even 
increased in July 2008, before it was finally reduced in November 2008. Between Q2/2011 
and Q3/2011, the target rate fell by 0.43%, while the MRO rate was increased twice by a total 
of 0.5% before being reduced again. In all of these cases, the ECB prematurely increased the 
MRO rate, leading to the creation of contractionary forces in the Eurozone. Similarly, the 
                                                          
69
 For example, Darvas (2014) calculates a target rate for the Eurozone using a constant natural real rate of 2% 
and finds that the MRO rate was continuously below the target rate for the entire period from 2001 to 2014. 
This proposition would surely have turned out more cautiously if a time-varying (or at least a smaller 
constant) natural real rate had been chosen in the calculations. 
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Figure 58: Taylor Rule Recommendations at Different Levels of the 
Natural Rate, 1999-2015 
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target rate dropped sharply following Q1/2012 and became negative in Q2/2013, while        
the actual MRO rate was reduced more slowly and was not brought to the ZLB                      
before September 2014.  
The results of this section have demonstrated that from 2002 to 2007, the MRO rate closely 
followed the target rate if the latter was based on the unemployment gap (calculated from the 
OECD’s NAIRU measure) and the previously estimated natural real rate. After the onset of 
the Great Recession, the ECB has raised the MRO prematurely on three occasions and 
reduced it to the ZLB later than suggested by the target rate. Still, for the Eurozone as a 
whole, the ECB’s monetary policy seems to have generally been appropriate in the face of a 
declining natural real rate. 
 
5.2 When One Size does not fit All: The Role of Diversity within the Eurozone 
5.2.1 Target Rates, Policy Stress and Convergence at the Aggregated Group Level 
However, a different question would be whether the ECB’s monetary policy could also be 
considered appropriate from the individual member countries’ point of view. In order to 
answer this question, regional differences in the determinants of the Taylor rule (see 
Equation 22) were investigated. Figure 59 depicts output gaps, unemployment gaps, and core 
inflation for the different Eurozone groups:  
Upper charts: 1999-2007 (n=428), lower charts: 2008-2015 (n=406); source: Authors’s illustration following 
Rawdanowicz et al. (2014); based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
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Figure 59: Core Inflation, Output Gaps, and Unemployment Gaps in the Eurozone,  
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As can be seen from the different scatter plots, large intergroup differences existed even 
before the Great Recession began.
70
 In particular, from 1999 to 2007, the Periphery countries 
displayed lower unemployment gaps and much larger output gaps and inflation rates than the 
Core countries. This condition was reversed from 2008 to 2015, with the Periphery countries 
now showing larger unemployment gaps and lower output gaps and levels of inflation 
compared to the Core countries. Furthermore, all variables displayed a much larger standard 
deviation for the Periphery countries (especially for the years following 2008), indicating a 
higher degree of dispersion within this group. In the case of the New countries, means and 
standard deviations were always smaller compared to the Periphery countries, but lay 
considerably above the respective values for the Core countries. Based on this information 
and on the author’s estimates of 𝑟𝑡
∗, quarterly target rates were calculated for each group of 
countries using Equation 22.
71, 72
 The results are displayed in Figure 60: 
Source: Author’s calculations following Taylor (1993) and Nechio (2011); based on the author’s estimates of the 
natural real rate and on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
 
Whether the target rates were calculated using the output gap or the unemployment gap, 
the results indeed suggested the existence of large intergroup differences within the Eurozone. 
Focusing on the right hand graph (as the unemployment gap had been determined as a more 
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 In order to deliver an accurate representation of the diversity within the Eurozone, the Periphery and New 
countries were only included for those years during which they were members of the monetary union. No 
information was avaible for Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta. 
71
 It is surely a strong assumption to consider the author’s estimate of the natural real rate (which has been 
calculated for the Eurozone as a whole) as an appropriate variable in calculating target rates for the different 
country groups. After all, these groups were subject to very different economic dynamics (see Figure 59). 
However, the previous section has shown that assuming a constant rate (e.g., 2%), which has established 
itself as a common practice, would constitute an even stronger and less reliable assumption. As has been 
demonstrated in Section 2.3, it is reasonable to assume that the natural real rate has been subject to significant 
downward pressure in each of the Eurozone countries. Therefore, quarterly aggregates of the author’s 
smoothed estimates – which suggest that the natural real rate has declined from 2.14% to 0.45% between 
01/1997 and 03/2015 – have been used in all subsequent calculations. 
72
 For each group, countries were weighed according to the size of their respective GDP in each observation 
period. The results considerably deviated from those of Nechio (2011), which may be explained by 
differences in the underlying assumptions. For instance, Nechio assigns Italy to the Core rather than the 
Periphery group and assumes a constant natural real rate of 2%. 
Figure 60: Taylor Rule Recommendations at the Aggregated Group Level, 1999-2015 
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suitable basis in the previous section), the target rate for the Core group was below the actual 
MRO rate until the beginning of the Great Recession and above the MRO rate afterwards. 
Using the words of Wren-Lewis (2014), this means that the ECB’s monetary policy has been 
“too tight” for the Core group until about 2009, and “too easy” since then. For the Periphery 
countries, the opposite was true: the results suggested that the rate should have been much 
higher until 2008 and should have been reduced to the ZLB much earlier after that. The 
absolute degree of deviation was also much larger for the Periphery group than for the Core 
group in almost all observation periods. The countries within the New group consecutively 
entered the Eurozone between 2007 and 2015, and it seems that their target rate converged 
closer to the actual MRO rate as time progressed.  
In order to gain more precise insights on the economic pressure created by the ECB’s 
common monetary policy, a measure of policy ‘stress’ was created following the example of 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998). According to these authors, the policy ‘stress’ for a given 
group of countries can be defined as the differential between the actual and the optimal 
policy, i.e.:
73
 
 𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = |𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇 − 𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑅𝑂|, (23) 
where 𝑠𝑗,𝑡 is the economic ‘stress’ for a given country group j in period t and 𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑅𝑂 is the 
ECB’s MRO rate. Figure 61 presents the results for the different country groups as well as for 
the Eurozone as a whole:
74
 
Source: Author’s calculations following Clarida et al. (1998) and Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008); based on 
the author’s estimates of the natural real rate and on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
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  While the theoretical justification has been given by Clarida et al. (1998), equation (23) was inspired by 
Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008). 
74
 For each group, countries were weighed according to the size of their respective GDP in each observation 
period. As has been pointed out by Quint (2014), these results strongly differ if a lower limit of 0 is defined 
for every target rate calculated by the Taylor rule. In that case, ‘stress’ levels tend towards 0 following 2008, 
as the ECB gradually reduced the MRO rate to the ZLB. However, doing so would produce some deceptive 
results, such as specifying the same level of ‘stress’ for France and Finland as for Greece in Q1/2015. 
Therefore, it was decided not to define a lower limit for the Taylor rate and to display the deviation between 
actual and optimal policy rate in its entire magnitude instead. 
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Figure 61: Monetary Policy 'Stress' at the Aggregated Group Level, 1999-2015 
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For the years 1999 to 2015, the average ‘stress’ level was 0.59% for the Eurozone as a 
whole, 1.23% for the Core group and 2.81% for the Periphery group. The average pre-crisis 
‘stress’ level (1999-2007) was lower than the post-crisis level (2008-2015) for the Eurozone 
(0.53% vs. 0.69%) and the Periphery group (2.68% vs. 2.97%). For the Core group, pre-crisis 
levels were much higher than post-crisis ones (1.44% vs. 0.99%). From the year 2007 (the 
year of Slovenia’s accession to the Eurozone) to 2015, average ‘stress’ amounted to 3.33% for 
the New group, albeit displaying a noticeable downward tendency.  
Hence, Figure 61 delivers three important insights. Firstly, with the exception of a small 
interlude in 2008, the degree of economic ‘stress’ was much larger for the Periphery than for 
the Core group. Secondly, since the beginning of the Great Recession, economic ‘stress’ has 
declined for the Core and the New group, but massively increased for the Periphery group. 
And finally (and most importantly), the ECB’s monetary policy has been much more 
appropriate for the Eurozone as a whole than from the point of view of the individual country 
groups. Hence, the findings of this section are in line with those of a range of earlier studies 
(see, for instance, Sturm and Wollmershäuser 2008 and Lee and Crowley 2009), even after 
accounting for a decline in the natural real rate. Confronted with this degree of diversity, it 
appears plausible to ask whether a single monetary policy can actually be appropriate for such 
heterogeneous groups of countries. 
Thus, the results of this section are closely related to the debate on the optimum size of 
currency areas. The modern debate on this topic goes back at least until Mundell (1961) who, 
as part of his ‘stabilization argument’, considered currency domain as invaluable in dealing 
with asymmetric shocks and advocated to keep the size of currency areas small.
75, 76
 
Figures 59 to 61 have clearly demonstrated that the Great Recession constituted such an 
asymmetric shock which adversely affected the different Eurozone members.
77
 Many of those 
members – particularly the Periphery countries – would probably have dissented from the 
monetary policy determined by the ECB and pursued measures more suitable for their own 
needs, if they only could. However, this is not open for debate since, as Eichengreen (1998) 
put it, “EU member states with very different preferences [are] shackled to one another by a 
                                                          
75
 In a later paper, however, Mundell reversed his conclusion after implementing a new economic model and 
began advocating larger currency areas instead of smaller ones. McKinnon (2000) demonstrates how    
Mundell – the “intellectual father of the euro” – subsequently arrived at being cited both by proponents and 
opponents of European monetary integration.  
76
  A more detailed comparison between the optimum currency area (OCA) theory and the realities of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is provided by Mongelli (2008). 
77
 This is not to say that the ECB’s monetary policy would generally have been appropriate for all member 
countries if the Great Recession had not occurred. As shown by Deroose, Langedijk and Roeger (2004), the 
Eurozone countries are particularly susceptible to “overheating and overcooling” due to the single monetary 
policy even in ‘normal’ times. 
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single monetary policy”. Consequently, many scholars have defined the task of determining 
such a single monetary policy where “one size fits all” as a substantial challenge since the 
Eurozone was proposed for the first time. Björksten and Syrjänen (2000), Eichengreen (1998, 
2002), Feldstein (1997, 2000), Friedman (1997), Krugman and Obstfeldt (2003), Ohr (1999), 
and Vaubel (1998, 1999) were among those who warned that the large differences between 
the currency union’s member states – both in terms of economic indicators and political 
incentives – might pose a serious impediment to its long-term success.78 
The findings of the present section seem to reassure the propositions of these sceptics. One 
and a half decades after the introduction of a common currency, the Taylor rule 
recommendations have not converged for the different country groups. Rather, the ‘stress’ 
from the common monetary policy is currently much higher for the Eurozone as a whole (and 
even more so for the Periphery group) than it was when the euro was introduced. As long as 
these significant differences persist, the Eurozone will remain far from unfolding its full 
economic potential. This section therefore concludes that, while the Eurozone is unlikely to 
enter an era of secular stagnation in the near future, the threat of a prolonged ‘diversity 
stagnation’ is rather acute and much more substantial.   
 
5.2.2 Target Rates, Policy Stress and Convergence at the Individual Country Level 
As suggested by the scatter plots displayed in Figure 59, the determinants of the Taylor rule 
not only strongly varied among, but also within the respective country groups. For the first 
quarter of 2015, for example, the unemployment gap was 8.46% in Greece compared                      
to -0.83% in Ireland and 1.41% in Finland compared to -0.80% in Germany. Core inflation 
amounted to 1.8% in Austria, but only to 0.7% in France. Hence, while analyzing target rates 
and ‘stress’ levels on an aggregate level (see Figures 60 and 61) delivered an important 
insight on the existing intergroup difference within the Eurozone, it did not offer much 
information on the suitability of the ECB’s monetary policy for the individual member 
countries. Hence, in order to gain more insights on the threat represented by Eurozone 
diversity, the analysis was repeated on the individual level. As such, the Taylor rule was used 
as a benchmark of how monetary policy “might have been in each individual Eurozone 
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 Academic criticism of the extent, effective date, and admission criteria of the European monetary union was 
particularly vocal in Germany. A first manifest arguing for a revision of the proposal (“The Monetary 
Resolutions of Maastricht: A Danger for Europe”) was signed by 62 German economics professors (Ohr and 
Schäfer 1992). It was argued that, while European monetary integration was generally considered desirable, 
the Maastricht criteria were too soft and the remaining time frame too short for achieving an adequate degree 
of convergence among the future members of the currency union. A second manifest (“The Euro starts too 
early”), stated that convergence had not been achieved and that, in contrast, many structural problems had 
actually worsened during the previous years (Kösters et al. 1998). It was supported by no fewer than 
155 German economics professors.  
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economy, if they had retained their own currency and had floated” (Wren-Lewis 2014). 
Figure 62 presents the results for every single Eurozone country. As has been supposed, the 
intragroup differences were found to be substantial:
79
 
  
Source: Author’s calculations following Taylor (1993) and Nechio (2011); based on the author’s estimates of the 
natural real rate and on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
As of Q1/2015, the MRO rate had been reduced to the ZLB. Concerning the Core 
countries, the Taylor rule implies that doing so was appropriate in the case of Finland and 
France. For the remaining five countries, this policy is considered as too loose (particularly in 
Germany, where a target rate of 2.1% is recommended). For most of the depressed Periphery 
countries, the Taylor rule recommends a negative MRO rate, ranging from -0.9% in Portugal 
to -10.8% in Greece (which is, of course, ruled out by the ZLB). Ireland, on the other hand, 
                                                          
79
  Calculations were based on the unemployment gap instead of the output gap, as this procedure had been 
found to deliver the most convenient results in Section 5.1. No data was available for Cyprus, Lithuania, and 
Malta. 
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Figure 62: Taylor Rule Recommendations at the Individual Country Level, 1999-2015 
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would benefit from raising the rate to 1.7%. Finally, in the case of the New country group, the 
Eurozone’s monetary policy is found to be too loose for Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia. For 
Slovenia, keeping the MRO rate at the ZLB can currently be considered as appropriate.  
These findings cast further doubt on the adequacy of the common monetary policy rate. 
Not only was the ECB’s monetary policy too loose for the Core group and too tight for the 
Periphery group following the financial crisis, the discrepancies were even larger from the 
individual countries’ point of view. Following Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008), the degree 
of convergence among member countries (as defined as a reduction in monetary policy 
‘stress’) was investigated more closely:80 
Source: Author’s calculations following Clarida et al. (1998) and Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008); based on 
the author’s estimates of the natural real rate and on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
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  See Footnote 79. 
Figure 63: Monetary Policy ‘Stress’ at the Individual Country Level, 1999-2015 
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While Figure 61 has already shown that the monetary policy ‘stress’ was lower for the 
Eurozone as a whole than for any of the three country groups, Figure 63 allows for a more 
detailed assessment of this pattern. Two points have to be noted. Firstly, As of Q1/2015, not a 
single Eurozone member country exhibited a true pattern of convergence (which would be 
defined as a sustained reduction of its ‘stress’ indicator towards 0).81 And secondly, for each 
country, the ‘stress’ indicator was subject to a large degree of volatility. Annual averages 
were subsequently calculated in order to control for the quarterly fluctuations. The results are 
displayed in Table 8:
82
 
Table 8: Monetary Policy ‘Stress’ at the Individual Country Level, 2001-2015 
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Austria 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.7 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.3 0.6 0.9 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.1 
Belgium 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.9 0.3 1.0 1.5 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.3 0.5 1.0 
Finland 0.5 0.6 1.5 2.6 1.9 0.8 1.0 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.9 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.1 
France 1.4 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.4 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.7 
Germany 2.4 1.3 2.2 1.4 2.6 2.4 1.2 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.6 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.6 
Luxembourg 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.9 1.4 2.2 1.3 1.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 
Netherlands 3.1 2.8 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.8 0.7 0.5 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.0 2.0 0.4 0.4 1.3 
    ø 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.1 
    Core 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Greece 1.3 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.8 4.1 3.6 10.2 14.3 11.6 10.8 5.6 
Ireland 7.2 7.6 6.5 4.7 5.0 7.2 8.1 2.3 10.8 6.6 2.3 3.1 1.4 0.7 1.7 5.0 
Italy 0.5 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.4 2.6 2.8 3.4 1.4 
Portugal 3.6 5.7 3.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.9 2.9 4.3 2.1 1.0 2.2 
Spain 3.8 3.0 3.9 4.6 6.2 6.9 5.1 1.5 2.5 3.4 4.2 6.4 6.3 5.8 4.0 4.5 
    ø  3.3 4.0 3.7 3.2 3.7 4.1 3.6 1.8 3.9 3.1 2.4 4.8 5.8 4.6 4.2 3.8 
    Periphery 2.1 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.4 3.6 2.7 1.0 2.3 2.4 2.2 3.8 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.0 
Estonia - - - - - - - - - - 0.4 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.9 1.7 
Latvia - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.7 1.5 1.6 
Slovakia - - - - - - - - 4.1 2.8 0.5 2.9 4.6 0.1 0.3 2.2 
Slovenia - - - - - - 1.4 2.2 1.1 1.8 2.8 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.5 
    ø - - - - - - 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.3 1.2 1.8 2.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 
    New - - - - - - 1.4 2.2 3.3 2.5 1.0 2.3 3.3 0.9 1.0 2.0 
Source: Author’s calculations following Clarida et al. (1998) and Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008); based on 
the author’s estimates of the natural real rate and on data provided by Eurostat (2015) and the OECD (2015) 
As a proxy for the appropriateness of the ECB’s monetary policy during the years 2001-
2015, the rightmost column of Table 8 delivers the average ‘stress’ level for each member 
country and for the different country groups. Average levels amounted to 1.2 for the Core, 3.0 
for the Periphery, and 2.0 for the New country group, as has already been suggested by earlier 
findings. But Table 8 further indicates that the common monetary policy has not been 
                                                          
81
  The members of the New country group seem to have converged somewhat, but only compared to the large 
levels of monetary policy ‘stress’ displayed in earlier years. As of Q1/2015, their respective ‘stress’ levels 
(with the exception of Slovakia) were still higher than for most countries in the Core group. 
82
  Ø depicts simple averages. Core, Periphery and New represent weighted averages, for which each member 
country was weighed according to the relative size of its GDP in each year. For each respective year, the 
averages of the New group only include those countries which were Eurozone members. 
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appropriate for a single member country. Even France, which has been subject to the lowest 
degree of policy ‘stress’, still displayed an average level of 0.7. Provided that even small 
changes in interest rates may have profound economic impacts, it can be expected that an 
average deviation of 0.7% from the optimum rate over a period of 15 years significantly 
restrained France’s economic potential.83 But these hardships seem to fade when compared to 
the average ‘stress’ levels of countries such as Spain (4.5), Ireland (5.0), or Greece (5.6). 
Concerning the development of the monetary policy ‘stress’ indicator over time, a small 
number of countries does indeed seem to have experienced some convergence during recent 
years. These countries are Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovakia. 
In some of these cases, however, it remains yet to see whether the recent developments 
indicate a long-term convergence or only a cyclical reduction in policy ‘stress’. But even if 
the reductions have a long-term character, they are more than offset by constant – or even 
increasing – levels of ‘stress’ in the remaining countries. 
The present section has extended the findings of Section 5.2.1 to the individual country 
level. For every single Eurozone member country, divergences between the Taylor rule 
recommendations and the actual MRO rate were found to be sizable. When compared to the 
aggregated group level, the results highlighted large intragroup differences in addition to the 
previously discussed intergroup differences. This supports earlier empirical assessments of 
scholars such as Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008).
84
 The lack of convergence between 2001 
and 2015 suggests that the Eurozone’s economic potential may continue to be significantly 
restrained by these differences. The implications are profound: while the euro has been 
introduced in order to foster European integration, the results of the present section have 
shown that the single monetary policy might actually solidify – or even increase – structural 
differences. This is also suggested by Estrada, Galí and López-Salido (2013), who show that 
the dispersion of unemployment rates following the Great Recession has been much larger for 
the Eurozone compared to non-Eurozone countries.
85
 Consequently, these authors conclude 
that the “common currency in its initial design and the lack of country-specific monetary 
                                                          
83
  The large impact of even marginal interest rate adjustments can be illustrated by the recent reduction in the 
ECB’s MRO rate: Between July 2011 and September 2014, it experienced seven different adjustments in 
order to be reduced from 1.5% to 0.05% (ECB 2015). 
84
  Some of the findings in Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008) are also contradicted by the present analysis, 
which is owed to the different time horizon. For instance, these authors propose that a significant degree of 
convergence had taken place in Italy. As can be seen from Table 8, the Great Recession has reversed this 
development. 
85
  Estrada, Galí and López-Salido (2013) analyze convergence and divergence of four different variables within 
the EMU: Unemployment, relative prices, inflation, and current account balances. They show that the 
operation of the EMU may have led to a convergence of relative prices (particularly among tradable goods) 
and current account balances. In the case of unemployment, however, the EMU led to a large degree of 
divergence. 
 77 
 
policies or stabilizing risk-sharing devices to accommodate country-specific shocks may have 
been a factor behind the large differences in unemployment performance.” Or, to put it          
differently, the ECB’s challenge to implement a single monetary policy for countries with              
strongly varying preferences and needs may result in a compromise where “one size                   
fits none” (Enderlein 2015). 
However, determining the actual economic burden associated with this ‘diversity 
stagnation’ is not an easy task, and the gains from having a common monetary policy – such 
as the impact on trade and competition – could well outweigh this burden (Sturm and 
Wollmershäuser 2008). It follows that any conclusive assessment would require quantifying 
the detriments and benefits, which is beyond the scope of the present analysis – even more so 
as many effects, such as the impact on political stability within the EU, are difficult to 
measure. Leaving this assessment up to further research, the present section concludes that the 
single monetary policy – which was initiated with the aim of accelerating European 
integration
86
 – may actually stimulate divergences within the Eurozone. During the 
previous 15 years, every single member country has been subject to a significant degree of 
economic pressure, a condition which is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. 
 
5.3 Lessons from the USA 
The different Taylor rates estimated in Section 5.2 have pointed to large divergences within 
the Eurozone. While the ECB’s single monetary policy was found to be appropriate for the 
Eurozone as a whole, it was far from ideal from the perspective of most individual countries. 
Based on these results, it was argued that any possible policy rate would constitute a 
compromise which would inevitably restrain the Eurozone’s economic potential and                     
possibly impair European integration. But while these findings seem to reassure the                                  
many critics of the euro (see Section 5.2.1), it has to be asked whether this headwind                                                   
does in fact rule out the possibility of future convergence. To this end, the                                
chances of a successful European monetary integration have often been assessed at the                                                                                 
example of the USA (see, for instance, Eichengreen, Obstfeldt, and Spaventa 1992                                   
and Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993). The present section highlights the most                                                
important differences between both monetary unions in order to evaluate whether or                                         
not the Eurozone could emulate the US-American success. Thus, the main question                                                                                                                                                
                                                          
86
  Three decades before its introduction, Mundell (1969) already defined European integration as the primary 
goal of any future European currency. He argued that “even if there were no economic case for a European 
Money there is a political case for one”, adding that “the case for a European money must be made primarily 
on political grounds, just because politics in the widest sense of the word has to override economics.” 
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of the present section is straightforward: If the USA managed to create an optimum                  
currency area out of 50 diverse states, why should the same be out of reach for the               
European Union?
87
 
Against this case, it is often argued that the Eurozone is simply much more heterogeneous. 
To many observers it seems self-evident that, while the USA are a rather homogenous nation, 
countries such as Germany and Slovenia, Greece and Portugal are just too different in 
economic and cultural terms to form a monetary union. However, if cultural factors (such as a 
common language) are left out, the interstate economic differences in the USA seem to be 
quite comparable to those of the Eurozone. As of 2014, levels of per capita GDP ranged           
from 31,551$ in Mississippi to 66,160$ in Alaska (USA: 49,469$). Alaska’ economy 
contracted by 1.3%, while North Dakota displayed a growth rate of 6.3%. In 2015, 
unemployment rates amounted to 2.7% in Nebraska and to 7.5% in West Virginia                   
(USA: 5.3%).
88
 On top of that, the USA are subject to large regional differences in a number 
of additional indicators which may influence economic performance, such as population 
density, geography, climate, and ethnics. 
These indicators show that the economic performance among some US states differs to a 
similar degree than between the Eurozone’s Core and Periphery states. As a result, the USA 
have been subject to a number of asymmetric regional shocks during the preceding                
decades (Mundell 1998). And yet, despite these apparent interstate differences, the Federal 
Reserve Bank issues a single policy rate for each of its 12 districts. This indicates that a 
comparison between the ECB’s and the Fed’s monetary policy could deliver important 
implications for the Eurozone. More specifically, it could explain why a single monetary 
policy is rather appropriate in the case of the USA, and whether or not the Eurozone could be                      
adjusted accordingly. 
Initially, the Eurozone’s output gap and unemployment gap (two of the main determinants 
of monetary policy, see equation (20)) were compared to those of the USA in order to get an 
overview on existing intergroup differences. For each US state, annual data on GDP and 
unemployment for the time period from 1999 to 2014 was provided by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). This information was 
converted into quarterly data, based on which the output gap and the unemployment gap were 
                                                          
87
  It has to be noted that there is no academic consensus on whether or not the USA represent an ideal OCA. 
Also, monetary integration took a long time in the case of the USA – Rockoff (2013) considers a period 
of 150 years as “a reasonable minimum”. As a starting point for the present analysis, however, it is taken that 
the USA resemble an OCA.  
88
  See BEA 2015 and BLS 2015. 
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calculated for each of the 50 states using a HP filter with λ=1,600.89 The resulting estimates 
were grouped according to the states’ affiliation with the 12 US Federal Reserve Districts. For 
the sake of clarity, the 12 Federal Reserve Districts have been merged into six groups, each 
containing approximately the same number of observations. In a comparative approach, the 
observations were grouped according to the eight different economic regions as defined by the 
BEA (2015). Figure 64 compares the spreading of output gap and unemployment gap in the 
USA and the Eurozone: 
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by, the OECD (2015), the BEA (2015), and the 
BLS (2015); n=3111/782 (USA/Eurozone) 
The 12 different US Federal Reserve Districts displayed a very similar kind of pattern. 
Mean values were all close to zero due to the use of a HP filter. The standard deviations 
displayed a range from 0.79 (Richmond) to 1.71 (San Francisco) in the case of the output gap 
                                                          
89
  As has been laid out earlier (see Footnotes 31 and 33), these results have to be taken with caution. However, 
as information on output gap and NAIRU were not available for the different US states, the HP filter was 
implemented nevertheless. 
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Figure 64: Output Gaps and Unemployment Gaps in the USA and the Eurozone, 1999-2014 
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and from 1.12 (Dallas) to 2.16 (Atlanta) for the unemployment gap. This did not change much 
if the 50 US states were grouped according to the eight different economic regions instead. In 
that case, the standard deviations of the output gap ranged from 0.97 (Mideast) to 1.67 (Far 
West). For the unemployment gap, they ranged from 0.95 (Far West) to 2.03 (Great Plains). 
For the Eurozone, on the other hand, the scatter plot presented a distinctively different            
pattern for the three country groups. Standard deviations were 1.78 (Core), 2.91 (New)                           
and 5.27 (Periphery) for the output gap and 0.68 (Core), 1.10 (New) and 3.44 (Periphery) for 
the unemployment gap. The intergroup variation was therefore much larger for the Eurozone 
than for the USA. Of course it has to be acknowledged that this can partially be explained by 
the different estimation methods, as the US data had only been derived from a simple HP 
filter which constrained the mean values close to zero. However, if the calculations for the 
Eurozone were repeated using HP filtered data as well, the resulting scatter plot still displayed 
the distinct skewness pattern and intergroup variation shown in Figure 64. 
These findings suggest that a single monetary policy may indeed be more appropriate for 
the USA than for the Eurozone. Comparably to Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, this could be 
confirmed by the calculation of Taylor rates for the different US states and regions. 
Unfortunately, information on inflation rates was available neither for the 50 different 
US states, nor for the 12 Federal Reserve Districts or the eight different economic regions. 
Hence, the present section relied on the estimations of Malkin and Nechio (2012), who 
calculated Taylor rates for the four major geographical regions:
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Source: Malkin and Nechio (2012) and author’s calculations based on the data provided by Malkin and 
Nechio (2012) and the St. Louis Fed (2015) 
                                                          
90
  Malkin and Nechio (2012) base their calculations on a constant natural rate and on national information on 
headline inflation. Section 5.1 has discussed the drawbacks of this approach, and the results in Figure 65 have 
therefore to be taken with caution. 
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Three important observations can be made based on Figure 65. Firstly, the average 
monetary ‘stress’ amounted to 1.8 (Northeast), 1.3 (Midwest), 1.4 (South), and 1.5 (West) 
during the years 1987-2011. While these levels were low compared to those experienced by 
the Eurozone’s Periphery since the introduction of the euro, they were much higher than for 
each Core country except Germany and the Netherlands. Secondly, the intergroup differences 
between Northeast, Midwest, South, and West were much smaller than between the Core, 
Periphery, and New groups. And thirdly, in contrast to the Eurozone, the different US-
American Taylor rates always followed the same cycles. 
Provided that these findings are representative for the Federal District and state level, they 
deliver an important implication for the present analysis: A common monetary policy is 
indeed more suitable in the case of the USA. While the Fed’s target rate did not always 
correspond to the Taylor rule recommendations (either due to a delayed reaction by the Fed, 
such as from 2002 to 2004, or due to the zero lower bound, as in 2009), the monetary 
requirements of the four major regions never ruled each other out. In the Eurozone, on the 
other hand, Figure 60 has shown that the Core would currently benefit from an increase of the 
MRO rate, but the Periphery would not. The USA has not managed to fully avoid                         
the ‘stress’ which stems from a single monetary policy, but the degree of ‘stress’ is                                       
more evenly distributed among its regions. Hence, whereas the Fed is able to set a                                       
target rate which accommodates the requirements of the different regions to a similar                        
degree, the ECB is not. It follows that, in order to reduce the economic pressure                
stemming from the Eurozone’s common monetary policy, European policymakers have to 
find ways to improve its efficiency. 
Within a monetary union, the efficiency of the common monetary policy can generally be 
improved via two channels. The first one is the adjustment of the monetary policy towards the 
needs of its member states. As has been shown, however, this is currently beyond the means 
of the ECB due to the large degree of inter- and intragroup variations. The second channel is 
the adjustment of its member states towards the needs of a single monetary policy. This would 
surely constitute an extensive and tedious challenge, but it might be an unavoidable one. If the 
Eurozone does indeed not constitute an optimum currency area, the future of the euro will 
depend on the implementation of changes aimed at reversing this condition. The effort may 
surely be worthwhile in terms of economic gains and political integration, as suggested by the 
example of the USA. According to Eichengreen (1991, 1992) and Feldstein (2011), two 
changes would be particularly rewarding in emulating the US-American success: the creation 
of an efficient, single labor market, and the implementation of a common fiscal policy. 
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Concerning the absence of a single European labor market, the large regional differences in 
unemployment (see Figure 64) may be seen as the result of low intra-Eurozone mobility of 
labor. While a number of steps have been taken towards the integration of the different 
national labor markets, they still remain separated by significant cultural and legal barriers. In 
addition to that, recent evidence points at a significant increase in the emigration of Eurozone 
workers to non-Eurozone destinations (Dhéret et al. 2013). Hence, further integration of the 
Eurozone’s national labor markets could reduce the threat of asymmetric shocks and support 
the alignment of the different member states’ growth cycles.91  
Similarly, the potential rewards from the implementation of a common fiscal policy seem 
evident as well. While monetary policy has been centralized in the Eurozone, fiscal policy has 
been left to the responsibility of its member states. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
aimed at maintaining budgetary discipline within the Eurozone, has not been enforced. The 
result was a loss of fiscal stability within the Eurozone (Mundell 2011). In addition to that, the 
USA possesses a system of transfers aimed at equalizing economic growth among its member 
states. Without the implementation of such a system, it will be difficult to align the growth 
cycles of the different Eurozone countries.  
Hence, both the absence of an efficient, single labor market and the lack of a common 
fiscal policy point at the need for further European integration.
92
 Admittedly, this is more 
easily said than the Eurozone’s realities allow for. Far-reaching reforms would surely be met 
with tremendous political resistance (particularly if they were aimed towards fiscal 
integration), and it is difficult to predict whether these hurdles may be overcome. However, as 
shown by the results of Section 5, there might be no viable alternative. While the ECB’s 
common monetary policy has been appropriate for the Eurozone as a whole, it has not been 
able to accommodate the specific needs of its three country groups (let alone the needs of its 
individual member countries). Hence, the significant differences among the Eurozone’s 
member countries will restrain its economic potential in the absence of profound reforms. In 
contrast to the alleged threat of secular stagnation, the threat of a protracted ‘diversity 
stagnation’ is very real and has to be countered.  
                                                          
91
  For further insights on the development of factor mobility and on current convergence/divergence patterns 
within the Eurozone’s labor market see ECB (2012), Estrada, Galí and López-Salido (2012), and Dhéret          
et al. (2013). 
92
  In fact, Feldstein (2011) delivers three main reasons for the alleged superiority of the US-American system: a 
single labor market, a centralized fiscal system, and the constitutional obligation of its member states to 
maintain a balanced budget. In the present analysis, the second and third reason have been merged into a 
general lack of a common fiscal policy. A number of authors have brought forward additional reasons which 
they regard as equally important to the lack of a single labor market and a common fiscal policy. For 
instance, Bordo (2004) considers a lack of political will as a central complication in the case of the Eurozone. 
This additional consideration will be addressed in Section 6. 
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6 The Political Economics of a Reform 
6.1 The Need for a Reform of the Fiscal and Monetary Framework 
The prevalent literature on secular stagnation seems to agree that only the implementation of 
bold, unconventional policy measures may counter the threat of a Japan-style ‘lost decade’ in 
the Eurozone. Accordingly, policy recommendations usually suggest raising demand by 
means of an extensive monetary and fiscal stimulus, accompagnied by structural reforms 
aimed at boosting potential growth and the natural real rate (see, for instance, Buiter 2014,                           
Crafts 2015, Rawdanowicz et al. 2014, and Wolff 2015).
93
 In this regard, the recent initiation 
of the ECB’s expanded asset purchasing programme (EAPP) and the launch of the European 
Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) are considered by many as a viable response to the 
threat of secular stagnation.
94, 95
 
However, Sections 3 and 4 have shown that the Eurozone does not face a significant threat 
of secular stagnation, neither in the imminent future, nor in the medium to long run. The 
Eurozone’s monetary policy has not become inefficient due to a decrease in the natural real 
rate of interest, but – as shown in Section 5 – it has been impaired by the significant degree of 
differences among its member states. In contrast to the alleged threat of secular stagnation, 
this ‘diversity stagnation’ will not be overcome by the implementation of a monetary stimulus 
or fiscal expansion. Hence, unlike a number of other works on the given topic, the present 
analysis does not specifically discuss monetary, fiscal, or structural policies aimed at 
reversing or preventing secular stagnation. Rather, Section 6 delivers an overview on different 
options for a reformation of the Eurozone’s monetary and fiscal system, and debates whether 
the implementation of any of these measures constitutes a likely outcome.  
Section 5.3 has defined the lack of a common fiscal policy as one of the two fundamental 
restraints of European integration (as compared to the USA). However, asserting that the 
Eurozone does not display a common fiscal policy at all would not be correct, as its member 
countries are bound by a number of important treaties. First and foremost, with the signing of 
                                                          
93
  Apart from the implementation of a monetary and/or fiscal stimulus coupled with structural reforms, a large 
number of additional (and sometimes rather radical) unconventional measures have been proposed as well. 
Examples are the elimination of the ZLB (Buiter 2009), an elevation of the inflation target (Ball 2014, 
Eggertsson and Mehrotra 2014), and the abolition of paper currency (Rogoff 2014). 
94
  The EAPP aims at raising inflation within the Eurozone by purchasing three different kinds of securities at a 
volume of €60bn per month: Third covered bonds, asset-backed securities, and public sector securities. It 
therefore constitutes a type of QE and is intended to be carried out at least until September 2016 (with the 
option of extending it in case of persistently low inflation).  
95
  The EFSI, which has been established within the European Investment Bank (EIB), is the central element of 
the Investment Plan aimed at boosting investment within the EU. Also known as the ‘Juncker Plan’, the 
Investment Plan rests on three pillars: The mobilization of financial resources, the support of investments in 
the real economy, and the creation of an investment friendly environment (for further information, see 
EC 2015a and Duprat 2015). 
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the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the future Eurozone member states agreed upon four different 
convergence criteria – the inflation criterion, the fiscal criterion, the exchange rate criterion, 
and the interest rate criterion.
96
 A potential member has to meet all four of these conditions in 
order to accede to the Eurozone. In addition to that, the fiscal criterion has to be met 
continuously after joining the monetary union. It is further composed of the deficit criterion 
and the debt criterion, which were institutionalized with the SGP in 1997 and which define 
the fiscal constraints that the Eurozone members should comply with. Specifically, these 
clauses state that a government should not run a budget deficit larger than 3% of the country’s 
GDP and that the government’s (gross) debt-to-GDP ratio should not exceed 60%. Figure 66 
illustrates the member countries’ compliance with these criteria: 
Dotted lines: Thresholds defined by the SGP (budget deficit: -3%; government gross debt: 60%);                       
Source: Author’s calculations; based on data provided by Eurostat (2015) 
Figure 66 delivers two important insights. Firstly, the debt criterion was violated by 
Belgium, Greece and Italy when they adopted the euro, while Greece and Slovakia infringed 
on the deficit criterion. Strictly spoken, this means that these four countries should not have 
                                                          
96
  Further details on the convergence criteria are provided by article 126 and article 140 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2000 2005 2010
%
Year
Periphery
Cyprus Greece
Ireland Italy
Portugal Spain
0
50
100
150
200
2000 2005 2010
%
Year
Periphery
Cyprus Greece
Ireland Italy
Portugal Spain
Government Gross Debt as % of GDP 
Figure 66: Compliance with the Deficit Criterion and the Debt Criterion, 1999-2014 
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been admitted to the Eurozone at the given time.
97
 The remaining countries, however, 
complied with the two clauses (or, such as in the case of Austria, only missed one of the 
criteria by a narrow degree). And secondly, almost all member countries were running large 
budgetary deficits and substantially increased their debt-to-GDP ratios following the 
year 2007. Initially, the European Commission signalized an understanding for short-term 
violations of the debt and deficit clauses due to the specific circumstances of the financial 
crisis. However, as can be seen from Figure 66, the violation of the debt criterion has since 
evolved into a rather long-term trend. This has a profound implication for the Eurozone:       
As of the year 2014 only Luxembourg, Slovakia and the Baltic states complied with the debt                   
and deficit criteria. 
What have been the consequences of this apparent disregard of the common fiscal rules? 
According to article 126 (11) TFEU, countries which violate the fiscal criterion may face 
warnings and, ultimately, financial sanctions. If a country repeatedly fails to meet the 
corrective rules specified in the SGP, these sanctions could amount to 0.5% of its GDP. 
Theoretically, this should be seen as a substantial threat – in the case of Germany, this would 
be almost as high as the annual budget of the Ministry of Education and Research (0.59%), 
and higher than the annual budget of the Ministry of Health (0.47%).
98
  
However, the repeated violation of the SGP has not yet resulted in any significant punitive 
measures. Following the year 2008, the SGP’s corrective arm initiated an Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) for each of the current Eurozone members except Estonia (EC 2015b). As 
of 2015, eleven of these EDPs have been closed, even though not all of these countries 
displayed efforts to reduce their fiscal burden.
99
 In the case of Italy, which displayed a debt-
to-GDP ratio above 130%, the Commission argued that current conditions would “make the 
respect of the debt rule particularly demanding”. As the Italian government committed to 
implement growth-enhancing structural reforms in the future, the Commission concluded that 
“the debt criterion […] should be considered as currently complied with” (EC 2015c). Similar 
arguments were brought forward for Austria, Belgium and Germany, whose debt levels were 
                                                          
97
  While it was supposed that Greece met the deficit criterion at the time of its accession to the Eurozone, a 
subsequent investigation documented that the information submitted to the European Commission did not 
correspond to reality. Hence, Greece was the sole member country which infringed on both criteria when 
entering the monetary union. In addition to that, it is now presumed that statistical data on Greece’s 
governmental debt and deficit has not only been manipulated before, but also beyond the year 2001. 
Accordingly, Figure 66 only displays this information for the years 2011-2014. For further information, 
see EC (2010). 
98
  Based on Germany’s estimated 2015 GDP (constant prices, base year: 2005) and the official 2015 federal 
government budget (IMF 2015, BMF 2015). 
99
  EPDs have been closed for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, and Slovakia.  
86  
 
far above 60% and still rising when the Commission published its verdict (EC 2012, 
2014, 2015d). For the remaining seven Eurozone countries, EDPs were still ongoing, with 
deadlines for correction ranging from 2015 to 2017. However, based on the previous 
decisions of the corrective arm, it may well be expected that these procedures will be 
concluded without the implementation of punitive measures as well. 
The example of the SGP highlights the central complication of the Eurozone’s fiscal 
framework: not the absence of common rules has led to fiscal imbalances, but rather the 
member countries’ inability and/or unwillingness to comply with the existing regulations. 
This is further aggravated by the lack of a credible enforcement of the SGP: the failure to 
impose adequate measures in the face of apparent and repeated violations of the fiscal 
criterion does surely not result in a favorable signaling effect. Recent reforms of the SGP 
(such as the implementation of the ‘six-pack’ in 2011, the addition of the fiscal compact and 
the ‘two-pack’ in 2013, and the European Semester in 2014) fell short of adequately 
addressing this issue (ECB 2014, Mabbett and Schelkle 2014).  
Apparent violations of the common legal framework can also be found elsewhere. 
Examples are the implementation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the                          
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which constitute a breach of the ‘no bail-out’ clause 
(article 125 TFEU), and the direct purchase of government bonds by the ECB, which 
sidesteps article 123 TFEU (Homburg 2011a). In each of these cases, existing laws were 
deliberately violated based on political grounds and against a vocal opposition of rather 
cautious academics and policymakers. 
Possibly the most alarming example of insufficient legal regulation may be found in the 
recent development of the balances within the Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2).
100
 TARGET2 is a settlement system which 
supports the functioning of the Eurozone’s monetary market by processing transactions 
between its member countries via the national central banks and the ECB. If a French 
citizen A orders a car from a German exporter B, the payment is channeled from A’s bank 
account to B’s bank account via the Banque de France, the ECB, and the Bundesbank. This 
leaves A’s bank with a debit at the Banque de France, which in turn has a debit at the ECB. 
B’s bank, on the other hand, now has a credit with the Bundesbank, which in turn has a credit 
at the ECB. This results in a French TARGET2 deficit and a German TARGET2 surplus. 
These balances are interest-bearing, which turns them into a kind of short-term Eurobonds, 
and technically without an upper limit (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011). This was not 
                                                          
100
  In the year 2007, TARGET2 replaced the earlier TARGET settlement system which had served this purpose 
since 1999. 
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considered as problematic when TARGET2 was implemented, as it was expected that 
transactions on the interbank market would largely countervail these balances. In the given 
example, inflows of public or private capital from Germany (or any other TARGET2 member 
country) to France would reduce the French TARGET2 deficit.
101
 However, when the 
interbank market broke down during the global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign 
debt crisis, this could no longer be ensured. Unintended by the developers of the system, this 
resulted in a persistent increase of the TARGET2 balances:
102
  
Source: Steinkamp and Westermann (2014) and author’s calculations based on data provided by Steinkamp 
and Westermann (2014) and the IMF (2015) 
                                                          
101
  As the purpose of the present section is to merely present the imbalances in the Eurozone’s fiscal and 
monetary framework rather than to discuss them in a detailed manner, the given example does not address the 
topic in its entire complexity. For further detail see Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) and Homburg (2011b). 
102
  For the charts on the right hand side, monthly TARGET2 balances have been converted into annual averages 
before dividing them by annual GDP (measured in constant 2005€). For the year 2015, average TARGET2 
balances have been calculated based on information for January to August. As their TARGET2 balances 
were substantially smaller than those of the Core and the Periphery countries (both in nominal terms and as a 
share of their GDP), the members of the New country group have not been included in Figure 67. 
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After the onset of the global financial crisis, the Periphery countries soon found it 
increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient credit from the private capital markets. The ECB 
swiftly reacted and significantly reduced its collateral standards in order to enable and 
encourage the peripheral central banks to provide additional capital. However, this resulted in 
massive capital flows from the Periphery to a number of Core countries – particularly to 
Germany, which was generally considered as a ‘safe haven’. Due to the limited demand for 
credit in the Core countries, the large inflow of foreign capital displaced the lending of capital 
by the Core’s central banks (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011). 
As can be seen from Figure 67, this process resulted in the emergence of significant claims 
and liabilities between the Eurozone’s central banks. These balances show a clear North-
South divide: the immense liabilities of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are almost 
exactly offset by the claims of Germany, Luxembourg, Finland and the Netherlands 
(Steinkamp and Westermann 2014). Scholars such as Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) and 
Homburg (2011b) have argued that, while the ECB’s swift intervention has initially prevented 
a financial collapse in the Periphery countries, it did not reduce its assistance after the acute 
stage of the financial crisis was overcome. Instead, the duration and magnitude of                         
said assistance exceeded by far the scope of a mere crisis management. Hence, these                      
authors argue that the massive increase in TARGET2 balances may have constituted a  
‘stealth bailout’, an immense financial assistance to the crisis states under avoidance of any                        
kind of parliamentary consent.  
This has not remained unchallenged. For instance, Whelan (2014) argues that the massive 
build-up of claims and liabilities has been a by-product of an agreed approach to monetary 
policy rather than a covered rescue attempt. But even if this were true, it would not lessen the 
need to find a policy solution in order to address this issue. 
Source: Author’s illustration; based on the data provided by the St. Louis Fed (2015) 
Figure 68: ISA Balances for the Different Federal Reserve Districts, 2003-2015 
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As a comparison, Figure 68 presents the balances within the Interdistrict Settlement 
Accounts (ISA) system, which constitutes the US-American equivalent to the European 
TARGET2. As can be seen, both systems differ in a significant detail: Every year, the 12 
Federal Reserve Districts have to settle their liabilities.
103
 Hence, while substantial claims and 
liabilities may emerge within the ISA as well (as can be seen from the example of the Federal 
Reserve Districts of New York and Richmond), the annual equalization prevents the build-up 
of ever increasing, long-term imbalances.  
The omission of a similar control mechanism from the TARGET2 system has resulted in 
far-reaching consequences: as of August 2015, the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) have amassed cumulated liabilities of €590bn. Germany has been left with €560bn 
worth of target claims (about 20.8% of its GDP). Luxembourg’s claims amount to €117bn, 
which constitutes a staggering 316.2% of its GDP. As shown by Homburg (2011b), this will 
have a profound impact in case of a (partial or full) breakup of the monetary union: If one of 
the debtor states leaves the Eurozone, it is obliged to clear its TARGET2 liabilities. However, 
this state might be either unable or unwilling to do so – for instance, it may well be doubted 
that Greece had settled its liabilities of more than €100bn if it had left the Eurozone earlier 
in 2015. In this case, these liabilities would constitute a loss for the remaining member 
countries, which had to be divided amongst them according to their respective capital shares 
at the ECB. If, on the other hand, one of the creditor states would leave the Eurozone, the 
remaining member countries would have to pay off the outstanding claim. However, it is 
more than unclear whether the remaining member countries would be able or willing to settle 
a credit of €560bn if Germany left the Eurozone. 
It follows that the persistent TARGET2 balances, which have arisen in the years following 
the financial crisis, exhibit a significant conflict potential. It is unclear whether these balances 
will be reduced in the future and what exactly would happen to them in the case of a possible 
(partial or full) dissolution of the Eurozone. While the emergence of such persistent claims 
and liabilities may not have been anticipated when TARGET2 was implemented, the ECB 
could have prevented them from increasing to their present levels. Hence, similar to earlier 
examples presented in this section (such as the disregard of the SGP and the violations of 
articles 123 and 125 TFEU), the root of this problem lies within insufficient regulation and 
the willingness to sidestep important principles of monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
                                                          
103
  For further detail on the differences between ISA and TARGET2 as well as on the Fed’s proceedings of 
settling the liabilities, see Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011). 
90  
 
Section 5 has shown that the ECB’s common monetary policy fails to adequately address 
the needs of its individual member countries, and that further fiscal integration (as has           
been implemented in the USA) may be needed in order to enhance the efficiency of the            
Eurozone. The present section has delivered additional insights on the shortcomings of the               
Eurozone’s common monetary and fiscal framework, particularly on the lack of credible 
enforcement of the existing rules. In order to overcome this unsatisfactory status quo, four 
general scenarios remain: (1) the complete integration of fiscal policy (i.e., the formation of a 
European state), (2) the credible enhancement of the existing fiscal framework without fully 
integrating it, (3) the partition of the Eurozone into smaller currency areas, and (4) the 
dissolution of the Eurozone. The feasibility and the likelihood of these four scenarios are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
6.2 The Tragedy of the Euro 
The need for a reformation of the Eurozone’s monetary and fiscal framework is apparent to 
most observers. The ECB’s common monetary policy has proven to be unable to single-
handedly accommodate the needs of the individual member countries (see Section 5), and the 
existing policy rules remain insufficiently enforced (see Section 6.1). The result is an 
increasing divergence among the individual member countries, both in terms of their needs 
for monetary policy and in terms of their fiscal stability. These results were not unanticipated: 
scholars such as Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Wyplosz (1991), and Eichengreen (1992) 
have argued at an early stage that any European monetary union would eventually require a 
larger degree of fiscal integration.
104
 This is underlined by historical comparisons: European 
predecessors, such as the Latin Monetary Union (de facto: 1865-1914; de jure: -1927) and the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union (de facto: 1872-1914; de jure: -1931), always disintegrated 
when they were not accompanied by further political integration (Theurl 1996).
105
 
                                                          
104
  Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991) show that a ‘Federal Fiscal Authority’ may help to lessen the impact of 
regional shocks within a monetary union. While recognizing that efforts made by regional governments could 
serve this purpose as well, they argue that a federal agreement may be much more effective. Wyplosz (1991) 
points out that each monetary union will eventually have to choose between fully integrating fiscal policy 
(such as within a federal budget) or maintaining a system of flexible and uncommitted policy coordination. 
He considers a middle ground between these two extremes as unlikely, given that extensive fiscal 
coordination is difficult to implement and to maintain in practice. Because of this, he concludes that some 
degree of fiscal federalism may be inevitable in the long run. Eichengreen (1992) regards fiscal federalism, 
which he considers as an important complement to each monetary union, as improperly substituted by the 
fiscal criteria laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. He also considers the fiscal clauses as unsuitable accession 
criteria for two reasons: firstly, due to the arbitrary nature of the criteria, they could well be violated by 
countries possessing the desired discipline; and secondly, fiscally undisciplined countries could ‘masquerade’ 
as disciplined ones for a prolonged period. 
105
  For a detailed comparison of these monetary unions (also taking into account the “involuntary” unions of the 
Austro-Hungarian krone and the post-Soviet ruble) with the Eurozone, see Berthold, Braun & Coban (2014).  
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Based on this evidence, it has to be wondered why European policymakers have not yet 
properly addressed this issue. The previous section has presented four possible scenarios to 
overcome the detrimental status quo, all of which would require bolder steps towards further 
integration or (partial or full) disintegration of the Eurozone. The first proposal demands the 
full integration of fiscal policy, leading to a type of fiscal federalism comparable to the USA. 
The second proposal falls short of fiscal federalism, but still requires significantly 
strengthening the existing framework (for example, by implementing a credible enforcement 
mechanism). The third scenario calls for a separation of the Eurozone into smaller, rather 
optimal currency areas (such as dividing it between the Core and Periphery countries or 
between its geographical north and south). The final proposal demands the dissolution of the 
Eurozone, based on the consideration that its member countries would be better off if they 
could conduct individual monetary and fiscal policies according to their own needs.  
All of these propositions have long since found their way into the academic and public 
discussion, with most of the attention being devoted to the two extreme cases – the dissolution 
of the euro on the one hand, full fiscal integration on the other. The financial crisis, followed 
by the Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis, has resulted in a growing public distrust 
towards the common monetary policy. Moreover, the rejection of the euro has widely led to a 
general discontent with the growing competences of the ‘ever closer’ European Union, and 
Eurosceptic political parties have rapidly gained ground in subsequent national and European 
elections (Leonard and Torreblanca 2014). In contrast, many individual policymakers have 
expressed their commitment towards further integration of the Eurozone. Most recently, 
Sigmar Gabriel (the German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs) and 
Emmanuel Macron (the French Minister of Economic Affairs) released a joint statement in 
which they argued for a radical reform of the monetary union: 
“The current, rules-based fiscal framework – while flexible and important, to ensure fiscal 
discipline – doesn’t guarantee that the sum of national fiscal policies will lead to an adequate 
fiscal stance for the Eurozone as a whole, in either good or in bad times. This demands a 
fiscal capacity over and above national budgets that would improve the ability to provide 
automatic stabilization and allow the European level to expand or tighten fiscal policy in line 
with the economic cycle”. 
– Gabriel and Macron (2015) 
In addition to the establishment of a supranational budget, these leading politicians of the 
Eurozone’s largest economies also suggest the encouragement of wage harmonization among 
member countries and the creation of an institution which may raise taxes within the union. In 
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a subsequent interview, Macron (2015) concretized these plans, arguing for the necessity of a 
“European economic government” led by a “Euro Commissioner” in Brussels, with sufficient 
competences to coordinate the individual member countries’ social, financial and economic 
policies. He also confirmed that this would necessitate the transformation of the Eurozone 
into a transfer union: 
“If the member states continue to repudiate any form of financial transfers within the 
monetary union, we can discard the idea of the euro and the Eurozone.” 
– Macron (2015) 
Despite these demonstrations of individual political will, however, it remains uncertain 
whether the Eurozone will ever see the implementation of such profound changes. Too 
hardened seem the fronts on this sensitive topic – not only among, but also within member 
countries. The joint statement of Gabriel and Macron (2015), for instance, sharply contrasts 
with the official stance of Merkel’s government, which firmly opposes permanent fiscal 
transfers to poorer countries of the monetary union. And while this debate seems to be as 
acute and important as never before, it actually dates back at least to the signing of the Treaty 
of Maastricht, and the arguments for and against further fiscal integration have not changed 
much during the past 23 years. But as most European policymakers seem to be reluctant to 
implement any kind of fiscal federalism, they also strongly oppose the idea of dissolving or 
downsizing the Eurozone. Angela Merkel (2012) argued that “the failure of the euro would 
constitute the failure of Europe”, and Mario Draghi (2012) famously stated that the ECB was 
committed to do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. The policy measures taken during 
the Greek debt crisis have shown that doing “whatever it takes” would even go as far as 
violating the Eurozone’s common legal framework. 
Hence, the experiences of the recent years have demonstrated the following: the public 
opinion on the future development of the Eurozone is strongly divided, and while national 
policymakers have shown a strong reluctance towards ceding fiscal competences to the 
Eurozone, they have been willing to go to great lengths to preserve the monetary union in its 
current form. Hence, even though the weaknesses of the current framework are widely 
acknowledged, it still seems unlikely that any of the four previously presented solutions will 
be implemented in the near future. While this phenomenon appears irrational at first sight, it 
has recently been argued that preserving the status quo may actually be in the best interests of 
most parties concerned. This can be shown by implementing a concept from the public choice 
theory – namely, the ‘tragedy of the commons’. 
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The tragedy of the commons, as presented by Hardin (1968), defines the overconsumption 
of a common good due to poorly defined property rights and the destructive rationalism of its 
consumers. Hardin (1968) illustrated the problem as follows: imagine a common (a 
collectively used pasture) and a number of herdsmen which may drive their cattle onto it. 
Every time a herdsman drives an additional animal on the common, he will be the sole 
recipient of the benefits, while the costs – in the shape of overgrazing – are born equally by 
each of the herdsmen. Hence, the individual benefits associated with adding additional cattle 
to the common are larger than the individual costs associated with it, creating an incentive to 
drive ever more cattle on the common. Moreover, every individual is aware that the other 
herdsmen are facing the same incentives as he does. Hence, even if he might be worried about 
a possible overuse of the common, every herdsman has to assume that overgrazing – together 
with the associated collective costs – will occur anyways. This provides further incentives to 
drive more cattle on the common in order to reap as much of the remaining benefits as 
possible. Consequently, the only rationale decision for each of the herdsmen is to increase 
their own use of the collective resource. The common is increasingly overconsumed                    
and finally disappears, depriving every herdsman of its use. This has, of course, not                           
been in the interest of any of the herdsmen. Individual rationalism thus leads to                            
collective irrationalism (and, hence, collective damage) if the use of a common good is not               
sufficiently regulated. 
It follows that four conditions have to be fulfilled for the occurrence of a tragedy of the 
commons: (1) the presence of a (finite) common good, (2) a number of economic agents who 
have access to it and draw a benefit from consumption, (3) unrestricted or insufficiently 
regulated access to the common good, and (4) the presence of negative externalities.  
The compliance with the first two criteria is easily answered in the case of the Eurozone. 
As shown by Bagus (2011), the common good is represented by the single currency issued by 
the ECB, and the economic agents having access to it are the national governments of the 
Eurozone member countries. These governments benefit from an increase in the monetary 
stock for two reasons. The first one is the increase in revenue due to “seigniorage”, which is                                    
distributed amongst the 19 national central banks according to their respective shares                        
in the ECB, and which is forwarded to the national governments at the end of the                                   
year (Whittaker 2011). As a second reason, the national governments can finance themselves 
at the ECB by issuing government bonds. This might either happen directly, meaning that the 
ECB purchases the government bonds, or indirectly, meaning that the ECB accepts 
government bonds as collateral for loans to the banking sector (Bagus 2011). In fact, 
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following the year 2007, the ECB has made it much easier for the national governments to 
access the common resource. Firstly, it has declared all solvent banks eligible for central bank 
financing, while leaving it within the competences of the national financial regulation 
authorities to decide whether or not a bank qualifies as being solvent. And secondly, it has 
consecutievely and significantly reduced its collateral standards (Dinger, Steinkamp                    
and Westermann 2012). 
Concerning the third criterion – the presence of poorly defined property rights – the 
Eurozone’s legal framework should actually prevent the emergence of a tragedy of the 
commons. While the herdsmen in Hardin’s (1968) classic example had unrestricted access to 
the common, the national member states should not have unrestricted access to the funds 
generated by the ECB for at least three reasons. Firstly, as noted by Collignon (2011), the 
ECB is an independent institution and could refuse to lend money to its member states. 
However, as has already been discussed earlier in this analysis, the ECB has recently shown a 
willingness to sidestep this principle. While the legal framework clearly prohibits the direct 
purchase of government bonds and the financial bail-out of a member state, the ECB has 
conducted both. In addition, it has voluntarily suspended its minimum credit requirements for 
accepting bonds as collateral during the Greek debt crisis. Secondly, since agreements such as 
the SGP oblige the member states to maintain fiscal discipline, they should not be able to 
overconsume the common good. But, as has been shown earlier in the analysis, the repeated 
violation of the fiscal clauses has not resulted in the imposition of penalties. And thirdly, as 
has been pointed out by Bagus (2011), poorly defined properly rights could be overcome if 
politically influential countries – such as Germany and France – used their influence to 
enforce and enhance them, i.e. to discipline the less disciplined members of the monetary 
union. However, as shown by Figure 66, Germany and France violate the SGP themselves, 
which should lower their willingness to push for the imposition of sanctions on other member 
countries. Based on these three points, the access to the Eurozone’s common resource may 
indeed be seen as insufficiently regulated. 
Finally, in order to qualify as a tragedy of the commons, the individual consumption of the 
common resource has to be associated with a negative externality. In the case of a monetary 
union, a first obvious negative externality is the acceleration of inflation. As the different 
governments increase their deficits in an attempt to externalize the costs (which, in its most 
extreme case, might even result in a ‘spending race’, see Bagus 2011), the loss in purchasing 
power affects every single member state. Additional external effects may result from 
increasing interest rates (as the rapid accumulation of public deficit and debt results in an 
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upward pressure on inflation-adjusted long-term interest rates, see Sanchis i Marco 2014) and 
from an appreciation of the common currency (leading to a reduction of exports, see Frenkel 
& Goldstein 1996). In fact, all of these externalities have been anticipated in the case of the 
Eurozone (or, rather, the EMU), as shown by the early warning issued by Holzmann, Hervé 
and Demmel (1996): 
Negative externalities may be triggered both by excessive deficits, while still respecting the 
solvency constraint of government, and by unsustainable debt levels. While deficit-related 
externalities will affect primarily the real economy through interest rate and exchange rate 
effects, debt-related externalities may pose a threat to price stability in EMU.  
[…] [The] EMU is likely to induce fundamental changes in the economic framework of 
European countries. From this result incentives for unsound national fiscal policies that have 
the potential to trigger significant negative externalities for the other member states. 
– Holzmann, Hervé and Demmel (1996) 
In addition to the ‘direct’ externalities of increasing inflation, higher interest rates and an 
appreciation of the currency, a number of ‘indirect’ negative externalities may arise within the 
Eurozone. One example is the possible underfunding of supranational public goods. Within 
each monetary and political union, a number of public goods exist which benefit the entirety 
of its member states. Examples are defense capacities, research and development, or a 
common agricultural policy. Each member country perceives a rivalry between (net) 
contributions to these public goods and national expenditure. While all member countries 
draw a benefit from consuming these public goods, they also have an incentive to free-ride, 
i.e. to spend a larger part of their national budget on national expenditure only, hoping that the 
remaining member countries will sufficiently finance the public good. As a result, funding of 
these goods may remain far below the optimal level (Eichengreen, Obstfeldt and 
Spaventa 1992, Collignon 2011). 
Hence, the Eurozone in its current form displays all characteristics of a tragedy of the 
commons. The 19 different national governments have a strong incentive to increase the 
income generated from seigniorage and to finance their deficits via the ECB as well as to 
minimize their contribution to the European budget. The existing legal barriers have proven 
ineffective to prevent this opportunistic behavior. This is likely to result in a number of                            
adverse effects, particularly in an increase of inflation, which will affect every single member 
and threaten the stability of the union as a whole. These negative externalities are either 
unanticipated by the different member states, or they are willingly accepted in light of                  
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the individual benefits associated with higher deficit and debt levels. Consequently, 
Bagus (2011) has adequately coined this development as the “tragedy of the euro”.106 
It is easy to see why this view is not widely recognized yet: As in other Western 
economies, the Eurozone’s inflation rate currently ranges far below the target rate of two 
percent (see Figures 8 and 21). In fact, increasing the rate of inflation is one of the primary 
motives behind the ECB’s recent QE programme. Hence, at a first glance, the lack of rising 
inflation seems to refute the “tragedy of the euro”. However, as the ECB continues to enhance 
the monetary base, it increases the risk of creating a ‘ketchup effect’, i.e. a sudden 
acceleration in inflation which may be very difficult to contain (Homburg 2011a,                   
Mayer 2015). Under this regard, the externality of rising prices could unfold without any 
warning, leaving the ECB little time to react. 
Could this “tragedy of the euro” be prevented by reaching a political settlement? After all, 
the 19 different Eurozone governments share an important goal: they do not want the common 
to disappear. In addition to that, these governments have a number of advantages compared to 
the herdsmen in Hardin’s (1968) example. Firstly, they have a significant number of advisors 
who sensitize them to the weaknesses of their monetary union. The Eurozone is home to a 
large number of highly specialized economists (in addition to the many foreign economists 
who also participate in the debate), whose very purpose it is to advise its policymakers in 
economic matters. Secondly, the large impact of the Great Recession and the sovereign debt 
crisis has almost resulted in the financial collapse of a number of its member states. Hence, 
unlike Hardin’s (1968) herdsmen, the Eurozone’s policymakers have recently been living 
under a substantial fear of losing their common. If their policy choices are affected by past 
experience, it could be expected that they exploit the common resource more carefully in the 
future. And thirdly (and most importantly), the individual countries’ governments can interact 
with each other. They are able to develop a rule-based system in accessing the common 
resource, and they may punish any member who does not obey these rules.  
Therefore, it has to be asked why a political settlement should be out of reach. If the 19 
different governments want to sustain their common resource, and if their recent                 
experience has demonstrated that reckless overuse might threaten exactly that, it should be in                          
the best interest of each government to reach a sustainable agreement. Four possible                            
solutions have been presented earlier in this section. If it is assumed that, for each                                    
                                                          
106
  Due to the limited scope of the present analysis, Section 6.2 does not discuss the ‘tragedy of the euro’ in its 
entire complexity. However, the abbreviated overview given in the present section suffices to highlight the 
most important implications for the Eurozone. For further detail, see Bagus (2011), Dinger, Steinkamp and 
Westermann (2012), Tornell (2013), and Wolf (2013). 
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government, all of these solutions are preferable to an unregulated breakdown of the common, 
it should be possible to avoid the “tragedy of the euro”. 
In order to answer to this presumption, it is important to add two additional dynamics to 
the discussion. Firstly, unlike Hardin’s (1968) herdsmen, the different countries are not 
homogenous. Some of them might consider the access to the common resource as essential for 
their own survival, while other countries would not be willing to save it at all costs. Imagine 
that, in addition to the common, the herdsmen possess private land as well. But while some of 
the herdsmen own impressive estates which are only a bit smaller than the common, others 
only own a very little parcel. Some of the herdsmen might not own any land at all. 
Consequently, this also results in different incentives in overconsuming the common resource. 
Secondly, governments may prefer to follow a short-sighted political rationale rather than a 
long-term economic one. In any democracy, politicians are oriented towards the next election, 
as the maximization of the election result is equivalent to the maximization of their own 
welfare. Because of this, they tend to favor policies which are seen as popular among the 
voters, and to shy at any policy measure which is expected to be unpopular. When financing a 
public project, for instance, any government has an incentive to raise the necessary funds via 
public borrowing instead of raising taxes or reducing transfers, which would be unpopular 
among the voters. While doing so may be entirely rationale from the government’s point of 
view, it increases the debt burden of the subsequent generation and decreases the country’s 
financial stability in the long run. 
It follows that a twofold “tragedy of the euro” is taking place on an international as well as 
on an intertemporal level (Homburg 2012). A political solution is hampered by deviating (and 
sometimes even diametrically opposed) preferences among the different member countries 
and by a tendency to favor short-term political gains over long-term stability. Under this 
regard, it may be explained why a far-reaching reform of the existing monetary and fiscal 
framework seems unlikely. 
Consider the first scenario, under which the Eurozone’s member states would adopt a US-
type of fiscal federalism. This would prevent individual governments from increasing 
government deficit and public debt beyond sustainable levels. It would also enable a federal 
authority to legally and frequently conduct fiscal transfers between the Eurozone’s regions, 
which would accelerate economic convergence within the union. For these reasons, the 
implementation of fiscal federalism could benefit the Eurozone’s long-term stability. 
However, ceding their fiscal competences will be considered as unacceptable by most 
governments. On the one hand, those governments which have benefitted from massively 
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increasing their levels of public debt (particularly in the Periphery and in a number of Core 
countries, see Figure 66) would fear that a fiscal authority might force them into austerity, as 
this would cost them the popular support of their voters. On the other hand, the governments 
in the wealthier and financially more stable countries (such as Germany) anticipate that such a 
federation would result in a constant outflow of fiscal transfers towards less wealthy regions. 
Not only would these governments fear that such transfers would develop poorer                      
countries at the expense of their own economic growth, but they also remember the negative                        
public reaction towards the ‘bail-out’ and ‘rescue packages’ during the sovereign debt               
crisis. Hence, the formation of a fiscal federation (i.e., a European state) constitutes a                           
very unlikely scenario. 
The same is true for the case of a significant strengthening of the fiscal framework under 
avoidance of fiscal federalism. While this would increase the Eurozone’s efficiency and 
reduce its vulnerability to economic shocks in the long run, it is not in the short-term interest 
of the national governments. As has been shown in Figure 66, only a single Core country 
(Luxembourg) and none of the Periphery countries currently meet the SGP’s deficit and debt 
criteria. Hence, the vast majority of the governments would have no interest in enforcing the 
existing rules if doing so might result in their own punishment and in the loss of popular 
support. In addition to that, the enforcement of fiscal discipline would prevent the emergence 
of high levels of debt in the future. As the different governments might feel that this could 
corrode their capabilities to accommodate their voters and to react to future crises, the 
significant strengthening of the fiscal framework is therefore highly unlikely as well. 
The third possible scenario constitutes the separation of the monetary union into smaller 
and rather optimal currency areas. The idea behind this is that currency unions may be more 
stable if they are comprised of rather similar members. As has been shown in Section 5.2.1, 
the Core and Periphery countries strongly differ in their monetary policy requirements. 
Hence, a “Core Zone” and a “Periphery Zone” (with the members of the New country group 
being divided among these two monetary unions) could prove to be more stable than the 
current Eurozone.
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 For instance, this would enable a possible “Core Central Bank” to raise 
its target rate without harming the Periphery. Another initial result would be the appreciation 
of the “Core euro” towards the Periphery’s counterpart. However, such a divide of the 
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  There have been a large number of varying proposals on how the Eurozone could reasonably be divided. For 
instance, Mayer (2013) hypothesizes a North-South divide via the formation of a “Mediterranean Council” 
and a “Central and Norther European Council”. In this scenario, the “Central and Northern European 
Council” would launch a parallel currency – the CeN – which would appreciate against the euro. The 
European Union would essentially become “an organizational wrapper for the unions within the union”. The 
remaining EMU members plus Norway, Switzerland and Turkey would eventually either join one of the two 
currency areas, or keep their own currencies while joining a new pan-European free trade area (the EUFTA). 
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Eurozone would not solve the “tragedy of the euro”, as the governments’ incentives to 
increase their revenues from seigniorage and to finance their deficits via the central bank 
would remain unchanged. Without political unification, both monetary unions would share the 
fate of the former Eurozone. Hence, such a separation would only lead to additional costs 
while delaying a sustainable solution of the “tragedy of the euro” (Homburg 2013b).  
The final possible scenario calls for a dissolution of the Eurozone. The rationale behind 
this is straightforward: If the “tragedy of the euro” is not solvable, the individual member 
countries could be better off by leaving the currency union than by delaying the detrimental 
status quo for two reasons. Firstly, the threat of ‘diversity stagnation’ would be overcome as 
each country could conduct an individual monetary policy suitable to its own needs. And 
secondly, the danger of a common fiscal recklessness would be prevented. Each country 
would be forced to maintain a higher degree of fiscal discipline since it could not count on a 
bail-out in case of financial instability. And even if a country would continue to run 
unsustainable levels of deficits and debts, these individual actions would not be conducted at 
the expense of other European states. 
However, this last scenario – while it could lead to higher stability and better performance 
in the long run – is unacceptable from the point of view of most governments. To begin with, 
some of the governments have greatly benefitted from financing their deficits at the ECB and 
from the income generated via seigniorage. Dissolving the monetary union would mean to 
lose access to this common resource. Coupled with the need of maintaining a higher degree of 
fiscal sustainability in the future, the governments in the more indebted countries would fear 
that this could cost them the support of their voters. This fear is reinforced by the fact that the 
dissolution of the Eurozone would necessitate these governments to settle their TARGET2 
liabilities (see Figure 67).  
In addition to that, the common currency is a strong symbol, as it has always been 
advertised as an important milestone towards European integration. Giving it up would be 
regarded as a setback for the idea of a united Europe (irrespective of whether or not this might 
be true). The inhabitants of the Core and Periphery countries have become used to the euro, 
and the announcement of a new currency reform would spark fears and insecurities. This 
creates a strong incentive for the current governments to sustain the euro, as none of them 
would want to be held responsible for its failure. 
It follows that, while the dissolution of the Eurozone could possibly lead to higher stability 
in the long run, it might constitute the least preferred scenario from the individual 
governments’ point of view. The animosity towards this option is exemplified by the strong 
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reluctance of most governments to even discuss its possibility. Hence, when Draghi (2012) 
announced that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro, he also                  
reflected the sentiments of these governments, who are willing to go to great lengths in                            
order to serve this goal. As Homburg (2011a) put it, the Eurozone’s policymakers will                      
therefore exhibit a high degree of creativity in protracting the dissolution of the Eurozone                              
for as long as possible. 
What are the implications for the future of the Eurozone? Sections 5 and 6 have clearly 
presented the weaknesses of the current monetary and fiscal framework and the need for a 
reform. The current status quo is untenable, as it impairs the economic performance of the 
different member countries and promotes the conduct of unsustainable policies. But while 
further fiscal integration – and possibly even the dissolution of the Eurozone – would be 
preferable to the preservation of the current situation, the implementation of such a profound 
reform is highly unlikely. The conflicting preferences of its member countries and the 
incentives of their governments consolidate the status quo and prevent a political solution. 
Neither the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy nor a frequently discussed fiscal stimulus 
will solve the Eurozone’s macroeconomic problems, as they fail to address the fundamental 
problem which lies within the tragedy of the commons (Tornell and Westermann 2012, 
Duprat 2015). The twofold “tragedy of the euro”, which will most likely continue to diminish 
the Eurozone’s economic potential, is therefore adequately summed up by the words of 
Orphanides (2014): 
The tragedy for Europe is that politics has dominated over economics. This has resulted in 
an unbalanced and divisive incidence of the costs of the crisis across the euro area. The euro 
was meant to complete the European project. Instead, its laws have been exploited for local 
political gain to the detriment of Europe. 
– Orphanides (2014) 
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7 Conclusion and Recommendation for Further Research 
Does the Eurozone face an acute threat of entering an era of secular stagnation due to a 
permanently negative natural real rate, as defined by Summers (2014a, 2014b)? Finding an 
answer to this question was the primary motivation behind this paper. To this end, a 
contemporary estimate for the Eurozone’s natural real rate was obtained. While it was found 
that the rate had significantly decreased in recent years (from 2.14% in 01/1997 to 0.45% in 
03/2015), it had not become negative and was located more than one percentage point above 
the actual real rate. This constitutes an important contribution to the debate on secular 
stagnation: While many scholars assume that the Eurozone’s natural real rate has become 
negative based on theoretical considerations, the empirical assessment of the present paper 
refuted this proposition. As a possible explanation of this contradiction, it was hypothe-     
sized that the prevalent formal contributions to secular stagnation – particularly the model 
developed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) – suffer from the exclusion of land. 
In addition to that, it has been investigated whether the Eurozone might suffer from secular 
stagnation in the long run, as defined as an enduring decrease in potential output growth per 
capita. While it was found that the ‘headwinds’ defined by Gordon (2012, 2014) might pose a 
challenge to future economic growth, current evidence is by far not sufficient to justify the 
notion of a protracted stagnation. Similarly, it was also deemed unlikely that secular 
stagnation could be triggered by a slower expansion of the technological frontier. While it is 
generally difficult to make accurate predictions on future technological growth, a protracted 
slowdown seems improbable given the improvements in human capital and the ever 
increasing share of global resources devoted to R&D.  
Based on the author’s estimate of the Eurozone’s natural real rate, a variant of the Taylor 
rule has been implemented in order to assess the appropriateness of the ECB’s single 
monetary policy between 1999 and 2015. It was found that the target rate set by the ECB has 
largely been adequate for the Eurozone as a whole given the decline in the natural real rate. 
But at the same time, it was far from ideal from the perspective of the different country 
groups (let alone from the individual member countries’ point of view). The monetary                
policy needs of the Core and Periphery have not converged, but rather diverged                                        
after the implementation of the euro (and particularly after the onset of the Great                                  
Recession). Because of these large inter-state differences, the ECB has not been able to                         
implement a target rate where “one size fits all”. Hence, the common monetary policy                               
prevents the Eurozone’s member states from fully exploiting their economic potential and 
might even lead to a reduction of said potential in the future. As this development is unlikely 
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to be reversed in the near future, the present paper coins the term ‘diversity stagnation’ and  
argues that this threat should be regarded as much more acute than the alleged threat                      
of secular stagnation. 
In order to compile a solution for the threat of ‘diversity stagnation’, a comparison with the 
USA was conducted. It was found that, unlike the ECB, the Fed is able to set an appropriate 
target rate for its different districts due to a lower variation in the monetary policy 
requirements. A subsequent investigation of the Eurozone’s fiscal and monetary framework 
showed that two factors are particularly causative for the failure of emulating the US-
American experience: the lack of fiscal federalism on the one hand and weak enforcement of 
the existing legal framework on the other hand.  
Based on these findings, it was discussed whether the Eurozone could overcome the 
problems of ‘diversity stagnation’ and unsustainable fiscal policies by means of a reform of 
its monetary and fiscal framework. Four different scenarios – ranging from the 
implementation of fiscal federalism to a dissolution of the Eurozone – were highlighted. 
While it was argued that most of these suggestions could improve the Eurozone’s economic 
outlook, the realization of any of these propositions is highly unlikely. The different 
governments, influenced by inter-state rivalries and focused on short-term political gains 
instead of long-term economic efficiency, tend to favor the status quo over the 
implementation of a far-reaching reform. This results in a classic example of the tragedy of 
the commons which will most likely continue to impair the Eurozone’s stability and  
economic performance. 
In summary, the present analysis answers the research questions formulated in Section 1 as 
follows. The Eurozone does not face a serious threat of entering an era of secular stagnation, 
neither in the short to medium term (research question 1a) nor in the long run (research 
question 1b). If the decline in the natural real rate is taken into account, the ECB’s target rate 
has largely been appropriate for the Eurozone as a whole, but not for the individual member 
states or the aggregated country groups (research question 2). Inter-state differences pose a 
major obstacle for the Eurozone, as the ECB is unable to conduct a monetary policy which 
accomodates the different member countries’ needs. This erodes the Eurozone’s economic 
potential and may lead to a prolonged ‘diversity stagnation’. Furthermore, the different 
incentives among its member states and the insuffiently enforced legal framework encourage 
the conduct of unsustainable fiscal policies (research question 3). Far-reaching reforms of the 
monetary and/or fiscal framework could improve the Eurozone’s economic outlook. But 
while several possible scenarios exist, all of them are conflicting with the incentives of the 
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different national governments. Hence, it seems unlikely that the Eurozone’s macroeconomic 
problems will be overcome in the near future (research question 4). 
This analysis concludes by delivering three different recommendations for future research. 
Firstly, the development of the Eurozone’s natural real rate of interest should be investigated 
and updated more frequently. While Laubach and Williams’ (2003) estimate of the US 
economy’s natural real rate is updated on a quarterly basis, there exists no such equivalent in 
the case of the Eurozone. Apart from the author’s results, the most recent estimates are those 
of Bouis et al. (2013) and Rawdanowicz et al. (2014), whose observation period ended              
more than two years ago. As the natural real rate represents a central element in the                 
recent debate on secular stagnation, a regular update would provide valuable information to 
the academic world. 
Secondly, it is recommended that the debate on secular stagnation pays more attention to 
the importance of land, which is currently ignored by the majority of academic contributions. 
As shown by Homburg (1991, 2014), overaccumulation – and, consequently, secular 
stagnation – may not occur if the economy is endowed with land. To this end, Eggertsson and 
Mehrotra’s (2014) formal model, which has recently established itself as a prevalent 
theoretical framework for analyzing secular stagnation, should be extended in order to 
accommodate the factor land. 
Thirdly, it is proposed that ‘diversity stagnation’ – the loss in efficiency and potential 
output that results from the Eurozone’s common monetary policy – should be quantified along 
with the benefits associated with it (such as the gains from trade and competition). If the net 
effect of the single currency turns out to be negative, this result would constitute a strong 
argument for a far-reaching reform (or, on the other hand, for a dissolution) of the Eurozone. 
This could make it more difficult for European governments to avoid any public discussion on 
a profound change of the status quo. But even if the net effect remains positive, a 
quantification of the sizable economic losses could make it more apparent to the public               
that the common currency does not come without its costs, and that there is significant                    
room for improvement. 
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